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1  Introduction 
If you ask a psychologist to assess a person’s cognitive ability, he or she will most 
probably apply an intelligence test and make a statement based on the person's intelligence 
quotient (IQ). And there are good reasons for this since IQ is the standard measure for 
cognitive ability and has a long research tradition in psychological science. 
The foundation for the research of individual differences in cognitive abilities lies in 
the 1880s. Galton (1883) examined participants in his anthropometric laboratory with a test 
battery containing perceptual discrimination tests, memory tests, and association tests. Cattell 
and colleagues (Cattell & Farrand, 1896) continued Galton’s work and developed a battery of 
mental tests for the selection of university applicants. This battery contained reaction time 
tests, perceptual discrimination tests, and memory tests. In a similar fashion, Münsterberg 
(1891) developed mental tests for the measurement of verbal associations, calculating ability, 
reading ability, and memory ability. These early approaches to the measurement of mental or 
cognitive ability consisted of sensory perception tests and rather simple cognitive tasks. The 
performance in these tests only correlated moderately (Sharp, 1899; Wissler, 1901) which 
means that a person who showed an above average performance in one task did not 
necessarily show an above average performance in another task. This started the discussion 
about the structure of cognitive abilities. 
Spearman (1904) was one of the first who formulated a model of the structure of 
mental or cognitive abilities. He tested school children and reported that their performance in 
various sensory discrimination tasks was positively correlated. Based on this finding, he 
concluded that there is a general mental ability factor that he called g-factor that determines 
the performance in all mental tasks. This laid the foundation for characterizing cognitive 
ability with a single score which has later been called IQ (Stern, 1911). Spearman also 
suggested that there are (task-)specific ability factors that are independent of g. However, 
Spearman’s test battery contained sensory discrimination tasks only and therefore, the 
generalizability of his model may be limited. His work nonetheless laid the foundation for 
further structural models of cognitive ability. Burt (1949) and Vernon (1950) used a broader 
range of cognitive tasks (e.g., memory tests, association tests, arithmetical tests, and spatial 
tests) and refined Spearman’s model. Like Spearman, they suggested that there is a general 
cognitive ability factor. However, they further proposed that the specific ability factors do 
overlap and that this overlap can be explained by more general group factors. For example, 
Vernon (1950) suggested that the performance in cognitive tasks is determined by task 
specific ability factors. These tasks specific factors do overlap and therefore can be grouped 
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into minor group factors like mathematical ability, reading, spelling, or spatial ability. 
Likewise, the minor group factors can be combined into more general major group factors 
like a verbal-educational factor or an inductive factor. In turn, the overlap between the major 
group factors can be explained by a single g-factor that corresponds to Spearman’s general 
mental ability factor. 
The idea of a hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities was also proposed by Cattell 
(1963). He suggested that the performance in cognitive tasks is determined by specific first 
order factors like figural relations, memory spam, or induction. In turn, these first order 
factors can be grouped into second order factors that he called fluid and crystallized 
intelligence. According to Cattell, fluid intelligence is the ability to adapt to and solve new 
problems whereas crystallized intelligence is the product of learning and prior experience. 
Initially, Cattell suggested that fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence are two 
independent factors at the top of his ability model. However, empirical investigations (e.g. 
Horn & Cattell, 1966) have shown that there is an overlap between these second order factors 
and hence Cattell suggested that this overlap may be explained by a general, third order factor 
that may be seen as equivalent to Spearman’s g-factor. 
Considering the various structural models of cognitive abilities and the various 
measurement methods involved, Jäger (1984) systematized the available tasks that have been 
used to measure cognitive ability. He suggested that these tasks can be classified by the 
cognitive operations that are necessary to solve the tasks and the task’s contents. According to 
Jäger, the cognitive operations are speed of operation, memory, creativity, and processing 
capacity and the contents can be figural, verbal, or numeric. In Jäger’s terms, a participant 
solves a numerical series task by applying his operational processing to numeric content. 
Likewise, a participant solves a number-digit test by applying his speed of operation to verbal 
content. Factor analyses (e.g., Jäger, 1982) revealed that individual performance differences 
can be explained by the four operational factors and by the three content factors. Jäger’s 
investigations further suggested the existence of a general ability factor. 
Maybe the most comprehensive structural intelligence model is Carroll’s (1993) three 
strata theory of intelligence. Based on reanalyses of over 460 factor analytic studies, he 
suggested a hierarchical model of cognitive ability. On the lowest level (stratum 1) there are 
64 different specific ability factors like reading comprehension, memory span, general sound 
discrimination, numerical facility, or simple reaction time. According to Carroll, these 
specific abilities are correlated and therefore, may be grouped into eight general ability factors 
(stratum 2) which are fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, general memory and 
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learning, broad visual perception, broad auditory perception, broad retrieval ability, broad 
cognitive speediness, and processing speed. On the top of the hierarchy (stratum 3) there is 
one general ability factor that explains the correlations between the stratum 2 factors. 
In summary, the majority of structural models of cognitive ability suggest a 
hierarchical structure of cognitive abilities with one single ability factor at the top of the 
hierarchy. This general ability factor or g-factor may be seen as a disposition to be successful 
in various situations or tasks and was described as the ability to be successful in a culture 
(Hofstätter, 1957), the ability to act purposeful and to think reasonable (Wechsler, 1975), or 
the ability to understand complex information, to think deductive, and learn from experience 
(Neisser et al, 1996). From a statistical point of view, the g-factor may be seen as the 
proportion of individual differences that is consistent across very different cognitive tasks. 
Sternberg and Gigorenko (2002) say that g is able to explain about 50% of the performance 
variance in very different cognitive tasks. Furthermore, g has been shown to be the most 
powerful predictor of educational attainment and professional success (e.g., Ng, Eby, 
Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005; Salgado et al, 2003; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). This underlines 
the significance and relevance of IQ as a measure of a single general cognitive ability factor. 
The different hierarchical models of cognitive abilities have in common that there is 
one general ability factor at the top of their structure. However, they vary in the number and 
width of specific ability factors. Early investigations used quite homogeneous tasks to 
investigate cognitive ability, which led to rather simple structural models (Spearman, 1904). 
Subsequent investigations used a much wider range of tasks (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 
1963; Jäger, 1984; Vernon, 1950), which led to more comprehensive and more fine-grained 
structural models. These hierarchical models may be seen as a framework, in which different 
ability constructs can be integrated. Such a systematization of abilities or tasks may explain 
the relation between different models of cognitive ability. In particular, Carroll’s three strata 
theory offers a very comprehensive framework to integrate various ability components. For 
example, the stratum 2 factor visual perception of Carroll's model may be seen as an 
equivalent to the grouping factor spatial ability in Vernon's model or the spatial content factor 
in Jäger's model. Likewise, memory span is a stratum 1 factor in Carroll's model as well as a 
level 1 ability factor in Cattell's model. Similarly, fluid intelligence is a stratum 2 factor in 
Carroll's model as well as an element of Cattell’s model (as a second order factor) or 
Vernon’s model (as the major group factor induction). In a similar vein, Jäger's Berlin 
intelligence model allows one to classify cognitive tasks by the contents of the tasks or by the 
cognitive operations that are used. For example, Cattell’s Culture Fair Intelligence Test which 
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was developed as an indicator of fluid intelligence may be described as a product of figural 
content and processing capacity in Jäger’s model. 
However, there are also ability factors that have not been integrated into these 
hierarchical models so far. These ability factors may characterize cognitive ability beyond IQ. 
The present thesis investigated two such constructs which were implicit learning and dynamic 
decision making. The usefulness of these constructs was evaluated in three ways. First, I 
evaluated the incremental construct validity of implicit learning and dynamic decision 
making. In particular, I evaluated whether implicit learning and dynamic decision making are 
divergent from measures of psychometric intelligence and I evaluated how they fit into 
hierarchical models of cognitive ability. Second, I evaluated the predictive validity of these 
constructs. In particular, I investigated whether implicit learning and dynamic decision 
making can incrementally predict success in real life. Third, I evaluated the psychometric 
properties of the measures of implicit learning and dynamic decision making. In particular, I 
investigated whether these measures are reliable, stable over time, and consistent across 
different tasks. The results of these investigations are reported in four manuscripts: 
 
Manuscript 1: Danner, D., Hagemann, D., Schankin, A., Hager, M., & Funke, J. (under 
review). Measuring individual differences in implicit learning with an artificial 
grammar learning task. Consciousness & Cognition. 
Manuscript 2: Danner, D., Hagemann, D., Schankin, A., Hager, M., & Funke, J. (under 
review). Can artificial grammar learning tasks measure individual differences in 
implicit learning? Journal of Individual Differences. 
Manuscript 3: Danner, D., Hagemann, D., Holt, D. V., Hager, M., Schankin, A., Wüstenberg, 
S., & Funke, J. (in press). Measuring performance in dynamic decision making: 
reliability and validity of the Tailorshop simulation. Journal of Individual Differences. 
doi: 10.1027/1614-0001/a000055. 
Manuscript 4: Danner, D., Hagemann, D., Schankin, A., Hager, M., & Funke, J. (in press). 
Beyond IQ. A latent state trait analysis of general intelligence, dynamic decision 
making, and implicit learning. Intelligence. doi: 10.1016/j.intell.2011.06.004. 
 
2  Implicit learning 
Implicit learning is most often defined as the ability to learn without being aware that 
something is learned. For example, Shanks and St. John (1994) suggest that “implicit learning 
occurs without concurrent awareness of what is being learned” (p. 369). Some authors refer to 
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the cognitive processes that take place. Mackintosh (1998) describes implicit learning as “the 
product of a basic associative system” (p. 365). Likewise, Mathews et al. (1989) characterize 
implicit learning as “an alternate mode of learning that is automatic, non-conscious, and more 
powerful than explicit thinking” (p. 1083). Other authors also refer to the kind of knowledge 
that is acquired. For example, Reber (1993) describes implicit learning as “largely 
independent of conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge 
about what was acquired” (p.5). In essence, most definitions contain two core aspects. First, 
implicit learning is unintended or even unconscious. Second, the acquired knowledge can not 
be reported.  
Considering implicit learning as a cognitive ability raises the question how implicit 
learning is related to other ability constructs. In particular, it is a theoretically interesting 
question, whether implicit learning is an ability which is independent of psychometric 
intelligence or whether implicit learning can be integrated into a hierarchical model of 
intelligence. Mackintosh (1998) hypothesizes that implicit learning is independent of 
psychometric intelligence. According to him, there are two independent learning systems: an 
implicit, associative learning system and an explicit, hypothesis generating and testing 
system. He suggests that the explicit learning system is necessary for discovering regularities 
with intention and awareness (e.g., in a numerical series task). The implicit learning system, 
on the other hand, detects contingencies without awareness or intention (e.g., judging whether 
a sentence is grammatically correct without being able to report the respective grammatical 
rule). Mackintosh criticizes that standard intelligence tests capture individual differences in 
the explicit system but not individual differences in the implicit learning system. He proposes 
that implicit learning is independent from psychometric intelligence but nevertheless a 
determinant of success in real life. There are several findings that support Mackintosh's 
position. Several studies report low and non-significant correlations between the performance 
on intelligence tests and the performance on implicit learning tasks (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 
2007; Feldman, Kerr, & Sreissguth, 1995; Kaufman et al., 2010; McGeorge, Crawford, & 
Kelly, 1997; Pretz, Totz, & Kaufman, in press; Reber, Walkenfeld, & Hernstadt, 1991). In 
addition, there are performance differences in several domains that can not be explained by 
psychometric intelligence but may be explained by the ability to learn rules implicitly. For 
example, Ceci and Liker (1986) investigated the performance in horse-racing bets. They 
reported that individual differences in betting performance could neither be explained by 
individual differences in reported knowledge nor by individual differences in psychometric 
intelligence. Comparing successful and unsuccessful betters, Ceci and Liker found that both 
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used the same variables to make predictions (e.g., whether a horse has won the last race, the 
condition of the track, or a horse’s lifetime). However, the successful betters used more 
complex interactions between variables to make predictions (e.g., whether a horse has won 
the last race on a specific track against a specific rival). Some authors (e.g., Mackintosh, 
1998) suggest that these complex interactions may represent implicitly learned rules and the 
successful betters may be more successful in implicit learning. In a similar vein, Berry and 
Broadbent (1984) developed a task which they called Process Control. In that task, the 
participants have to control an outcome variable (e.g., amount of sugar produced in a factory) 
by manipulating an input variable (e.g., number of workers hired). Typically, the participants 
are not able to report how the input variable and the outcome variable are connected but there 
are individual performance differences. The performance differences are independent of 
psychometric intelligence (e.g., Berry & Broadbent, 1984; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007) and 
several authors suggested that the participants may have learned the connection between the 
variables implicitly (Berry, Broadbent, 1984; Buchner, Funke, & Berry, 1995; Mackintosh, 
1998). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that implicit learning may be independent of 
psychometric intelligence. Furthermore, there are individual performance differences in some 
cognitive tasks that can not be explained by intelligence but that fit conceptually well with 
implicit learning. Hence, implicit learning may be an interesting ability construct to describe 
and understand human cognitive ability beyond IQ.  
 
3  Dynamic decision making 
Any cognitive task can be seen as a problem that has to be solved: there is a given 
state (e.g., an unsolved item) that has to be transferred into a goal state (e.g., a solved item) 
whereby a barrier has to be overcome (e.g., find a rule). Dörner (1980, 1986) criticizes that 
standard intelligence tests only measure the speed and accuracy of the ability to solve simple 
problems (like an analogical reasoning task) but not the ability to solve complex problems in 
real life (like managing a company). Dörner suggests that real life problems are characterized 
by complexity, connectivity, non-transparency, dynamics, and polythely. For example, an 
analogical reasoning task may be seen as a simple task because there is one default solution 
for a given item and the structure of the task is rather simple (e.g., London is to England as 
Berlin is to Germany because London is the capital of England and Berlin is the capital of 
Germany). On the other hand, managing a company may be seen as a much more complex 
task because it requires considering many variables like the financial situation of the 
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company, employee satisfaction, the demands of the market, and so on. Such a task may also 
be seen as connected since several variables are interdependent (like the demands of the 
market and the financial situation of the company). Furthermore, the task may be seen as non-
transparent because not all information which is necessary to solve the task will be available 
all the time. The task may also be seen as dynamic because the variables (like the demands of 
the market) will change over time, and the task may be seen as polythelic because a problem 
solver may have to solve several subgoals (like satisfying the employees, optimizing the 
production, etc.) to reach the superior goal (manage the company successfully). Dörner’s 
critique laid the foundation for a field of research, which has been called dynamic decision 
making (Gonzalez, Vanyukov, & Martin, 2005) or complex problem solving (Funke, 2010).  
On a conceptual level, the relationship between dynamic decision making and 
psychometric intelligence is unresolved. On the one hand, dynamic decision making and 
psychometric intelligence may be seen as different because they are operationalized 
differently. In particular, Dörner suggested that the demands of items in an intelligence test 
differ from the demands of complex problems (e.g., in terms of complexity or dynamics).  On 
the other hand, dynamic decision making and psychometric intelligence may be seen as 
similar because both ability constructs are defined in a similar way. Neisser et al. (1996) 
described intelligence as the ability to understand complex information, to think deductively, 
and learn out of experience. This agrees with Dörner’s description of complex problem 
solving. Furthermore, Hofstätter (1957) suggested that intelligence is the ability to be 
successful in a culture and Dörner (1980) suggested that complex problems are valid 
representations of real-world problems. Accordingly, there should be a substantial overlap 
between dynamic decision making performance and psychometric intelligence. In line with 
that, some authors even describe intelligence as the ability to solve problems (e.g., Berg & 
Sternberg, 1985).  
Beyond similarities in their definitions psychometric intelligence and dynamic 
decision making have also been described as involving similar cognitive processes. In 
particular, Dörner (1986) suggested that making dynamic decisions requires gathering 
information, elaborating goals, planning decisions, and self-management. For example, in 
order to manage a company, the problem solver has to identify the relevant information (e.g., 
demands of the market, current production status), set objectives (e.g., increase production), 
make plans (e.g., hire more workers and buy new machines in order to increase production), 
and so on. In a similar vein, Funke (2010) suggests that dynamic decision making requires 
complex cognition, which means actively searching for information with the intention to 
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make decisions or to solve problems (see also Knauff & Wolf, 2010). Such a description of 
the problem solving process agrees with Sternberg’s (1977) analyses about what cognitive 
processes are involved in solving items of an intelligence test. In particular, Sternberg 
suggested that solving inductive reasoning items of an intelligence test requires encoding, 
inference, mapping, application, justification, and responding. In summary, despite obvious 
and considerable differences in the tasks used to measure them, dynamic decision making and 
psychometric intelligence also have a lot in common: Conceptually, both constructs are 
described in similar terms and some authors suggest that similar cognitive processes are 
involved when solving complex problems and when solving items of traditional intelligence 
tests. 
However, apart from the constructs’ relation on a theoretical level, it may be even 
more interesting to know how dynamic decision making and psychometric intelligence are 
related on an empirical level. In particular, it is interesting to know whether dynamic decision 
making is an ability that is independent of psychometric intelligence and how dynamic 
decision making fits into a hierarchical model of cognitive abilities. Previous studies found 
non-significant or only small correlations (for an overview, see Kluwe, Misiak, & Haider, 
1991), other studies report significant standardized path coefficients between β = .38 and 
β = .54 from latent intelligence to latent dynamic decision making variables (Kröner, Plass, & 
Leutner, 2005; Rigas, Carling, & Brehmer, 2002; Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004). One study 
even found a correlation between a latent intelligence and a latent dynamic decision making 
variable of r = .84 (Wirth & Klieme, 2003). Given these heterogeneous findings, it is 
undecided whether dynamic decision making is a facet of intelligence or an independent 
ability construct. The present thesis will help to clarify this issue. 
 
4  Some psychometric considerations 
Several studies reported small and non-significant correlations between implicit 
learning variables and psychometric intelligence variables. These findings were interpreted as 
preliminary evidence for the independence of implicit learning and psychometric intelligence. 
That conclusion may not be warranted. In particular, because these studies treated the 
performance measures as trait-like variables which are stable over time and consistent across 
different situations or methods (Stemmler, Hagemann, Amelang, & Bartussek, 2011). This 
might be inappropriate because the variance of a performance measure may capture additional 
factors beyond individual differences in a trait which in turn might affect the correlation with 
other variables. 
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First, a performance measure may also be influenced by the specific measurement 
situation even in standardized experiments. For example, one person may be well rested 
whereas another person may already have worked several hours before testing. One person 
may be motivated to show maximum performance whereas another person may have gotten a 
stinging rebuke by his or her supervisor that day and may not be motivated to perform well. 
This means, that performance in an implicit learning task may not only reflect individual 
ability differences but also individual situational effects. This may decrease the correlation 
between an implicit learning variable and an intelligence variable and thus the correlation may 
not reflect the relation between the ability constructs. Likewise, dynamic decision making 
variables may reflect occasion specific variance which may affect the correlation with 
psychometric intelligence variables. In particular, a dynamic decision making variable with a 
small proportion of occasion specific variance may reveal a substantial relation with an 
intelligence variable, whereas a dynamic decision making variable with a substantial 
proportion of occasion specific variance may reveal a small correlation with an intelligence 
variable. 
Second, a performance measure may be influenced by the specific method being used. 
Hence, there may be individual differences in a performance measurement which are 
triggered by the method. For example, a verbal intelligence test may capture individual 
differences in general intelligence as well as individual differences in speech comprehension 
whereas a figural intelligence test may capture individual differences in general intelligence 
and visual thinking. Thus, individual differences in speech comprehension or visual thinking 
are method specific because they can only be assessed with verbal or figural test material. 
Similarly, a particular implicit learning task may measure performance differences, which are 
specific to this particular task but not to implicit learning ability in general. Thus, method 
specificity may be an additional factor that decreases the correlation between psychometric 
intelligence variables and implicit learning variables. The same applies to dynamic decision 
making variables. A particular dynamic decision making task may not only reflect individual 
differences in dynamic decision making ability but also individual knowledge differences (as 
suggested by Hesse, 1982). A variable with a small proportion of method specific variance 
may reveal substantial correlations with psychometric intelligence variables whereas a 
variable with a substantial proportion of method specific variance may reveal small 
correlations. 
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Third, a performance measure may be influenced by unsystematic measurement error. 
For example, instructions may be ambiguous or persons may accidentally make mistakes, 
which may result in a low reliability of performance measures. These effects may contribute 
unwanted variance in implicit learning variables and dynamic decision making variables and 
hence decrease the correlation with other variables. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to 
investigate the reliability of implicit learning variables in greater detail. 
In essence, the occasion specificity, the method specificity, and the reliability of 
variables may affect the correlation with other variables. Therefore, these factors must be 
taken into account when investigating the relations between these constructs. The present 
work investigates these effects which will help to understand the validity of implicit learning 
and dynamic decision making in greater detail. 
 The consideration that a variable may reflect trait variance as well as occasion 
specific, method specific, and unsystematic variance has been formalized in Steyer and 
colleagues’ latent state-trait theory (Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999). In a nutshell, latent state-
trait theory proposes that the measurement i of a variable Y can be decomposed into a trait ξi, 
a state residual ζi, a method residual ηi, and an unsystematic error residual εi, thus 
Yi = ξi + ζi + ηi + εi. Given the independence of these factors (Steyer et al., 1999), the variance 
of this measurement can be decomposed as σ²(Yi) = σ²(ξi) + σ²(ζi) + σ²(ηi) + σ²(εi), and the 
factor variances may be estimated with a structural equation model as shown in Figure 1. As 
can be seen in this figure, the latent trait factor is defined as a variable that is consistent across 
several measurement occasions and methods, whereas the latent state residual and the method 
factor are specific to the individual measurement occasion or the assessment method. Hence, 
these models allow separating the different contributions of the trait, the measurement 
occasion, and the measurement method to the manifest variables. 
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Figure 1. Latent state-trait structural equation model. Y11 = variable on measurement occasion 
1 with method 1, Y12 = variable on measurement occasion 1 with method 2, Y21 = variable on 
measurement occasion 2 with method 1, Y22 = variable on measurement occasion 2 with 
method 2, ξ = trait variable, ζ1 = state residual 1, ζ2 = state residual 2, η1 = method residual 1, 
η2 = method residual 2, ε1-ε4 = measurement error. 
 
There have been many applications of latent state-trait models in different domains of 
personality research, which demonstrated substantial effects of the measurement occasion or 
the method on behavioral variables (e.g., Eid, Notz, Steyer, & Schwenkmezger, 1994; Schmitt 
& Steyer, 1993; Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Auer, 1990; Yasuda, Lawrenz, Whitklock, Lubin, & 
Lei, 2004; Ziegler, Ehrlenspiel, & Brand, 2009) or physiological variables (e.g., Hermes et al., 
2009; Hagemann, Hewig, Seifert, Naumann, & Bartussek, 2005). However, there have been 
no applications of latent state-trait models on performance variables yet, even if some 
findings suggest that it may be instructive to consider the occasion specificity and method 
specificity of these variables. For example, in some studies the participants completed the 
same dynamic decision making task several times (Süß, Kersting, & Oberauer, 1993; 
Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004) and the performance between subsequent tasks correlated only 
moderately (between r = .37 and r = .62). This points either towards a low reliability or 
towards a substantial occasion specificity of the variables. Moreover, Wirth and Klieme 
(2003) reported structural equation models, which implied a correlation of r = .33 between 
two dynamic decision making tasks (r = .47 when corrected for attenuation) and Gebauer and 
Mackintosh (2007) reported a correlation of r = .15 between two artificial grammar learning 
tasks (r = .21 when corrected for attenuation). This suggests a substantial method specificity 
of the performance measures.  
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Taken together, there are some findings which suggest that implicit learning variables 
and dynamic decision making variables may contain substantial proportions of occasion 
specific or method specific variance. These unwanted variance proportions may affect 
correlations with other variables such as psychometric intelligence and thus these correlations 
may be biased estimates for the relation between constructs. Therefore, one aim of the present 
thesis was to investigate implicit learning variables and dynamic decision making variables 
with latent state-trait models. Thus, these unwanted variance proportions can be controlled 
and the relation between constructs can be estimated without bias. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, a construct has to be measured with at least two different 
methods on at least two different measurement occasions in order to apply latent state-trait 
models. For the purpose of the present thesis, I therefore ran a longitudinal study and 
measured psychometric intelligence, implicit learning, and dynamic decision making with two 
different methods on two different measurement occasions. In addition, I measured several 
indicators of real life performance to investigate whether implicit learning and dynamic 
decision making are determinants of success in real life as suggested by Mackintosh (1998) 
and Dörner (1986). 
 
5  The measurement of psychometric intelligence 
Carroll (1993) has shown that the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven, 
Court, & Raven, 1994) are an excellent marker for psychometric intelligence. Therefore, I 
selected the APM as a first indicator for psychometric intelligence. The Berlin Intelligence 
Structure Test (BIS; Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997) was used as a second indicator for 
psychometric intelligence. The BIS was used because Jäger (1973) carefully selected the tasks 
that he included in the BIS. In particular, he reviewed and systematized 289 different tasks in 
order to obtain a representative sample of available intelligence tasks. Thus, the performance 
in the BIS may be seen as a further valid indicator for psychometric intelligence. 
 
6  The measurement of implicit learning I 
While there are many investigations on how to measure individual differences in 
psychometric intelligence, there is a paucity of investigations on how to measure individual 
differences in implicit learning. However, there are tasks that have been used to investigate 
implicit learning processes and such tasks may also be suitable to investigate individual 
differences in implicit learning. In particular, artificial grammar learning tasks have become 
the standard paradigm to investigate implicit learning (e.g., Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995; 
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Dulany, Carslon, & Dewey, 1984; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Knowlton & Squire, 1994, 
1996; Meuleman & Van der Linden, 2003; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Pothos & Bailey, 
2000; Reber, 1967; Reber et al., 1991; Reber & Perruchet, 2003; Scott & Dienes, 2010; 
Tunney, 2005). In such a task, the participants are asked to learn a list of arbitrary letter 
strings (like WNSNXS). Afterwards they are told that these strings were constructed 
according to a complex rule system or a grammar (see Figure 2 for an example) and they are 
asked to judge new strings (like WNSNXT) as grammatical or non-grammatical. Typically, 
the participants’ judgment accuracy is above chance, which suggests that they learned 
something but they are not able to report the grammar rules, which suggests that they learned 
the rules implicitly. This operationalisation agrees with definitions of the implicit learning 
process. When the participants are asked to learn the letter strings, they do not know that these 
letter strings are constructed according to a grammar. Thus, they are not able to learn the 
grammar intentionally or consciously. In addition, they are not able to report the grammar 
rules. Accordingly, the judgment accuracy in the testing phase of an artificial grammar 
learning task may be used as a valid performance indicator for implicit learning.  
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a grammar that is used in artificial grammar learning tasks. 
Grammatical Stimuli are generated by following any path of arrows (e.g., NWSW). 
 
However, this approach may be limited, in particular, if participants complete an 
artificial grammar learning task more than once. Participants who complete an artificial 
grammar learning task for the first time do not know that the letter strings in the learning 
phase are constructed according to a grammar and thus will not search for grammar rules. 
However, participants who complete an artificial grammar learning task for the second time 
will know that the letter strings in the learning phase are constructed according to a grammar 
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and thus they may intentionally search for the grammar rules. This would violate the 
definition of implicit learning. Therefore, the learning during the second artificial grammar 
task may not be implicit any more and the performance in the second artificial grammar 
learning task may not be a valid indicator for implicit learning performance. The application 
of latent state-trait models requires the participants to complete several artificial grammar 
learning tasks several times. Therefore, I first had to investigate whether artificial grammar 
learning tasks can be used more than once for measuring individual differences in implicit 
learning. 
 
6.1  Measuring individual differences in implicit learning with an artificial grammar 
learning task (Manuscript 1) 
In order to use an artificial grammar learning task more than once, Gebauer and 
Mackintosh (2007) suggested modifying the standard procedure of artificial grammar learning 
tasks. In particular, they asked their participants to learn a list of grammatical strings in a 
learning phase. Afterwards, in a testing phase, they did not inform the participants that the 
strings were constructed according to a grammar but they asked their participants to rate the 
presented letter strings as “old” (already presented in the learning phase) or “new” (not 
presented before). Indeed all presented strings were new, but half of them were grammatical 
and the other half was not. Grammatical strings rated as “old” and non-grammatical strings 
rated as “new” were counted as correct answers. The idea behind this procedure may be that 
the participants learned something about the grammar, thus felt familiar with a grammatical 
string and this is why they classified a grammatical string as an “old” one.  
In line with this reasoning, there are several authors who suggest that novelty 
judgments and grammaticality judgments are conceptually similar. For example, Whittlesea 
and Leboe (2000) demonstrated that several heuristics (fluency, generation, and resemblance) 
influence the performance in recognition as well as classification tasks. The authors suggest 
that these heuristics affect the perceived familiarity of stimuli and that familiarity affects 
novelty judgments as well as grammaticality judgments (see also Kinder, Shanks, Cock, & 
Tunney, 2003; Scott and Dienes, 2008; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). However, as 
noted by Whittlesea and Loboe (2000) “that does not mean that classification and recognition 
decisions that are performed heuristically will ordinarily be correlated” (p. 101). Therefore, 
one aim of this study was to test whether asking subjects for novelty measures the same 
construct as asking for grammaticality. 
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Another aim of this study was to investigate whether the performance in an artificial 
grammar learning task is independent of reportable grammar knowledge when several 
artificial grammar learning tasks are completed. Therefore, I developed a bi- and trigram 
knowledge test. The bi- and trigram knowledge test was developed with reference to 
Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) who suggest that the participants may not use abstract grammar 
knowledge to make grammaticality decisions but heuristics like bigrams. In a similar fashion, 
other authors suggest that the participants may use fragments (Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 
1984) or chunks (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990). Therefore, I asked the participants to 
rate whether a bi- or tri-gram occurred more often in grammatical or more often in non-
grammatical strings. A zero correlation between n-gram knowledge and accuracy would 
indicate that the participants did not use bi- or trigrams for their judgments, whereas a positive 
correlation between n-gram knowledge and accuracy would indicate that the participants may 
have used bi- or trigrams for their judgments. 
I performed a series of experiments, which manipulated whether the participants had 
to rate the grammaticality of strings in the testing phase (“classical” procedure) or the novelty 
of strings in the testing phase (modified procedure). There were three central findings of these 
experiments. First, the reliability estimates of the judgment accuracy variables were rather 
small (between 0.00 and 0.66). This replicates the findings of Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) 
and Reber et al. (1991) who also reported small reliability estimates for the performance in 
artificial grammar learning tasks. Second, the instruction to rate the novelty of letter strings 
does not allow one to measure the same construct as the instruction to rate the grammaticality 
of letter strings. This means that even if both instructions may be seen as similar on a 
conceptual level (Kinder, Shanks, Cock, & Tunney, 2003; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 
1989; Whittlesea and Loboe, 2000), they differ substantially on an empirical level. Therefore, 
novelty judgments are not equivalent to grammaticality judgments. Third, if participants 
complete a “classical” artificial grammar learning task for the first time, there is a zero 
correlation between the judgment accuracy and the amount of reportable grammar knowledge. 
However, if participants complete a “classical” artificial grammar learning task for the second 
time, there is a substantial correlation between the judgment accuracy and the amount of 
reportable grammar knowledge. Furthermore, the performance in a first artificial grammar 
learning task does not significantly correlate with the performance in following artificial 
grammar learning tasks but the performance in a second artificial grammar learning task 
correlates significantly with the performance in a third artificial grammar learning task. This 
suggests that the performance in a first artificial grammar learning task may be seen as an 
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indicator of implicit learning whereas the performance in subsequent artificial grammar 
learning tasks may not be seen as implicit any more. 
The findings of this first study suggest that artificial grammar learning tasks may only 
be used once to measure individual differences in implicit learning. However, there is also an 
alternative interpretation. Our participants completed a knowledge test (containing bi- and 
trigrams of letter strings) after every artificial grammar learning task. Therefore, it is also 
possible that the knowledge test and not the grammar awareness changed the participants’ 
strategy and caused the low task consistency as well as the relation with reported knowledge. 
Investigating this hypothesis was the aim of a second study. 
 
6.2  Can artificial grammar learning tasks measure individual differences in implicit 
learning? (Manuscript 2) 
The initial aim of this study was to investigate whether a knowledge test increases the 
correlation between two successively completed artificial grammar learning tasks. Therefore, 
half the participants completed a bigram knowledge test after the first artificial grammar 
learning task (the bigram group) whereas the other half did not (the control group). A first 
result was that the correlation between both artificial grammar learning tasks was smaller in 
the bigram group. Likewise, there was a significant correlation between the performance in 
the second artificial grammar learning tasks and reported bigram knowledge in the bigram 
group, but not in the control group. These results suggest that a bigram knowledge test 
decreases the task consistency of artificial grammar learning tasks and increases the 
correlation between implicit learning performance and reportable grammar knowledge. This 
means, artificial grammar learning tasks may only be used once to measure individual 
differences in implicit learning if the participants complete a bigram knowledge test. 
However, artificial grammar learning tasks may be used for several times if the participants 
do not complete a bigram knowledge test. Therefore, participants can complete several 
artificial grammar learning tasks for several times and latent state-trait models can be used to 
estimate a latent implicit learning trait variable. 
There were some further findings of this study. The reliability estimates of artificial 
grammar learning performance were rather small (between 0.21 and 0.60). This replicates 
previous findings (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Reber et al., 1991) and suggests that the 
performance in artificial grammar learning tasks is substantially affected by unsystematic 
measurement error. 
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In addition, the participants in this study also completed Cattell’s Culture Fair 
Intelligence Test and they were asked to report their final school exams’ grade point average. 
Similar to previous studies (Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2010; McGeorge 
et al., 1997; Pretz et al., in press; Reber et al., 1991) there was only a moderate correlation 
between implicit learning performance and psychometric intelligence. Furthermore, the 
results of this study revealed a significant relation between participants’ final school exams 
and artificial grammar learning performance. This is in line with Kaufman et al. (2010) who 
also showed a significant association between implicit learning performance and educational 
success. However, the association, observed in the present study, became non-significant 
when intelligence was included as a further predictor. This suggests that even though the 
implicit learning variable and the psychometric intelligence variable only correlated 
moderately, the relation between artificial grammar learning performance and educational 
success was due to this overlap. 
 
6.3  The measurement of implicit learning II 
Taken together, the central finding of both studies is that artificial grammar learning 
tasks can be used several times to measure individual differences in implicit learning. The 
present findings suggest that bigram knowledge tests may turn the participants’ attention 
towards bigrams. Thus, the participants may intentionally acquire bigram knowledge in a 
subsequent artificial grammar learning task and learning may not be implicit any more. 
However, if no bigram knowledge test is completed, several artificial grammar learning tasks 
can be used to measure individual differences in implicit learning. Therefore, I used two 
different artificial grammar learning tasks (without bigram knowledge tests) to measure 
individual differences in implicit learning. 
Furthermore, both studies revealed small reliability estimates of the implicit learning 
performance variable. This replicates the findings of Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) and 
Reber et al. (1991). As discussed, a small reliability has implications for the investigation of 
the relation between implicit learning and psychometric intelligence. In particular, a small 
reliability decreases the correlation between two variables. Hence, to investigate the relation 
between implicit learning and psychometric intelligence, I used latent state-trait models to 
control for this lack of reliability. They decompose the variances of the manifest performance 
variables into a trait proportion, a state residual proportion, a method residual proportion, and 
a measurement error proportion. 
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Finally, there is preliminary evidence for a relation between implicit learning and the 
real life criterion educational success. In the present investigation, this relation became non-
significant when psychometric intelligence was included as a predictor. Nevertheless, this 
finding suggests that it may be worthwhile to investigate the relation between implicit 
learning and real life criteria in greater detail. Therefore, I used different indicators of real life 
performance in order to investigate the relation between implicit learning and real life 
performance in the longitudinal study. 
 
7  The measurement of dynamic decision making 
Traditional paper-pencil intelligence tests have been criticized as inadequate methods 
to measure dynamic decision making (Dörner, 1980, 1986). Therefore, several authors 
suggest using computer-based simulations to measure dynamic decision performance. Over 
the years, several dynamic decision making tasks have been developed. For example, the 
Tailorshop scenario (Dörner, 1979; Funke, 1983) simulates a fictional company where the 
participants have to control several variables like the number of workers or the costs for 
advertising in order to maximize their company’s value. Other tasks simulate a forestry 
(Wagener, 2001), a power plant (Wallach, 1998), or a space flight (Wirth & Funke, 2005) 
where the participants have to control several variables to reach a given goal state. These 
simulations have in common that they simulate complex, connected, dynamic, non-
transparent, and sometimes even polythelic environments. 
The Heidelberg Finite State Automaton has become a common instrument for 
measuring individual differences in dynamic decision making, especially since it has been 
included in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA; Wirth & Klieme, 2003). 
Therefore, I chose this simulation as one indicator of dynamic decision making. The scenario 
simulates a space flight where the participants can control a space ship and a vehicle with a 
user interface (see Figure 3). During the simulation, the participants are asked to reach several 
goal states (e.g., landing the space ship on a particular planet) whereby the number of reached 
goal states is taken as a performance indicator for dynamic decision making (Wirth & Funke, 
2005; Wirth & Klieme, 2003).  
 
Cognitive ability beyond IQ  23 
 
Figure 3. Screenshot of the graphical user interface of the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton 
(labels translated). 
 
The simulation corresponds to Dörner’s and Gonzalez’s definition of dynamic 
decision making. In particular, the simulation may be seen as complex, because it consists of 
many variables (e.g., the state of the propulsion, the state of the landing gear). The simulation 
may be seen as connected because the different variables depend on each other (e.g., the 
ability to fly with the space ship depends on the state of the propulsion, the heat shield, the 
landing gear, and the state of the vehicle). The simulation may be seen as non-transparent 
because the participants do not know how the variables in the simulation are connected but 
have to find out while exploring and controlling. Likewise, the simulations may be seen as 
dynamic because each intervention in the simulation influences the following state of the 
simulation. Finally, the simulation may be seen as a polythelic task because it is necessary to 
achieve different subgoals (e.g., controlling the landing gear, the heating shield, the state of 
the vehicle) to achieve a greater goal (e.g., landing the space ship on a particular planet).  
The Tailorshop is another well established dynamic decision making task that has 
been used for several decades (e.g., Barth & Funke, 2010; Leutner, 1988; Putz-Osterloh, 
1981, 1983; Putz-Osterloh, Bott, & Köster, 1990; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981; Süß, Kersting, 
& Oberauer, 1993; Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004). The scenario simulates a small business that 
produces and sells shirts. The participants have to manage this business for twelve simulated 
months by manipulating several variables like the number of workers, the expenses for 
advertising, etc. (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Screenshot of the graphical user interface of the Tailorshop (labels translated). 
 
The Tailorshop was initially developed by Dörner (1979) according to his definition of 
complex problems. In particular, the simulation consists of many variables and connections. 
Therefore, the Tailorshop may be seen as complex. Furthermore, the variables are highly 
connected. For example, the ability to produce shirts in the Tailorshop simulation depends on 
the amount of raw material, the number of machines and workers, the workers’ satisfaction, 
and the state of the machines. In addition, the simulation may be seen as non-transparent 
because the participants do not know how the variables in the simulation are connected but 
have to find out while exploring and controlling them. The Tailorshop may also be seen as 
dynamic because each intervention in the simulation influences the following state of the 
simulation. Finally, the Tailorshop may be seen as a polythelic task because it is necessary to 
achieve different subgoals (like buying raw material, hire workers, advertising, etc.) to 
achieve the greater goal (maximize the company value). 
However, even if the simulation has become a standard paradigm to investigate 
dynamic decision making, there is a discussion which indicator should be used as a 
performance variable. Some authors suggest using the number of months with a positive trend 
in the company value to quantify dynamic decision making performance (e.g., Funke, 1983) 
whereas other authors suggest using the absolute company value at the end of the simulation 
to quantify the dynamic decision making success (e.g., Barth & Funke, 2010; Süß, Oberauer, 
& Kersting, 1993). In order to find an appropriate performance indicator for the Tailorshop 
simulation, I analyzed the data of the first measurement occasion of the longitudinal study. 
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7.1  Measuring performance in dynamic decision making: reliability and validity of the 
Tailorshop simulation (Manuscript 3) 
In this analysis, I compared two different performance indicators of the Tailorshop 
simulation: the change variable and the trend variable. The change variable corresponds to 
the sum of the changes of the company value between the simulated months (which is 
equivalent to the final company value after twelve simulated months). The trend variable 
corresponds to the number of months with a positive trend in the company value. I used 
structural equation models to test measurement models and estimate the reliability of the 
performance variables. Furthermore, the validity of the performance variables was evaluated 
with respect to their correlation with the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton (convergent 
validity), their correlation with self rated income and supervisor ratings (predictive validity), 
and their correlation with the performance in the Advances Progressive Matrices (divergent 
validity). 
The analysis revealed that the measurement models fitted the trend variables well (in 
particular, the trends between the second month and the twelfth month) but not the change 
variables. Furthermore, the results revealed good reliability and good overall validity for the 
trend of the company value. Hence, I decided to use the number of months with a positive 
trend in the company value (between the second and the twelfth month) as a performance 
measure in the Tailorshop simulation. 
 
8  The measurement of success in real life 
For the purpose of the present study, I focused on a particular aspect of success in real 
life: professional success. For one thing, the predictive validity of psychometric intelligence 
has often been evaluated by its association with professional success (e.g., Ng et al., 2005; 
Salgado et al, 2003; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). Thus, from a theoretical point of view, 
professional success is a useful criterion to evaluate the predictive validity of implicit learning 
and dynamic decision making variables. Second, professional success is an important 
outcome variable in an economic context. Thus, in an applied context, implicit learning or 
dynamic decision making may become interesting selection criteria for university or job 
applications if they are able to predict professional success. 
Dette, Abele, and Renner (2004) systematized different indicators of professional 
success. They suggested that the different indicators may be distinguished by (1) their frame 
of reference (specific task vs. global career), (2) the type of data (e.g., neutral parameter or 
comparison with reference), and (3) the data source (document, self-rating, external rating). 
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For example, a participant’s yearly income may be characterized as an indicator with global 
career as the frame of references. Income can further be seen as a neutral parameter because it 
can be measured objectively and the data source can be either a document (e.g., payroll) or 
self-rated. 
I measured professional success in order to evaluate the relation with individual 
differences in implicit learning and dynamic decision making, which are consistent across 
different methods and stable over time. As different authors noted (e.g., Epstein, 1979; 
Wittmann, 1988), the relation between construct variables and criterion variables can only be 
evaluated accurately if the variables are measured on a similar level of abstraction. In order to 
measure individual differences that are unaffected by method specific effects (such as the type 
of data or the data source), I used indicators of different data types and data sources. In order 
to measure individual differences in professional success that are stable over time, I selected 
the participants’ global career as the frame of reference. In particular, I asked the participants 
to report their yearly income, their highest educational attainment, and I asked the participants 
to rate their social status. Yearly income and educational attainment may be seen as global 
career parameters because they refer to a rather long time period. In the same vein, social 
status may be seen as a global career indicator because it refers to a profession in general and 
not to the social status of a specific task. These three measures served as indicators of 
objective professional success. 
In addition, the participants’ supervisors rated their overall job performance. Hereto, I 
developed a supervisor rating scale. Based on a literature review, I selected 18 items from 
Goodman and Svyantek (1999), Higgins, Peterson, Pihl, and Lee (2007), Tsui and Gutek 
(1984), and Wayne and Liden (1995). Afterwards, N = 18 supervisors from different 
companies and branches rated the appropriateness of these items and I selected the nine items 
that were rated as most appropriate. Then, N = 34 other supervisors (also from different 
companies and branches) rated a total of N = 52 employees with these items. Finally, the five 
items with the greatest item-total correlation (all rit ≥ .80) were selected for the supervisor 
rating scale. 
 
9  The psychometric properties of implicit learning and dynamic decision making 
(reported in Manuscript 4) 
The longitudinal study consisted of two measurement occasions (five months apart) 
and the participants completed the Advanced Progressive Matrices, the Berlin Structure 
Intelligence Tests, the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, the Tailorshop, and two artificial 
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grammar learning tasks (without grammar knowledge tests) on both measurement occasions. I 
used latent state-trait models to decompose the variances of the manifest performance 
variables (Y) into a trait proportion (ξ), a state residual (ζ), a method residual (η), and a 
measurement error residual (ε). Then, I evaluated the measures by their trait specificity, their 
occasion specificity, their method specificity, and their reliability. The trait specificity (also 
referred to as consistency) is the proportion of variance that is stable over time and consistent 
across different methods [σ²(ξ) / σ²(Y)]. The occasion specificity is the proportion of 
individual differences that is specific for a particular measurement situation [σ²(ζ) / σ²(Y)]. 
The method specificity is the proportion of variance that is triggered by a particular method 
[σ²(η) / σ²(Y)]. These parameters have a range between zero and one, and a greater value 
indicates a greater specificity. The reliability is the sum of these systematic variance 
proportions and indicates the proportion of systematic individual differences of the trait, the 
measurement situation, and the method [σ²(ξ) + σ²(ζ) + σ²(η)] / σ²(Y)]. These parameters are 
reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 










APM 1 0.72 0 0.14 0.86 
APM 2 0.70 0 0.13 0.83 
BIS 1 0.67 0 0.22 0.90 
BIS 2 0.71 0 0.24 0.95 
AGL1 1 0.29 0 0 0.29 
AGL1 2 0.31 0 0 0.31 
AGL2 1 0.30 0 0 0.30 
AGL2 2 0.25 0 0 0.25 
Tailorshop 1 0.36 0 0.16 0.52 
Tailorshop 2 0.29 0 0.13 0.42 
HFA 1 0.44 0 0.36 0.80 
HFA 2 0.44 0 0.36 0.80 
Note. APM = Advanced Progressive Matrices, BIS = Berlin Intelligence Structure 
Test, HFA = Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, AGL1 = artificial grammar learning task 
with grammar 1, AGL2 = artificial grammar learning task with grammar 2, N = 173. 
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As can be seen, the measures of psychometric intelligence contained great proportions 
of trait specific variances. This replicates the findings of previous investigations (e.g., Carroll, 
1993; Conley, 1984; Larsen, Hartmann, Nyborg, 2008) and demonstrates that individual 
differences in psychometric intelligence can be measured consistently with different methods 
and that these differences are stable over time.  
The analysis further revealed that the occasion specificity was zero for the implicit 
learning measures. This indicates that no occasion specific effects influenced the 
measurements. For example, the measurement of individual differences in implicit learning 
was not affected by the participants’ awareness that there is a grammar defining the strings in 
the learning phase when they completed an artificial grammar learning task for the second 
time. This replicates the results of my previous studies and suggests that artificial grammar 
learning tasks may be used several times in order to measure individual differences in implicit 
learning. The method specificities were also zero, which indicates that there were no method 
specific effects such as specific characteristics of the grammars that affected the 
measurements. Taken together, the latent state-trait analysis of the implicit learning revealed 
that different artificial grammar learning tasks can be used several times to measure individual 
differences in implicit learning. This suggests that the small reliabilities that have been 
reported in previous studies (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Reber et al., 1991) were not 
caused by occasion specific or method specific effects but due to random measurement error. 
The reliability estimates of the implicit learning variables were rather small (≤ 0.31), which 
indicates that the manifest variables contain great proportions of unsystematic measurement 
error. This indicates that the manifest variables are poor indicators of implicit learning ability. 
These results have two important implications. For one thing, the correlations between the 
performance in artificial grammar learning tasks and the performance in psychometric 
intelligence tests that have been reported in previous studies (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 
2007; McGeorge et al., 1997; Pretz et al., in press; Reber et al., 1991) are insufficient for 
drawing conclusions about the relationship between implicit learning ability and psychometric 
intelligence. The subsequent structural equation model analyses will separate the implicit 
learning trait variance from the unsystematic variance proportions and reveal insights into the 
relation between implicit learning ability and psychometric intelligence. For another thing, the 
small reliability estimates suggest that the manifest performance variables are not suitable for 
an individual assessment because a performance score will only yield an inaccurate 
measurement of a person’s implicit learning ability. 
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The dynamic decision making measures (the Tailorshop and the Heidelberg Finite 
State Automaton) also revealed trait specificities below 0.50 which indicates that less than 
half of the variance of the manifest performance variables reflect individual differences in 
dynamic decision making. The analysis further revealed that both measures contained 
substantial proportion of method specific variance (between 13% and 36%), which suggests 
that the Tailorshop and the Heidelberg Finite Automaton capture different aspects of dynamic 
decision making. In particular, the Tailorshop simulation takes place in an economic context 
where the participants have to lead a company successfully. The Heidelberg Finite State 
Automaton, on the other hand, takes place in a rather futuristic setting where the participants 
have to control a space ship. As Beckmann and Guthke (1995) and Hesse (1982) have shown, 
the semantic context of a dynamic decision making scenario has impact on the decision 
making processes that take place. Thus, the method specificity of the simulations may partly 
be explained by the semantic context in which they take place. This finding has implications 
for the manifest performance variables. For one thing, their trait specificities are too low to 
use these dynamic decision making tasks for individual assessments. A participant’s 
performance in a single task is not sufficient for making inferences about this participant’s 
dynamic decision making ability. For another thing, a correlation with a manifest dynamic 
decision making variable is not sufficient for drawing conclusions about the relation to the 
construct dynamic decision making in general. Structural equation modeling makes it possible 
to investigate the relation with a latent dynamic decision making variable, which is adjusted 
for these method specific effects. 
In sum, the latent state-trait analysis revealed that the manifest implicit learning 
variables and the manifest dynamic decision making variables are poor indicators for the 
ability constructs. Therefore, I investigated the relations between the constructs using latent 
ability variables, which were adjusted for method specific effects and measurement error.  
 
10  The relation between psychometric intelligence, implicit learning, and dynamic 
decision making (reported in Manuscript 4) 
The correlations between the latent ability variables allow one to evaluate the 
construct validity of implicit learning and dynamic decision making. The correlations between 
the latent variables are shown in Table 2. As can be seen, there was a great correlation 
between psychometric intelligence and dynamic decision making (r = .86), which indicates a 
poor divergent validity of dynamic decision making. The latent intelligence variable 
explained about 74% of the variance of the latent dynamic decision making variable. This 
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suggests that dynamic decision making only offers minor insights into cognitive ability 
beyond IQ. This result replicates the findings of Wirth and Klieme (2003) who reported a 
correlation of r = .84 between a latent intelligence variable and a latent dynamic decision 
making variable. The results of the latent state-trait analysis further suggest that the 
heterogeneous findings of previous studies may be due to the heterogeneous reliabilities or 
the heterogeneous method specificities of dynamic decision making variables. In sum, these 














.86***    
implicit learning .32** .26*   
OPS .78*** .52*** .31*  
SR .03 .25* -.02 -.07 
Note. OPS = objective professional success, SR = supervisor ratings, *** p < .001, 
** p < .010, * p < .050, N = 173 
 
On the other hand, the relation between implicit learning and psychometric 
intelligence was less substantial (r = .32), the latent intelligence variable explained only 10% 
of the variance of the latent implicit learning variable. This replicates the findings of previous 
studies that reported low correlations between implicit learning and psychometric intelligence 
(Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Feldman, et al., 1995; Kaufman et al., 2010; McGeorge et al., 
1997; Reber et al., 1991). Besides, the present study investigated the relation between latent 
trait variables which were adjusted for measurement error. Therefore, it can be ruled out that 
the low correlation is a result of the low reliability of the variables. This in turn suggests good 
divergent validity of implicit learning. The ability to learn implicitly is only weakly related to 
psychometric intelligence. 
All correlations between psychometric intelligence, implicit learning, and dynamic 
decision making were positive. Following Spearman (1904), this suggests a hierarchical 
structure of these abilities. I additionally performed a principal component analysis on the 
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correlations between the latent ability variables. This analysis revealed eigenvalues of 2.02, 
0.84, 0.14, which indicates that a single general ability factor can explain about 67% of the 
variance of the latent variables. This result is in line with Sternberg and Gigorenko (2002) 
who suggest that a general ability factor is able to explain about 50% of the variance in 
various performance tasks. To investigate this issue in a greater detail, I used a structural 
equation model. The respective model is shown in Figure 4. As can be seen, a hierarchical 
model with one single ability factor at the top of the hierarchy fitted the data well. 
Furthermore, the specific ability factors for psychometric intelligence and dynamic decision 
making were not significant and thus set to zero. This suggests that the intelligence test as 
well as the dynamic decision making tasks may be seen as indicators for general cognitive 
ability whereas the artificial grammar learning tasks capture general cognitive ability as well 
as an incremental proportion of implicit learning ability. 
 
 
Figure 4. Hierarchical ability model for psychometric intelligence, implicit learning, and 
dynamic decision making. The standardized path coefficients are reported. g = general 
cognitive ability, IQ = psychometric intelligence, DDM = dynamic decision making, 
IL = implicit learning, APM = Advanced Progressive Matrices, BIS = Berlin Intelligence 
Structure Test, HFA = Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, AGL = artificial grammar learning 
task, ε1-ε12 = measurement error variables, χ²(58) = 61.60, p = .348, RMSEA = 0.02, 
CFI = 1.00, N = 173. 
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11  The relation between implicit learning, dynamic decision making, and success in real 
life (reported in Manuscript 4) 
The predictive validity of implicit learning and dynamic decision making can be 
evaluated by their relation to criteria of success in real life. As can be seen in Table 2, there 
was a significant correlation between implicit learning and objective professional success 
(indicated by income, social status, and educational attainment). However, a latent regression 
analysis revealed that this relation decreased and became non-significant when psychometric 
intelligence was included as a predictor. In addition, the correlation between implicit learning 
and supervisor ratings was close to zero and not significant. These findings suggest that there 
is no incremental predictive validity of implicit learning. 
There was also a substantial and significant correlation between dynamic decision 
making and objective professional success. Again, a latent regression analysis revealed that 
this relation decreased and became non-significant when psychometric intelligence was 
included as a predictor. In addition, there was a significant correlation between dynamic 
decision making and supervisor ratings. More importantly, this association remained 
significant when adjusted for psychometric intelligence. This indicates the incremental 
predictive validity of dynamic decision making. Thus, even if dynamic decision making is not 
much more than psychometric intelligence, this little more offers insights into aspects of 
success in real life that can not be explained by psychometric intelligence.  
The results reported so far refer to latent variables that were adjusted for method 
specific effects or measurement error. However, in an applied context it may be worthwhile to 
know, how manifest measures can predict manifest criteria. For example, a company which is 
conducting an assessment center may wish to know how the performance scores of a 
particular task are related to supervisor ratings. Therefore, I additionally investigated the 
correlations between the manifest variables. In sum, the greatest correlations were between 
the measures psychometric intelligence and the indicators of objective professional success 
(between r = .22 and r = .48). The correlations with the manifest dynamic decision making 
variables were less substantial (between r = .05 and r = .23) as were the correlations with the 
manifest implicit learning variables (between r = -.04 and r = .19). The supervisor ratings 
only correlated significantly with the dynamic decision making tasks (between r = .12 and r = 
.20) which indicates that even if the dynamic decision making measures offer an incremental 
predictive value, their explanatory power is limited. 
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12  Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of the present work was to evaluate whether implicit learning and dynamic 
decision making are useful constructs to describe cognitive ability beyond IQ. Therefore, I 
investigated the incremental and the predictive validity of the constructs, and the 
psychometric properties of the performance measures. There are six core findings of my 
investigations. First, implicit learning is only weakly related to psychometric intelligence, 
even after adjusting for measurement error. This indicates that implicit learning captures 
individual performance differences beyond IQ and suggests a good divergent validity of 
implicit learning. Second, there is a great association between dynamic decision making and 
psychometric intelligence. This speaks against the divergent validity of dynamic decision 
making. Third, implicit learning as well as dynamic decision making can be integrated into 
hierarchical models of cognitive ability. The present findings revealed that both constructs 
load substantially on a general ability factor. In addition, implicit learning reveals a specific 
ability component whereas dynamic decision making captures no incremental variance. 
Fourth, there is no evidence for the incremental predictive validity of implicit learning. In the 
present study, there was only a weak association between implicit learning and professional 
success. Furthermore, this association vanished when adjusted for psychometric intelligence. 
Fifth, dynamic decision making can incrementally predict supervisor ratings, even though 
there is a great overlap between psychometric intelligence and dynamic decision making. This 
was true for the latent ability variables as well as for the manifest performance indicators. 
Hence, even if there are only minor individual differences in dynamic decision making 
beyond IQ, these individual differences can explain success in real life in greater detail. Sixth, 
the trait specificities of the manifest measures of implicit learning and dynamic decision 
making were too small to use these measures for individual assessments. Investigating the 
measurement of implicit learning and dynamic decision making in greater detail will make 
these constructs valuable supplements not only in research contexts but also in applied 
contexts. 
Taken together, these findings show that implicit learning as well as dynamic decision 
making are useful constructs for investigating individual differences in cognitive ability. 
Implicit learning is largely independent of psychometric intelligence and offers insights in 
cognitive ability beyond IQ. Even though there are only minor individual differences in 
dynamic decision making beyond psychometric intelligence, these ability differences play a 
significant role for achieving success in real life. However, in order to use implicit learning 
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tasks and dynamic decision making tasks for an individual assessment, the psychometric 
properties of the performance measures have to be improved. 
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The present study investigates whether an artificial grammar learning task may be used to 
measure individual differences in implicit learning. In three experiments, the participants had 
to rate either the grammaticality or the novelty of letter strings. The results indicate that only a 
task with the instruction to rate the grammaticality but not a task with the instruction to rate 
the novelty measures reliable and consistent individual differences in implicit learning. 
Furthermore, it is shown that when the participants are asked to rate the grammaticality of 
letter strings, the task can only be used once to measure implicit learning. Subsequently, the 
role of strategy use and implications for further and past research are discussed. 
Keywords: implicit learning, artificial grammar learning, individual differences, reliability
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Measuring individual differences in implicit learning  
with an artificial grammar learning task 
Implicit learning is a process of acquiring complex information without awareness of 
what has been learned (Frensch & Rünger, 2003; Frensch, 1998; Seger, 1993). Like in any 
learning process there may be substantive individual differences, but not much is known 
about their magnitude and meaning for a successful completion of cognitive laboratory tasks 
or mastering the challenges of everyday life. Whereas some authors reason that implicit 
learning is executed by evolutionary old systems, is essential for survival and therefore shows 
only minor individual differences (Reber, 1992), others have postulated that individual 
differences in implicit learning may be a powerful determinant of success in educational and 
work achievement and thus may have the same preponderance as general intelligence 
(Mackintosh, 1998). Recently, Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Jiménenz, Brown, and Mackintosh 
(2010) and Pretz, Trotz, and Kaufman (2009) reported significant associations between 
implicit learning performance and academic achievement, which supports Mackintosh’s 
hypothesis. However, beyond these investigations, there is only weak empirical evidence to 
support such claims. One of the major reasons for this may be the lack of a reliable task for 
the measurement of individual differences in implicit learning. The present paper reports on a 
series of experiments that aim to fill this gap by investigating the reliability and the task 
consistency of artificial grammar learning tasks (Reber, 1967), which is a standard procedure 
in implicit learning research. Experiment 1 and 2 will reveal that not every type of artificial 
grammar learning tasks is suitable for the measurement of individual differences. However, 
experiment 3 will demonstrate how the artificial grammar learning task can be used to 
measure reliable individual differences in implicit learning. 
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The artificial grammar learning task 
An artificial grammar learning task consists of a learning phase and a testing phase. In 
the learning phase, the participants are asked to learn a list of apparently arbitrary letter 
strings (like WNSNXS). Afterwards in the testing phase, they are told that these strings were 
constructed according to a complex rule system (a grammar) and they are asked to judge 
newly presented strings (like NWSWWN) as either grammatical or non-grammatical. 
Typically, the participants show above chance performance, which suggests that they learned 
something but they are not able to report the grammar rules, which suggests that they learned 
the rules implicitly. Therefore, implicit learning may be assessed based on two criteria: the 
judgment accuracy in the testing phase and the amount of reportable grammar knowledge.  
Judgment accuracy. The most popular indicator for implicit learning success within 
an artificial grammar learning paradigm is the judgment accuracy, which is commonly 
quantified as the percentage of correct judgments within the testing phase. In particular, a 
mean percentage of correct judgments that is significantly above chance suggests that implicit 
learning took place. 
Grammar knowledge. Artificial grammar learning tasks are labeled implicit learning 
tasks because there appears to be no relation between participants’ judgment accuracy and 
their amount of knowledge about the grammar. However, there is a lively discussion what 
kind of knowledge may be relevant for an artificial grammar learning task and how it should 
be assessed. When we ask the participants to reproduce the underlying grammar, we presume 
that people reach an above-chance accuracy because they learned something about the 
underlying grammar. However, this does not have to be true. Several authors suggested that 
the participants may not learn the grammatical rules implicitly but instead may use heuristics 
like bigrams (Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990), fragments (Dulany, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984), or 
chunks (Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990). In particular, Perruchet and Pacteau 
Cognitive ability beyond IQ    A1 - 6 
 
 
(1990) have conducted a series of experiments and showed that learning bigrams in the 
learning phase is as effective as learning grammatical letter strings and that the classification 
of bigrams corresponds to the classification of letter strings. In the same vein, Dulany et al. 
(1984) have shown that the participants in an artificial grammar learning task can report 
which fragments they use to make grammaticality judgments. Furthermore, they have shown 
that the reported knowledge (containing bi- and trigrams) can predict grammaticality 
judgments. In sum, these findings suggest that knowledge of n-grams (bi-and trigrams) may 
be relevant for the performance in artificial grammar learning tasks. In addition to that, an n-
gram knowledge test may also be seen as an indirect form of other forms of grammar 
knowledge. In particular, using knowledge of n-grams is just one possibility to succeed in an 
n-gram knowledge test. Another strategy may be to use more abstract knowledge and deduce 
the answers for the knowledge. Thus, an n-gram knowledge test may measure different forms 
of grammar knowledge. Therefore, we asked the participants to rate whether an n-gram 
occurred more often in grammatical or more often in non-grammatical strings. A zero 
correlation between n-gram knowledge and accuracy would indicate that the participants did 
not use n-grams for their judgments, whereas a positive correlation between n-gram 
knowledge and judgment accuracy would indicate that the participants may have used n-
grams for their judgments.  
Individual differences and reliability 
The reliability of an implicit learning measure is important for several reasons. First, 
some studies showed that there is no relation between measures of artificial grammar learning 
and measures of knowledge about the underlying grammar (e.g., Reber, & Allen, 1978) or 
general intelligence (e.g., Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2010; McGeorge, 
Crawford, & Kelly, 1997; Reber, Walkenfeld, and Hernstadt, 1991). This is often taken as an 
evidence for the divergent validity of the measurement, i.e. the proposition that individual 
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differences in implicit learning may constitute an independent ability. However, this argument 
only holds true if both measures are reliable. If not, a low correlation between the measures 
may also be explained by the low reliability of the measurement.  
Second, Mackintosh (1998) suggested that implicit learning is a powerful predictor of 
educational or professional success (see also Kaufman et al., 2010; Pretz et al., 2010). If this 
holds true, implicit learning may be a very useful construct to describe human mental ability 
or predict success in later life. However, such a construct would only be useful if it can be 
measured reliably. In particular, if an artificial grammar learning task may be used to measure 
a single person’s implicit learning ability (e.g., as part of an assessment center) then this 
measurement is only useful if it is reliable because otherwise it will yield incorrect decisions.  
Third, when implicit learning is considered as a mental ability or a trait it is also an 
important issue whether this ability can be measured with more than one method (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959). In principle, a great correlation between several procedures that are designed to 
measure the same construct indicates a good convergent validity of the measures. However, 
such a correlation is only informative if the measurements are reliable. 
Given the importance of reliability considerations, it is surprising that there are only a 
few publications that report reliability estimates for measures of artificial grammar learning. 
Reber et al. (1991) examined N=20 students and reported a Cronbach’s alpha of α=.51 for 
100 grammaticality judgments. This result shows that it is possible to measure individual 
differences in implicit learning although this measurement is not very consistent. However, 
one limitation of this study is that only a single grammar was used. Gebauer and Mackintosh 
(2007) assessed N=605 pupils. They used two different grammars and presented 80 letter 
strings in the testing phase. Based on 80 grammaticality decisions they reported a split-half 
correlation of r=.70. Although this sample was much larger, there may be another difficulty in 
their study. Gebauer and Mackintosh conducted two artificial grammar learning tasks and 
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reported the split-half correlation pooled over both tasks. However, the mean accuracy in task 
one was 67.08%, whereas the mean accuracy in task two was 61.36%. Because both tasks 
apparently varied in their difficulty, it may be possible that the reported correlation was 
increased by the pooling and thus overestimated the true reliability of the measurement.  
Task consistency 
There is also an obstacle for any study on the task consistency of the measurement. 
The task consistency may be important in a research context. For example, to test whether the 
artificial grammar learning performance measures a trait-like ability that is stable over time. 
In an applied context, it may be important for an individual assessment (e.g., if an applicant is 
tested more than one time). Estimating the task consistency would require the same 
participants to complete at least two artificial grammar learning tasks with two different 
underlying grammars. There lies one difficulty in this approach. When participants complete 
the learning phase for the fist time, they do not know that there is a grammar behind the letter 
strings. In the testing phase they are told that there is a grammar and that they should rate the 
grammaticality of newly presented strings. Thus, when participants complete the learning 
phase for the second time, they already know about the grammar. The participants will also 
know that there will be a testing phase and that they will be asked to judge new strings as 
grammatical or non-grammatical. This may cause them not to memorize the strings but to 
search for the grammar or simple heuristics that may help them later in the testing phase. For 
that reason, Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) modified the standard paradigm and asked their 
participants not to rate the grammaticality but the novelty of the strings in the testing phase. 
However, none of the strings were previously presented and if the participants (inadvertently) 
classified a newly presented letter string as an “old” one, this was scored as a correct decision. 
The idea behind this procedure may be that the participants learn something about the 
grammar, thus they feel familiar with the grammatical strings and therefore they classify a 
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grammatical string as an “old” one. In Gebauer and Mackintosh’s (2007) study, there was a 
significant correlation of r=.15 between the judgment accuracy of the two different artificial 
grammar learning tasks, which suggests a low task consistency. However, it remains unclear 
if rating the novelty of the strings measures the same construct than rating their 
grammaticality. 
From a conceptual point of view, novelty judgments and grammaticality judgments 
may be seen as similar. For example, Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) demonstrated that several 
heuristics (fluency, generation, and resemblance) influence the performance in recognition 
tasks as well as in classification tasks. The authors suggest that these heuristics affect the 
perceived familiarity of stimuli and that the familiarity affects novelty judgments as well as 
grammaticality judgments. In line with this suggestion, Scott and Dienes (2008) demonstrated 
that grammaticality ratings can be predicted by the perceived familiarity of strings. 
Furthermore, there are findings, which suggest that the fluency of the processing of the 
stimuli affects novelty ratings (e.g., Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) as well as 
grammaticality ratings (Kinder, Shanks, Cock, & Tunney, 2003). This further  points towards 
the conceptual similarity of both measures. However, from an empirical point of view, it is 
unclear whether asking participants to rate the novelty of letter strings measures the same 
construct than asking participants to rate the grammaticality of letter strings. Therefore it is 
not known at present if this result indicates a low consistency of artificial grammar learning in 
general or just in case the participants are asked to rate the novelty instead of the 
grammaticality of the strings. 
The present study 
Taken together, there is only weak support for the measurement of reliable individual 
differences in artificial grammar learning. The task consistency of those measures is also 
unclear. Therefore, the general aim of the present study was to examine an artificial grammar 
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learning task as a measure of reliable and consistent individual differences in implicit learning 
with three experiments.  
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether asking the participants to rate the 
grammaticality of a newly presented letter string in the testing phase quantifies the same 
construct as asking the participants to judge the novelty of the letter strings. The major aim of 
experiment 2 was to test the reliability and the task consistency of an artificial grammar 
learning task when the participants were asked to judge the novelty of the letter strings. 
Experiment 3 aimed at the reliability and the task consistency of an artificial grammar 
learning task when the participants were asked to judge the grammaticality of the letter strings. 
Finally, a conjoint analysis of experiment 1, 2, and 3 was conducted in order to test whether 
individual differences may be quantified with the instruction to rate the grammaticality of 
strings as well as with the instruction to rate its novelty. 
Experiment 1 
To estimate the task consistency of the performance in an artificial grammar learning 
task, it is necessary that the same participants complete more than one task. Because this 
procedure may cause a validity problem, Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) asked their 
participants to rate the novelty of the letter strings instead of their grammaticality.  
The idea behind this procedure may be that the participants learn something about the 
grammar, thus feel familiar with the grammatical strings and therefore classify a grammatical 
string as an “old” one. Although this idea is theoretically sound, there is no empirical 
evidence for the presumed similarity of grammaticality and novelty ratings. Hence the aim of 
experiment 1 was to test if asking participants for novelty measures the same construct as 
asking for grammaticality. Therefore two artificial grammar learning tasks were presented 
along with these two instructions. The correlation between the two tasks indicates the extent 
to which both judgments measure the same construct.  




Participants. The participants were N=21 students from the University of Heidelberg 
who were recruited from the campus and were paid €5 for their participation. This sample size 
was chosen because it allows a detection of a population correlation of r=.50 between 
accuracy of novelty and grammaticality rating with a type-one-error probability of 0.05 (one-
tailed) and a power of 0.80 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
Stimulus material. The letter strings were the same as used by Gebauer and 
Mackintosh (2007). There were two grammars. For each grammar, there were 30 grammatical 
strings in the learning phase and 40 grammatical and 40 non-grammatical strings in the testing 
phase (see Appendix, Table A1 and Table A2). The grammatical strings were constructed 
according to Figure 1 and Figure 2. The non-grammatical strings contained one violation of 
the grammar at random positions of the strings. The length of the strings varied between three 
and eight letters. 
********************************** 
Please insert Figure 1 and 2 about here 
********************************** 
To test the reportable grammar knowledge of the participants, 12 n-grams were 
selected for each grammar. There were 6 n-grams which occurred in the learning phase and 
which also occurred in the testing phase more frequently in grammatical than non-
grammatical strings (NX, XS, SN, NXS, WNS, NWS for grammar 1 and MM, LM, RH, 
LMM, MMM, RHP for grammar 2, respectively). These n-grams were chosen because they 
may help to identify grammatical strings as grammatical. In addition, there were 6 n-grams 
which did not occur in the learning phase but which did occur in the testing phase more 
frequently in non-grammatical strings than in grammatical ones (NN, XN, XX, WSS, NWW, 
SSW for grammar 1 and MP, RM, LH, HHP, HPL, LMH for grammar 2, respectively). Those 
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strings were chosen because they may help to identify non-grammatical strings. The strings 
were presented on a 17“ screen of a personal computer with a standard German keyboard. 
Procedure. Each participant completed two artificial grammar learning tasks. The first 
artificial grammar learning task was run with grammar 1. In the learning phase 30 letter 
strings were presented and the participants were instructed to memorize them (e.g., 
WNSNXS). Each string was presented individually for 4 s on a 17“ screen of a personal 
computer. The participants were asked to repeat the strings correctly by pressing the 
respective letters on the keyboard. When a string was repeated correctly, the next string 
occurred. When a string was repeated incorrectly, the string was displayed again until 
repeated correctly. After a participant repeated ten strings correctly, these ten strings were 
simultaneously displayed for 90 s on the screen and the participant was asked to repeat them 
silently. After a participant repeated all 30 string correctly the learning phase was finished. In 
the testing phase 80 new strings were presented. Even though all strings were new (have not 
been presented in the learning phase), the participants were instructed to rate the strings as 
“old” (presented in the learning phase) or “new” (not presented in the learning phase). To 
judge a string as “old”, the participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge a 
string as “new” they had to press the L-key. The strings were presented in a new random 
order for each participant. Immediately after the testing phase, the participants completed the 
knowledge tests. In the n-gram knowledge test, the participants were instructed to judge 
whether an n-gram occurred more often in “old” strings or whether an n-gram occurred more 
often in “new” strings. To judge an n-gram as occurring more often in “old” strings, the 
participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge an n-gram as occurring more 
often in “new” string, they had to press the L-key. The n-grams were presented in a new 
random order for each participant.  
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The second artificial grammar learning task was run with grammar 2. The procedure 
of the learning phase was the same as in the first artificial grammar learning task. However, 
after the learning phase was finished, the participants were informed that all strings in the 
learning phase were constructed according to a complex rule system. In the testing phase 80 
new strings were presented (see Appendix, Table A2). The participants were instructed to rate 
the strings as grammatical or non-grammatical. To judge a string as grammatical, the 
participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge a string as non-grammatical, they 
had to press the L-key. The strings were presented in a new random order for each participant. 
In the n-gram knowledge test, the participants were instructed to judge whether an n-gram 
occurred more often in grammatical strings or whether an n-gram occurred more often in non-
grammatical strings. To judge an n-gram as occurring more often in grammatical strings, the 
participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge an n-gram as occurring more 
often in non-grammatical strings, they had to press the L-key. The n-grams were presented in 
a new random order for each participant. 
Measures. Judgment accuracy. The judgment accuracy was quantified as the 
percentage of correct classifications of the 80 strings in the testing phase. As suggested by 
Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007), grammatical strings which were rated as “old” strings and 
non-grammatical strings which were rated as “new” strings were counted as correct 
classifications. 
N-gram  knowledge. The amount of n-gram knowledge was quantified as the 
percentage of correct classifications of n-grams in the knowledge test. Analog to the testing 
phase, grammatical bi- and trigrams which were rated as “old” and non-grammatical bi- and 
trigrams which were rated as “new” were counted as correct classifications. 
Statistical analysis. The psychometric properties of the judgment accuracy in the 
testing phase were quantified with Cronbach’s alpha and the split-half correlation (odd-even-
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split, Spearman-Brown corrected). A t-test was used to evaluate the null hypothesis that there 
was no above-chance accuracy of grammaticality judgments in the testing phase. 
Results 
Judgment Accuracy. In task 1, the judgment accuracy was as expected above chance, 
M=61.78%, t(20)=10.18, p<.001, d=2.40, and the same was true in task 2, M=57.80% 
t(20)=4.31, p<.001, d=0.95. In task 1, Cronbach’s alpha of the 80 judgments was α=.12 and 
the split-half correlation was r=.29. In task 2, Cronbach’s alpha was α=.58 and the split-half 
correlation was r=.27. The correlation between judgment accuracy in task 1 (grammar 1, 
instruction to judge old vs. new) and task 2 (grammar 2, instruction to judge grammatical vs. 
non-grammatical) was r=.23, p=.300. A visual inspection of the frequency distributions 
revealed that the judgment accuracy variables were approximately normally distributed. 
N-gram knowledge. In task 1, the performance in the n-gram knowledge test was 
M=48.41%, SD=7.74%. Cronbach’s alpha of the twelve items of the knowledge test was α=-
2.16 and the split-half correlation was r=-.31. In this task, the correlation between judgment 
accuracy in the testing phase and n-gram knowledge was r=.59, p=.005. In task 2, the 
performance in the n-gram knowledge test was M=66.27%, SD=18.16%. Cronbach’s alpha of 
the knowledge test was α=.53 and the split-half correlation was r=.54. In this task, the 
correlation between judgment accuracy in the testing phase and n-gram knowledge was r=-.22, 
p=.329. 
Discussion 
From the perspective of cognitive psychology, this experiment successfully 
demonstrates an instance of implicit learning because the above-chance accuracy in the 
testing phase has been replicated. From an individual differences perspective, however, there 
are several critical points that need attention. 
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Reliability of judgment accuracy. The internal consistency of the judgment accuracy 
in task 1 was surprisingly low, which may indicate an unreliable measurement. However, 
according to classical test theory, Cronbach’s alpha is only a point estimation of the reliability 
if all items are homogenous (or technically spoken have the same true score), elsewhere it is 
just a lower border of reliability (Lord & Novick, 1968). The same principle applies for the 
split half correlation, i.e. only if both test halves are homogeneous (have the same true score) 
the split half correlation is a point estimate of the reliability. Of course, this does not have to 
be true in empirical applications of the classical test theory. With respect to the present 
experiment, we do not know that much about the decision processes that take place, and very 
different judgment patterns may result in equally successful response patterns. In particular, 
when the participants were instructed to rate the novelty of the letter strings, some “correct” 
judgments (grammatical strings which were rated to be “old”) were actually false alarms 
because none of the strings of the testing phase were previously presented in the learning 
phase. This may have shrunk the consistency of judgment patterns even more. To avoid this 
problem in the following experiment, we used a reliability estimation that is not biased by 
heterogeneous items or test halves, which is the retest correlation. Hence, in the following 
studies, 20 out of the 80 strings in the testing phase were presented repeatedly so that the 
retest correlation could be computed for these 20 strings. 
In addition, there is another factor that may also shrink the reliability of the 
measurement, which is the order of presentation of the strings. This order was different for 
each participant and thus may have caused different effects of order for each participant, 
which in turn may have increased the error variance. To control this potential nuisance 
variable, the order of presentation of strings was fixed across participants in the following 
experiments. 
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Task consistency. The low and insignificant correlation between the two tasks 
replicates the results of Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) who reported a correlation of r=.15 
between two artificial grammar learning tasks in which the participants were asked to rate the 
novelty of letter strings. In the present study, the low correlation may be due to several 
reasons. First, the reliability of the measurements may be low and therefore the correlation 
between the tasks was low. Second, the two tasks did not measure the same construct because 
they used different artificial grammars. Third, the instruction to judge strings for novelty may 
measure something different than to judge for grammaticality. Clearly this low correlation 
cannot be interpreted just in the light of the results of experiment 1. Experiment 2 and 3 will 
help to clarify this point. 
The relation with n-gram knowledge. There was a substantial and significant 
correlation (r=.59) between the magnitude of n-gram knowledge and the judgment accuracy 
in task 1, which suggests that about 35% of the variance of the novelty ratings may be 
explained by n-gram knowledge. On the other hand, there was no significant correlation 
between n-gram knowledge and the judgment accuracy in task 2, which indicates that the 
grammaticality ratings could not be explained by n-gram knowledge. This may be seen as 
preliminary evidence against the similarity of both measures.1 
Taken together, the aim of experiment 1 was to test whether asking the participants for 
grammaticality or novelty measures the same construct. This question could not be answered 
properly. It remains unclear whether the low correlation between the judgment accuracy in the 
two tasks was due to a low reliability of the measurements, due to the different artificial 
grammars, or due to the different instructions to judge either for novelty or grammaticality. 
Thus, two further experiments were conducted to clarify these issues.  




Experiment 2 was designed to follow up several questions. The first issue was to test 
whether the retest correlation offers greater reliability estimates than Cronbach’s alpha or the 
split-half correlation for the performance in the testing phase. The second issue was to test 
whether the performance in the testing phase may be consistent across two different grammars 
when the participants are instructed to rate the novelty of the strings in both instances. The 
third issue was to test whether the performance in a third task, during which the participants 
are asked to rate the grammaticality of the strings, measures the same construct as the 
performance during the first and second task. 
Method 
Participants. A total of N=21 students from the University of Heidelberg who did not 
participate in experiment 1 were recruited from the campus and were paid €7 for their 
participation. 
Stimulus material. There were three grammars. The strings of grammar 1 and 
grammar 2 were the same as in experiment 1. The grammatical strings for grammar 3 were 
constructed according to Figure 3. There were also 30 grammatical strings in the learning 
phase and 40 grammatical and 40 non-grammatical strings in the testing phase. The non-
grammatical strings contained one violation of the grammar at random positions of the strings. 
The length of these strings also varied between three and eight letters (see Appendix, Table 
A3). 
********************************** 
Please insert Figure 3 about here 
********************************** 
To test the grammar knowledge of the participants, 24 n-grams were selected for each 
grammar. There were 12 n-grams which occurred in the learning phase and which also 
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occurred in the testing phase more frequently in grammatical than non-grammatical strings. 
These n-grams were chosen since they may help to identify grammatical strings as 
grammatical. In addition, there were 12 n-grams which did not occur in the learning phase but 
which did occur in the testing phase more frequently in non-grammatical strings than in 
grammatical ones. Those strings were chosen because they may help to identify non-
grammatical strings. The n-grams are shown in Table 1. The strings were presented on a 
17“ screen of a personal computer with a standard German keyboard. 
********************************** 
Please insert Table 1 about here 
********************************** 
Procedure. Each participant completed three artificial grammar learning tasks. The 
first artificial grammar learning task was run with grammar 1. In the learning phase 30 letter 
strings were presented and the participants were instructed to memorize them (e.g., 
WNSNXS). The strings were presented in a counterbalanced order across participants. String 
one was presented to participant one first, string two was presented to participant two first, 
string three to participant three and so on. Each string was presented individually for 3 s on a 
17“ screen of a personal computer. The participants were asked to repeat the strings correctly 
by pressing the respective letters on the keyboard. When a string was repeated correctly, the 
feedback “correct” was given and the next string occurred. When a string was repeated 
incorrectly, the feedback “false” was given and the string was displayed again until repeated 
correctly. The feedback was given to increase the participants’ motivation to memorize the 
strings properly. After a participant repeated ten strings correctly, these ten strings were 
simultaneously displayed for 90 s on the screen and the participant was asked to repeat them 
silently. After a participant repeated all 30 string correctly the learning phase was finished. In 
the testing phase 80 new strings were presented (see Appendix, Table A1). Ten grammatical 
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and ten non-grammatical strings were presented twice. These strings were randomly selected 
out of the original 80 strings. Thus there were a total of 100 strings in the testing phase and 
the retest correlation of the 20 strings could be computed. Even though all strings were new 
(have not been presented in the learning phase), the participants were instructed to rate the 
strings as “old” (presented in the learning phase) or “new” (not presented in the learning 
phase). To judge a string as “old”, the participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to 
judge a string as new, they had to press the L-key. The order of presentation of the strings was 
fixed across participants in a random order. This was done to ensure that possible effects of 
order would affect all participants in the same way. Immediately after the testing phase, the 
participants completed the n-gram knowledge test. In the n-gram knowledge test, the 
participants were instructed to judge whether an n-gram occurred more often in “old” strings 
or whether an n-gram occurred more often in “new” strings. To judge an n-gram as occurring 
more often in “old” strings, the participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge 
an n-gram as occurring more often in “new” string, they had to press the L-key. The order of 
presentation of the n-grams was fixed across participants in a random order. All n-grams were 
presented twice so that the retest correlation could be computed. 
The second artificial grammar learning task was run with grammar 2. The procedures 
of the learning phase, the testing phase and the knowledge test were the same as in the first 
artificial grammar learning task. 
The third artificial grammar learning task was run with grammar 3. The procedure of 
the learning phase was the same as in the first and the second artificial grammar learning task. 
After the learning phase was finished, the participants were informed that all strings in the 
learning phase were constructed according to a complex rule system. In the testing phase 80 
new strings were presented. Ten grammatical and ten non-grammatical strings were presented 
twice. These strings were randomly selected out of the original 80 strings. Thus there were a 
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total of 100 strings in the testing phase. The participants were instructed to rate the strings as 
grammatical or non-grammatical. To judge a string as grammatical, the participants had to 
press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge a string as non-grammatical, they had to press the 
L-key. The order of presentation of the strings was fixed across participants in a random order. 
In the n-gram knowledge test, the participants were instructed to judge whether an n-gram 
occurred more often in grammatical strings or whether an n-gram occurred more often in non-
grammatical strings. To judge an n-gram as occurring more often in grammatical strings, the 
participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge an n-gram as occurring more 
often in non-grammatical strings, they had to press the L-key. The order of presentation of the 
n-grams was fixed across participants in a random order. All n-grams were presented twice so 
that the retest correlation could be computed. 
Measures. As in experiment 1, the judgment accuracy and the amount of n-gram 
knowledge were recorded. 
Results 
Judgment Accuracy. As expected, the judgment accuracy was above chance in task 1, 
M=64.00%, t(20)=15.79, p<.001, d=3.45, in task 2, M=63.62% t(20)=9.96, p<.001, d=2.18, 
and in task 3, M=57.29% t(20)=5.96, p<.001, d=1.30. In task 1, Cronbach’s alpha was α=-.16, 
the split-half correlation was r=-.23, and the retest correlation was r=.18. In task 2, 
Cronbach’s alpha was α=.46, the split-half correlation was r=.29, and the retest correlation 
was r=.58. In task 3, Cronbach’s alpha was α=.30, the split-half correlation was r=-.10, and 
the retest correlation was r=.07. The correlation between judgment accuracy in task 1 
(grammar 1, instruction to judge “old” vs. “new”) and task 2 (grammar 2, instruction to judge 
“old” vs. “new”) was r=-.18, p=.443. The respective correlation between task 2 and task 3 
(grammar 3, instruction to judge grammatical vs. non-grammatical) was r=-.08, p=.728. The 
correlation between judgment accuracy in task 1 and task 3 was r=.58, p=.006. A visual 
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inspection of the frequency distributions revealed that the judgment accuracy variables were 
approximately normally distributed. 
N-gram knowledge. In task 1, the performance in the n-gram knowledge test was 
M=72.94%, SD=11.18%. Cronbach’s alpha of the measured knowledge was α=.45, the split 
half correlation was r=.24, and the retest correlation was r=.50. In this task, the correlation 
between judgment accuracy in the testing phase and n-gram knowledge was r=.27, p=.245. In 
task 2, the performance in the n-gram knowledge test was M=62.70%, SD=8.17%. 
Cronbach’s alpha was α=-.29, the split half correlation was r=-.07, and the retest correlation 
was r=.49. In this task, the correlation between judgment accuracy in the testing phase and n-
gram knowledge was r=-.10, p=.653. In task 3, the performance in the n-gram knowledge test 
was M=71.63%, SD=11.53%. Cronbach’s alpha was α=.37, the split half correlation was 
r=.31, and the retest correlation was r=.64. In this last task, the correlation between judgment 
accuracy in the testing phase and n-gram knowledge was r=.16, p=.477. 
Discussion 
Reliability of judgment accuracy. One aim of experiment 2 was to examine whether 
the retest correlation provides a greater reliability estimate for the judgment accuracy than 
Cronbach’s alpha or the split-half correlation. However, this was not the case since all 
reliability estimates of the judgment accuracy were rather small. Two factors may have 
worked against a reliable measurement. First, the instruction in task 1 and task 2 was to rate 
the novelty, not the grammaticality of the strings in the testing phase. Therefore it may be 
possible that specifically the judgment accuracy of novelty ratings is not a reliable measure. 
Second, the reliability estimates in the third task were also in a low range, but at that time, the 
participants already completed two artificial grammar learning tasks during which they got 
the instructions to rate the novelty of the letter strings. Although the instruction of task 3 
explicitly states to rate the grammaticality of the strings, it may be possible that some 
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participants did not realize the change of the instruction properly whereas others did. This 
possibility is supported by the observation that some participants reported that it was boring to 
complete the same task three times after the experiment was over. To clarify this point, 
experiment 3 was conducted, in which the participants completed three artificial grammar 
learning tasks with the instruction to rate the grammaticality of the strings. 
Task consistency. Another aim of experiment 2 was to check whether the 
performance in the testing phase may converge across two tasks when the instruction is to 
judge the novelty of the strings. The low correlation between task 1 and task 2 suggests that 
the task consistency of the measurements was low and two realizations of the same paradigm 
do not appear to measure the same construct. On the one hand, the estimated reliability was 
low and therefore the small correlation should not be overstated. On the other hand, this result 
is consistent with Gebauer and Mackintosh’s (2007) work because they also report a low 
correlation between two artificial grammar learning tasks in which the participants had to 
judge the novelty of letter strings. Taken together, we conclude that the judgment accuracy in 
an artificial grammar learning task is not a consistent measure when the participants are asked 
to rate the novelty of the strings. 
Effects of the instruction. The third aim was to test whether the performance in the 
testing phase quantifies the same construct regardless whether the participants are asked to 
judge the novelty or the grammaticality of letter strings. This was checked by the correlation 
between task 1 and task 3, and the correlation between task 2 and task 3. Since the reliability 
estimates of these measurements were low, one may not expect a high correlation between the 
tasks. Not surprisingly, there was no significant correlation between task 2 and task 3. 
However, there was a significant and unexpected high correlation between judgment accuracy 
of task 1 and task 3, which is not easy to explain. Sometimes a correlation between two 
variables may be a cue for their reliability even if other reliability estimates are low. However, 
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this does not seem to be plausible here because Cronbach’s alpha, the split-half correlation as 
well as the retest correlation consistently indicated a low reliability of the measurement.2  
The relation with n-gram knowledge. Similar to experiment 1, Cronbach’s alpha of 
the knowledge measure was quite small. As discussed above, this may be due to a 
heterogeneous knowledge structure because a participant who learned a specific n-gram did 
not have to learn another n-gram necessarily. To account for that circumstance, the retest 
correlation was additionally computed. Since the retest correlations of the knowledge tests 
were in a more acceptable range (between r=.49 and r=.64), this finding suggest that the 
acquired knowledge was measured reliably. Moreover, the correlation between the judgment 
accuracy and the amount of n-gram knowledge was insignificant and rather small in all three 
tasks. This result is in line with the suggestion that the acquired knowledge, which affects the 
above-chance accuracy in the testing phase, is implicit. However, the estimated reliability for 
the judgment accuracy was low and may explain these small correlations as well. 
Once again, experiment 2 showed rather low reliability estimates for the judgment 
accuracy, regardless whether Cronbach’s alpha, the split-half correlation or the retest 
correlation was considered. The estimated consistency across tasks was also low. This speaks 
against the idea that artificial grammar learning tasks may be used to measure individual 
differences in implicit learning. However, in task 1 and task 2 the participants were asked to 
rate the novelty but not the grammaticality of the strings. This is a renunciation of Reber’s 
original paradigm. Therefore experiment 3 was conducted in which the participants were 
asked to rate the grammaticality of strings during three tasks. 
There is one additional circumstance that may have influenced the measures. In 
experiment 1 as well as in experiment 2, grammar 1 was first presented and grammar 2 
afterwards. Therefore we cannot exclude the possibility that there were effects of grammar 
order that may have influenced the participants’ judgment. That would be the case if the 
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participants still think about letter strings of grammar 1 while completing the second task. 
Since the judgment accuracy was significantly above chance in all tasks, this concern does not 
appear to be striking. However, to counteract this possible problem, the order of presentation 
of grammar 1 and grammar 2 was added as a between participant variable in experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was conducted to test whether the judgment accuracy in the testing 
phase may be assessed reliably and consistently across different tasks when the participants 
are asked to rate the grammaticality of strings. As outlined above, there lies one difficulty in 
this approach. When the participants complete a second artificial grammar learning task, they 
already know that there is a grammar constituting the strings during the learning phase and 
they have to rate the grammaticality of strings in the testing phase. Hence, it may be possible 
that they do not only memorize the strings but also try to discover the grammar explicitly. 
Therefore three artificial grammar learning tasks were conducted. A change of the 
participants’ strategy after the first task and using the same strategy for task 2 and 3 may 
result in a low correlation between task 1 and task 2 (as well as between task 1 and task 3) and 
a great correlation between task 2 and 3. In addition, to examine possible effects of order, we 
added the order of presentation of grammar 1 and grammar 2 as a between participant variable. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were N=42 students from the University of Heidelberg 
who were recruited from the campus and were paid €7 for their participation. The order of 
presentation was added as a between participant variable and therefore the sample size was 
doubled so that the power within both order conditions was the same as in experiment 2 and 3. 
One participant already had participated in experiment 2 and therefore was excluded from the 
analysis. 
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Stimulus material. The stimuli were the same as used in experiment 2.  
Procedure. All participants completed three artificial grammar learning tasks. Half of 
the participants completed task 1 with grammar 1, task 2 with grammar 2, and task 3 with 
grammar 3 (order 1). The other half of the participants completed task 1 with grammar 2, task 
2 with grammar 1, and task 3 with grammar 3 (order 2). The order of the presentation of 
grammar 3 was not included as a between participant variable since that would have required 
a larger sample size. The procedures of the learning phase, the testing phase, and the 
knowledge test were the same for all three artificial grammar learning tasks. 
In the learning phase 30 letter strings were presented and the participants were 
instructed to memorize them. The strings were presented in a counterbalanced order across 
participants. String one was presented to participant one first, string two was presented to 
participant two first, string three to participant three and so on. Each string was presented 
individually for 3 s on a 17“ screen of a personal computer. The participants were asked to 
repeat the strings correctly by pressing the respective letters on the keyboard. When a string 
was repeated correctly, the feedback “correct” was given and the next string occurred. When a 
string was repeated incorrectly, the feedback “false” was given and the string was displayed 
again until repeated correctly. After a participant repeated ten strings correctly, these ten 
strings were simultaneously displayed for 90 s on the screen and the participant was asked to 
repeat them silently. After a participant repeated all 30 string correctly the learning phase was 
finished. After the learning phase was finished, the participants were informed that all strings 
in the learning phase were constructed according to a complex rule system.  
In the testing phase 80 new strings were presented. Ten grammatical and ten non-
grammatical strings were presented twice. These strings were randomly selected out of the 
original 80 strings. Thus there were a total of 100 strings in the testing phase. The participants 
were instructed to rate the strings as grammatical or non-grammatical. To judge a string as 
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grammatical, the participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge a string as non-
grammatical, they had to press the L-key. The order of presentation of the strings was fixed 
across participants in a random order.  
In the n-gram knowledge test, the participants were instructed to judge whether an n-
gram occurred more often in grammatical strings or whether an n-gram occurred more often 
in non-grammatical strings. To judge an n-gram as occurring more often in grammatical 
strings, the participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to judge an n-gram as 
occurring more often in non-grammatical strings, they had to press the L-key. The order of 
presentation of the n-grams was fixed across participants in a random order. Because of a 
software problem, only 18 out of the 24 n-grams were presented and all bi- and trigrams were 
only presented once instead of twice. 
Measures. As in experiment 1 and 2, the judgment accuracy, and the amount of n-
gram knowledge were recorded. 
Results 
Judgment accuracy. Table 2 shows the means, t- and p-values, and the effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d) for the judgment accuracy. As expected, the judgment accuracy was above 
chance in all tasks.  
********************************** 
Please insert Table 2 about here 
********************************** 
Cronbach’s alpha, the split-half correlation, and the retest correlation of the judgment 
accuracy are shown in Table 3. All coefficients are positive and considerably greater than in 
experiment 2. 




Please insert Table 3 about here 
********************************** 
Table 4 reports the correlations between tasks separated by order of presentation and 
additionally pooled over both orders of presentation. As can be seen, there was a substantial 
correlation between task 2 and 3, r=.38, p=.014, but not between task 1 and 2, r=.05, p=.751, 
or task 1 and 3, r=.08, p=.631. A visual inspection of the frequency distributions revealed that 
the judgment accuracy variables were approximately normally distributed. 
********************************** 
Please insert Table 4 about here 
********************************** 
N-gram knowledge. The performance in the first n-gram knowledge test was 
M=66.12%, SD=8.94%, the performance in the second n-gram knowledge test was 
M=67.21%, SD=11.90%, the performance in the third n-gram knowledge test was M=64.90%, 
SD=11.53%. Table 5 shows Cronbach’s alpha, the split-half correlation of the measured 
knowledge, and the correlation between n-gram knowledge and the judgment accuracy. It is 
obvious from this table that there were substantial correlations between n-gram knowledge 
and judgment accuracy in task 2 and 3 but not in task 1. 
********************************** 
Please insert Table 5 about here 
********************************** 
Discussion 
Reliability of judgment accuracy. The results of the present experiment suggest that 
individual differences may be measured reliably if the participants were asked to rate the 
grammaticality of strings. Most reliability estimates were in a range between 0.40 and 0.60, 
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which is better than the reliability estimates in experiment 2. The major difference to 
experiment 2 was that the participants in experiment 3 were asked to rate the grammaticality, 
whereas the participants in experiment 2 were asked to rate the novelty of strings. These 
findings suggest that individual differences may only be quantified reliably when the 
participants are asked to rate the grammaticality of strings. To test this hypothesis statistically, 
we conducted a conjoint analysis of experiment 1, 2, and 3 (see below). 
Task consistency and the relation with n-gram knowledge. The results of 
experiment 3 suggest that the learning performance in the first artificial grammar learning task 
may be implicit because the judgment accuracy was significantly above chance and there was 
no significant relation with n-gram knowledge. The performance of the second and third task, 
on the other hand, may not be called implicit due to two reasons.  
First, the correlation between task 1 and task 2 (or task 3) was low and insignificant, 
but there was a substantial and significant correlation between task 2 and task 3. This result 
showed up for both task orders and was even more distinct if the judgment accuracy was 
computed after pooling over both orders. This finding indicates that a first realization of an 
artificial grammar learning task seems to measure something different than a second or third 
realization, which may be due to the circumstance that the participants already know that 
there is a grammar in the tasks 2 and 3. Therefore it appears to be impossible to measure 
individual differences in implicit learning consistently across different tasks if the participants 
are asked to rate the grammaticality of strings. 
Second, the correlation between n-gram knowledge in task 1 was insignificant and low 
(r=.06, p=.751), which indicates that the performance in the testing phase cannot be explained 
by knowledge about n-grams. However, there was a substantial and marginally significant 
correlation between judgment accuracy and n-gram knowledge in task 2 (r=.30, p=.060) and a 
substantial and significant correlation in task 3 (r=.34, p=.023). Since the judgment accuracies 
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in task 2 and task 3 were significantly above chance, the participants apparently learned 
something. However, the substantial correlation with the knowledge test indicates that this 
learning was not completely implicit. This finding suggests that participants process an 
artificial grammar learning task differently when they know that there is a grammar 
constituting the strings in the learning phase. 
Effects of the order of the grammars. The results show that there were only minor 
differences in the judgment accuracies and reliability estimates depending on the order of 
grammar presentation. The pattern of correlations between the tasks was the same for both 
orders of presentation and the pattern of correlations between judgment accuracy and n-gram 
knowledge became even more distinct if the results were pooled over both grammars. 
Taken together, experiment 3 showed that an artificial grammar learning task may be 
used to measure individual differences in implicit learning if the participants are asked to rate 
the grammaticality of letter strings. However, it was not possible to measure these differences 
repeatedly across different task. The correlation with the knowledge test in task 2 and task 3 
also suggest that the learning that took place in task 2 and task 3 was not implicit. 
Conjoint analysis 
The reliability estimates of the tasks in experiment 1, 2, and 3 showed a broad 
variation. However, whereas all reliability estimates for novelty judgments were unacceptably 
small, most of the reliability estimates for grammaticality judgments were satisfactory. 
Therefore, we tested the hypothesis that only grammaticality judgments quantify reliable 
individual differences. 
Method 
The units of observation were the split-half correlations for each task in experiment 1, 
2, and 3. These reliability estimates were employed because they could be computed in all 
experiments. We used the fixed-effect model for the meta-analysis of correlations of Hedges 
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and Vevea (1998). In a first step, the correlations were participated to a Fisher’s Z-
Transformation. In a second step, the transformed correlations of task 1 and 2 of experiment 2 
were averaged as well as the correlations of task 1, 2, and 3 of experiment 3, because these 
correlations resulted from the same sample and therefore were dependent from each other. In 
a third step, the Z-scores were transformed to averaged effect sizes (MZ) separately for the 
tasks in which the participants had to rate the grammaticality vs. the novelty of strings. In a 
last step, the standard errors of the effect sizes were computed. A z-test was used to test the 
null-hypothesis that the averaged effect sizes in both conditions did not differ from zero. 
Results 
The averaged effect size of the grammaticality rating tasks differed significantly from 
zero, MZ=0.32, z=2.75, p=.006. On the other hand, the averaged effect size of the novelty 
rating tasks did not differ significantly from zero, MZ =0.09, z=0.56, p=.575. 
Discussion 
The results indicate that individual differences in implicit learning may be measured 
reliably if the participants are asked to rate the grammaticality of the strings but not if they 
were asked to rate their novelty. This suggests that the variation in the judgment accuracy that 
is observed in grammaticality judgments quantifies systematic individual differences, whereas 
the variation that is observed in novelty ratings quantifies no systematic differences between 
individuals. 
General Discussion 
We conducted three experiments to investigate whether an artificial grammar learning 
task may be used to measure individual differences in implicit learning. The judgment 
accuracy in the testing phase was taken as an indicator of implicit learning success. The 
results of these experiments demonstrate that it is possible to measure individual differences 
in implicit learning when participants are asked to rate the grammaticality of strings in the 
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testing phase. This conclusion is supported by experiment 3 which showed that the judgment 
accuracy in a first realization of an artificial grammar learning task is significantly above 
chance and not systematically related with knowledge of n-grams. However, there are several 
obstacles when a repeated measurement of individual differences in implicit learning ought to 
be realized.  
First, when the participants were asked to rate the grammaticality of strings, an 
artificial grammar learning task can only be used once. Experiment 3 shows that the 
performance in a second or third realization is not related with the performance in a first 
realization, whereas the performance in a second or third realization is related with knowledge 
about n-grams of letter strings. Thus, a second completion is neither task consistent, nor 
divergent from n-gram knowledge. Second, the instruction to rate the grammaticality of letter 
strings in the testing phase cannot be replaced by the instruction to rate the novelty of letter 
strings. Experiment 1 and 2 showed that the correlation between grammaticality and novelty 
judgments is small and non-significant. Moreover, reliable individual differences can only be 
quantified when the participants were asked to rate the grammaticality of letter strings, but not 
when they are asked to rate the novelty. The conjoint analysis revealed that the reliability 
estimates of novelty judgments did not differ significantly from zero but reliability estimates 
of grammaticality judgments did. Third, the reliability estimates of the grammaticality 
judgments are too low to make inferences about the abilities of individuals. In order to use an 
artificial grammar learning task as an assessment tool, its reliability needs to be enhanced. 
 The role of strategy use. The reliability estimates of the judgment accuracy 
variables were rather small. One explanation for this may be that different strategies are used 
to make grammaticality judgments. In particular, the participants may use implicit as well as 
explicit strategies to solve implicit learning tasks (as suggested by Dienes & Berry, 1997; 
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Norman, Price, & Duff, 2006). This may affect the reliability estimates as well as the 
correlation between artificial grammar learning tasks in different ways. 
 First, some items may be solved with a greater extent of implicit strategies whereas 
other items may be solved with a greater extent of explicit strategies. Accordingly, some 
items may reflect individual performance differences in implicit strategy use whereas other 
items may reflect individual performance differences in explicit strategy use. Technically 
spoken, the items may not be τ-equivalent (Lord & Novick, 1968). This may affect the 
reliability estimates. For example, Cronbach’s alpha is a point estimate of the reliability only, 
if the items are τ-equivalent. Elsewise, it offers just a lower bound of the reliability. Likewise, 
the split-half correlation is a point estimate of the reliability only if the test-halves are τ-
equivalent. Elsewise, it underestimates the reliability. It further may affect the correlation 
between two different artificial grammar learning tasks, since the items of one grammar may 
measure implicit strategies in a greater extent than the items of another grammar.  
 Second, persons may differ in the extent in which they use implicit and explicit 
decision strategies (e.g., Buchner, Funke, & Berry, 1995). Accordingly, the judgment 
accuracy of one person may indicate the success of an implicit strategy whereas the 
judgments accuracy of another person may indicate the success of an explicit strategy. This 
means, the judgment accuracy may not only capture individual differences in implicit learning 
performance but also individual differences in strategy use. This may additionally shrink the 
consistency of judgments and the correlation between artificial grammar learning tasks.  
 Third, the use of implicit and explicit strategies may change over time (as suggested 
by Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchards-Fields, Cho, & Druhan, 1989). For example, one 
participant may use an implicit strategy first and then switch to a more explicit strategy later. 
Another participant may use an implicit strategy all the time and another participant may use 
an explicit strategy all the time. Accordingly, the judgment accuracy may also capture 
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individual differences in strategy change, which may additionally shrink the correlation 
between artificial grammar learning tasks.  
 Forth, the instruction to rate the novelty of the strings may induce other judgment 
strategies than the instruction to rate the grammaticality of strings. From a theoretical point of 
view, grammaticality judgments and novelty judgments may be seen as conceptually similar 
(Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Scott & Dienes, 2008; Whittesea et al, 1990, Whittlesea & 
Loboe, 2000). However, from an empirical point of view, the present results suggest that the 
instructions measure different constructs. Likewise, the conjoint analysis has shown that the 
split-half correlations are significantly above chance for the grammaticality judgments, but 
not for the novelty judgments. A possible explanation may be that the novelty instruction 
induces several independent judgment strategies, which may lead to a more heterogeneous 
performance variable. However, the results of the present study do not offer insights in the 
different judgment processes that may have been used. Identifying these processes may be a 
worthwhile goal for future research.  
 Taken together, the use of different strategies can affect the reliability estimates and 
the correlation between two artificial grammar learning tasks in several ways. The items may 
measure implicit learning success to different degrees, the participants may use implicit and 
explicit strategies in different extents, and the use of strategies may change over time. 
Furthermore, the instruction to rate the novelty of strings may induce other processes than the 
instruction to rate the grammaticality of strings. However, if artificial grammar learning tasks 
may be used as an assessment tool, then the performance variable has to be measured reliably, 
regardless of which strategies may be used. 
Implications 
Individual differences in implicit learning. Reber (1992) and Reber and Allen (2000) 
suggested that implicit learning is such an evolutionary old system that there are only weak 
Cognitive ability beyond IQ    A1 - 34 
 
 
differences between individuals. However, the present study shows that individual differences 
in implicit learning can be measured reliably. This conforms to Mackintosh (1998) who 
claims that implicit learning is an ability that varies between individuals and replicates the 
findings of Reber et al. (1991) who also reported reliable individual differences in the 
performance of an artificial grammar learning task.  
The present research differs from other approaches that investigated individual 
differences in implicit learning. In particular, the present work investigated the reliability and 
the task consistency of artificial grammar learning tasks, whereas previous studies 
investigated the relation between the implicit learning and other performance variables. Those 
studies have shown that the performance in artrificial grammar learning tasks is rather 
unrelated with general intelligence (Gebauer & Makintosh, 2007; McGeorge, Crawford, & 
Kelly, 1997; Pretz et al., 2010: Reber et al., 1991) or the performance in explicit learning 
tasks (McGeorge et al., 1997; Reber et al., 1991). These results suggest that implicit learning 
may measure an ability that is independent from traditional performance variables such as IQ.  
However, the reliability of implicit learning tasks, such as artificial grammar learning 
tasks, have only sparsely been investigated, which makes these findings difficult to interpret. 
For example, Reber et al. (1991) suggested that an insignificant correlation between the 
performance in an artificial grammar learning task and an intelligence test may be taken as an 
indicator for the divergent validity of an implicit learning ability. In this vein, they interpreted 
an insignificant correlation of r=.25 between the performance in an artificial grammar 
learning task and a general intelligence test (four subscales of the WAIS-R). However, the 
estimated reliability of their performance measurement was only 0.51 and therefore we would 
not expect a large correlation of this variable with any measure of intelligence even if their 
true-scores have a correlation close to unity. A more realistic size of the correlation between 
these two measures may be in a magnitude of r=.30, which qualifies as a medium effect size 
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according to Cohen (1988). A post-hoc power analysis reveals that the power to detect a 
medium effect was only 0.39 in the sample of Reber et al. (1991), which had a total sample 
size of 20 participants. Thus, the reported insignificance is not a compelling evidence for the 
divergent validity of the measurement. In the same vein, McGeorge et al. (1997) and Pretz et 
al. (2010) reported non-significant correlations between the performance in an artificial 
grammar learning task and the performance in cognitive ability tests. However, the authors 
did not report reliability estimates for the performance in the artificial grammar learning task. 
The findings of the present study may suggest that the non-significant correlation may be a 
result of an unreliable measurement. Gebauer and Makintosh (2007) also reported an 
insignificant correlation between several measures of intelligence and the performance in an 
artificial grammar learning task. However, Gebauer and Mackintosh asked their participants 
to rate the novelty of letter strings and our results show that novelty ratings measure not the 
same construct as grammaticality ratings. Therefore, the question how implicit learning and 
general intelligence is related is yet not answered properly. A fertile approach for future 
research may be to investigate the relation between implicit learning and other ability 
constructs with structural equation models. This would allow to separate systematic individual 
differences from unsystematic measurement error.  
Individual assessment and reliability. To make inferences about the abilities of 
individuals, the reliability of the measurement procedure has to be improved beyond the level 
that has been achieved in the present study. Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) used an item 
analysis to select the letter strings with the greatest item-total correlation. On the one hand, 
this procedure may be useful to get homogeneous items. On the other hand, the validity of the 
measurement may shrink because the remaining items may not be a representative sample of 
the underlying grammar anymore. Another approach would be to repeat the letter strings in 
Cognitive ability beyond IQ    A1 - 36 
 
 
the testing phase and enhance the reliability this way. However, whether lengthening the test 
really increases the reliability or just causes fatigue or memory effects is an open issue. 
The use of alternative instructions. When the participants are asked to rate the 
grammaticality of letter strings, an artificial grammar learning task may only be used once. 
The results of the conjoint analysis suggests that the performance is not reliable when the 
participants are asked to rate the “novelty” of letter strings. Furthermore, experiment 1 and 
experiment 2 revealed that individual differences in novelty ratings are unrelated with 
individual differences in grammaticality ratings. Thus, alternative instructions for an artificial 
grammar learning task may be considered. For example, Manza and Bornstein (1995; see also 
Helman & Berry, 2003; Zizak & Reber, 2004), suggested to use liking instead of 
grammaticality ratings in the testing phase because liking ratings would be a more implicit 
measure. This procedure would also avoid telling the participants that there is a grammar 
constituting the letter strings in the testing phase. However, there are no data available which 
would support the notion that liking ratings are a reliable and valid measurement of implicit 
learning. 
Limitations 
Measurement models of classical test theory. We used Cronbach’s alpha, the split-
half correlation, and the retest correlation as reliability estimates in the present study. These 
estimates are based on measurement models of classical test theory which make particular 
assumptions (Lord & Novick, 1968). For example, Cronbach’s alpha is a point estimate of 
reliability only if items are τ-equivalent. Elsewise, it offers just a lower bound of reliability. 
Since the reliability estimates were rather low in the present samples, it would have been a 
worthwhile goal to test these assumptions with structural equation models. However, the use 
of structural equation models would have required larger sample sizes and therefore could not 
be realized in the present study. 
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Operationalisation of implicit learning. We measured implicit learning success by 
the judgment accuracy in the testing phase of artificial grammar learning tasks. The 
generalizability of the present findings rests on this particular operationalisation. However, 
the judgment accuracy seems to be an appropriate measure for several reasons. First, it is the 
standard performance measure in artificial grammar learning studies (e.g., Altmann, Dienes, 
& Goode, 1995; Dulany et al., 1984; Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Knowlton & Squire, 1994, 
1996; Meulemann & Van der Linden, 2003; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Pothos & Bailey, 
2000; Reber, 1967; Reber et al., 1991; Reber & Perruchet, 2003; Scott & Dienes, 2010; 
Tunney, 2005). Second, there were also great correlations between the overall judgment 
accuracy and the signal detection parameter d’ in all tasks of the present study (all rs>.98, 
ps<.001). Third, there is empirical evidence for the validity of judgment accuracy as a 
performance measure. Dulany et al. (1984) have shown that a control group without a 
learning phase showed a significant worse judgment accuracy than experimental groups with 
a learning phase. In the same vein, Reber and Perruchet (2003) have shown that a control 
group which learned randomly generated stimuli performed worse in the testing phase than an 
experimental group which learned grammatical stimuli. Taken together, the judgment 
accuracy appears to be a valid indicator for implicit learning success. 
The measurement of n-gram knowledge. We used an n-gram knowledge test in 
order to measure the amount of reportable grammar knowledge. The development of the 
knowledge test was inspired by the work of Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) and Dulany et al. 
(1984) who suggested that the participants acquire explicit knowledge of n-grams and 
therefore show above chance performance in the testing phase. However, implicitly learned 
knowledge may also help the participants to pass the n-gram knowledge test and therefore, the 
performance in the n-gram test may reflect explicit as well as implicit knowledge. This goes 
in line with several authors (e.g., Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 2007; Seger, 1994; 
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Tunney & Shanks, 2003) who suggested that the participants in an artificial grammar learning 
tasks acquire implicit as well as explicit knowledge. Therefore, it might have been worthwhile 
measuring the participants’ knowledge with an additional method. For example, Dienes and 
Scott (2005; Scott & Dienes, 2008) distinguish between structural knowledge (e.g., n-gram 
knowledge that indicates why a strings is grammatical) and judgment knowledge (the 
knowledge that a string is grammatical). To measure judgment knowledge, Dienes and 
colleagues (Dienes, 2008; Dienes, Altman, & Kwan, 1995; Dienes & Seth, 2010; Tunney, 
2005) have suggested to use confidence ratings. In particular, they suggested that decisions 
that are based on unconscious, implicit knowledge should be made with low confidence 
(guessing criterion) and accordingly there should be no correlation between confidence 
ratings and accuracy (zero correlation criterion). Therefore, asking the participants to rate the 
confidence of their judgments would have offered further insights in participants’ knowledge. 
Effect of the knowledge test. In experiment 3, there were low and non-significant 
correlations of performance between task 1 and task 2, and between task 1 and task 3, but 
there was a substantial and significant correlation between task 2 and task 3. There was also a 
low correlation between judgment accuracy and n-gram knowledge in task 1, but substantial 
correlations between judgment accuracy and knowledge in task 2 and task 3. We interpreted 
this result as an effect of grammar awareness. During the first task, the participants do not 
know that there is a grammar constituting the letter strings, but they do so during a second and 
third task. However, this finding could also be interpreted as an effect of the knowledge test. 
After completing a knowledge test, the participants may draw their attention towards n-grams 
and this may affect their judgments in subsequent tasks. However, if this would have been the 
case, the same pattern of results should have been found in experiment 1 and experiment 2, 
which was not the case. Nonetheless, it might be a worthwhile goal for future research to 
investigate possible effects of the knowledge test in greater detail. 




We demonstrated that an artificial grammar learning task can be used to measure 
individual differences in implicit learning. Future research may investigate whether 
lengthening the test may substantially increase reliability, whether the use of a liking 
instruction may allow to perform several realizations of the task, and how individual 
differences in implicit learning are related to intelligence, educational attainment or even 
professional success in later life. The present study provides the empirical basis for pursuing 
these questions. 
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1
 The performance in the second n-gram knowledge test was significantly above 
chance (t(20)=4.11, p=.001, d=0.90). This result suggests that the participants acquired n-
gram knowledge. However, it does not indicate that the participants used this knowledge for 
making grammaticality judgments. Only a positive correlation between the performance in the 
testing phase and the performance in the n-gram knowledge test would suggest that the 
participants used their n-gram knowledge for making grammaticality judgments. 
2
 One possible explanation for this result may be a greater similarity between grammar 
1 and grammar 3. In particular, a detailed inspection of the grammatical strings revealed that 
the strings of grammar 1 and grammar 3 may be more similar to each other than the strings of 








N-grams used in the knowledge test 
grammar grammatical n-grams non-grammatical n-grams 
1 NS NWS NWX NX NXS NXT 
SN SSS ST WNS  XS XT 
NN NNW NNX NWN NWW SSW  
WNW WWN WWS  XN XWX XX 
2 HHH  HL HPH LM LMM  LRH 
ML MM  MMM PR  RH RHP 
HHP HPL HPM LH  LMH LPH LRM  
MHM MP  PHP PLR RM 
3 BG BGK BK BKD DG  GD GDF 
GFD  GK GKD KD KFD 
BF  DD DFF DK FDF FFD FGG GFF  
GGF KDD KFF KK 
Note. Grammatical n-grams are n-grams that occurred in the learning phase and which 
occurred in the testing phase more often in grammatical than in non-grammatical strings. 
Non-grammatical n-grams are n-grams that did not occur in the learning phase and which 
occurred in the testing phase more often in non-grammatical than in grammatical strings. 




Judgment accuracy in experiment 3 
task grammar M t df p d 
1 1 59.67% 5.46 20 .000 1.19 
1 2 62.85% 10.26 19 .000 2.29 
1 1+2 
(pooled) 
61.22% 10.12 40 .000 1.58 
2 1 61.75% 7.40 19 .000 1.65 
2 2 61.76% 7.61 20 .000 1.66 
2 1+2 
(pooled) 
61.76% 10.75 40 .000 1.68 
3 3 59.15% 8.88 40 .000 1.39 
 




Cronbach’s alpha, split-half, and retest correlation of the judgment accuracy in experiment 3 
task grammar α rsh rtt 
1 1 .66 .43 .58 
1 2 .56 .54 .41 
1 1+2 (pooled) .55 .38 .43 
2 1 .56 .54 .46 
2 2 .32 .22 .46 
2 1+2 (pooled) .54 .60 .44 
3 3 .49 .45 .18 
Note. α = Cronbach’s alpha, rsh  = split-half correlation, rtt = retest correlation. 




Correlation between tasks separated by order of presentation in experiment 3. 
 order 1  order 2  pooled  
 r p r p r p 
task 1 – task 2 -.07 .759 .24 .314 .05 .715 
task 1 – task 3 -.02 .908 .14 .560 .08 .631 
task 2 – task 3 .41 .067 .39 .089 .38 .014 
Note. In order 1 the participants completed grammar 1 first and then grammar 2 and 
grammar 3. In order 2 the participants completed grammar 2 first and then grammar 1 and 
grammar 3. 




Cronbach’s alpha of n-gram knowledge and correlation with the judgment accuracy in 
experiment 3 
task grammar α rsh r 
1 1 -.61 -.15 .24 (.303) 
1 2 -.08 -.08 -.09 (.704) 
1 1+2 (pooled) -.42 -.11 .06 (.715) 
2 1 .49 .40 .41 (.076) 
2 2 -.12 .05 .16 (.493) 
2 1+2 (pooled) .24 .25 .30 (.060) 
3 3 .20 .09 .34 (.023) 
Note. α = Cronbach’s alpha of measured knowledge, rsh = split-half correlation, r = 
Pearson correlation between n-gram knowledge and judgment accuracy (p-values in brackets). 




Figure 1: Grammar 1 




Figure 2: Grammar 2 




Figure 3: Grammar 3 
 





Letter strings for grammar 1 sorted for different parts of the experiment 
Phase Strings 
Learning phase WNSNXS NXSTWXT WNSTTWXT WXWSNXT NWXTS NXSNWXS 
WNTSSS NXSWXTX WXWSNWSN WNSNWXS NXSWXT NXSWWWW 
NWSWN  WNSNWXTX NXSWNTX NXS WNSWWWW WXWSWN 
NXSTNWS WNSTWNSW WNSWXTX WNTSSX WNSNWSW WNTX 
NXSWNSW WNSNXTS  NXTSSS NXSNWSN WNSNWSN NXSWNTSS 
Testing phase 
(correct items) 
WNSN NWSW NWSN NXSWW NWXSW NXTSX WNSWNS NXSWNT 
NWXTSS  WNSWWW WNSWNT NXTSSX WXWTSX WNSNXT 
NWSWWN  NXSNWS NXSNWXT NXTSSSX WNSTWNS NXSTNXS  
WNTSSSX WNSWXWT NXSNXTX  WXWSWXT NWXSWNS 
NWXSNWS NXSTXWNT  WNSTNWXT WXWSNWXS NXSTWNTX 
WXWSTWXT WXWSNWSW WXWSWXTX  NXSTNWSN NWXSWXWS 
WXWTSSSS WNSTNXTX  WXWSWNSW NWXSWXTX NXSNXSWN 
Testing phase 
(incorrect items) 
TXSWNT TWXTSX NTSWWN WWSWNS WNWWNT NWSXWN 
NWXSSW WXWTST TXWTSSX SWXSWNS WSSWWWN WSSWXTS 
NWWSWXT NXNTNXS WNTTSSX NWXWSSX NWXSNTS WNSNXXX 
WXWSWST  WNSWXWN WXWSWNW XNSTWNTS  TWXSWXWS 
TWSWWWWN NNXSWXWT WSSTTNXT  WNNWNSWW WNNNWXSW 
NWXWWXTX  WXWXWXTX WXWSXWXT WXWSNWSW  
NXSWWXWN WXWSWNWW  WXWSNWNS 
 




Letter strings for grammar 2 sorted for different parts of the experiment 
Phase Strings 
Learning phase LRHMMLM LRPHLLMM RHPHR RHPHMMLM LRHL 
LPMHLLMM LPPHLM RHPRLMMM LRHMRP  RHPHMMRP 
LPPPLL RPHHHLLM RHPHL  LPPRLMMM LPR LRHRPMMM 
LPPRL  LPMMRPMM RHPHRP LPMHHLLM  LPMMRP 
RHMHLLMM LPLM  RPHHHHLL LRR LRRLMMM  RHMHHL 
LPPRLMM RPLLMMM RHPHLMM 
Testing phase 
(correct items) 
LRPHHHL RHMHHHL LRHMLMMM LPRP LPRPMM 
LPRPMMM LPLMMMM  RHPHMMML LPMR LPMRPM 
RPHHHLL  LPPHMLM LPPHMMRP RPHL LRHLMM 
RHPHMML  RHPHLMMM LPMLLMMM LPLMM LRHMML 
RPHLLMM LPMHHHLL LPPHLMMM RHPHLM LPPHMML 
RHMLLMM RPLLMMMM LPPPHLLM LPMMML  LPMLLMM 
RHMHLLM RHPHMLMM LPRPMMMM LPLMMM RHPHMLM 
RHPRLMM LRPHHHLL RHPPHLLM  
Testing phase 
(incorrect items) 
RPRL LLRPMM RHHPHHL RHMHHPL LRPHMHLL LPLR 
LPPMRP LPHMMR RHPRLMH LPMHHPLL HHMLL LPLRMM 
RPPLLMM PPLLMMMM LRHMMHPM LPHHL LPMMHM  
LPPLRPM PHPHMMML LPPHLMHM LPPLL RPHHPL  
RPHHRLL MPPHMMRP LPPPHLRM LPLMP LPMMMP 
LPPHPML LPHMMMRP  RHMHHLLP HRHLMM MHPPHLL 
LPPHPRP LPPMMRPM LPMLLMMP  LLMHHL RMPPLLM 
LPPHMHM LPPLHHHL RHPPHLLL 
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Abstract 
The present study investigates whether artificial grammar learning tasks can measure 
individual differences in implicit learning. In particular, we investigated (1) the reliability and 
the task consistency of implicit learning performance, (2) the association between implicit 
learning performance, reportable grammar knowledge, and general intelligence, and (3) 
whether implicit learning performance can predict educational attainment. N=106 participants 
completed two artificial grammar learning tasks and the Culture Fair Intelligence Test. The 
results indicate that the reliability of the performance measure is only moderate and the task 
consistency is adequate as long as no bigram knowledge test is performed. Artificial grammar 
learning performance is independent from reportable grammar knowledge and independent 
from general intelligence. Furthermore, there is a predictive but not an incremental predictive 
value on educational attainment. 
 Keywords: implicit learning, artificial grammar learning, individual differences, 
reliability, validity 
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Can artificial grammar learning tasks measure individual differences in implicit learning? 
Sometimes we make correct decisions based on our gut feeling but can not explain 
them. Regarding this, several authors suggested that we can learn implicitly, which means 
without intention and awareness (Frensch & Rünger, 2003; Reber, 1967, 1992; Seger, 1994). 
For example, sometimes we are able to classify a sentence to be grammatical correct or 
incorrect but we are not able to report the determining grammatical rule. Relating to this, 
Reber (1967) suggested that we may learn complex rules implicitly. He further suggested that 
implicit learning is an evolutionary mechanism that is independent from explicit learning 
(Reber, 1992; Reber & Allen, 2000). In the same vein, Mackintosh (2006) proposes an 
implicit associative learning system, and an explicit hypothesis generating and testing system. 
In particular, the implicit learning system may detect contingencies without awareness or 
intention whereas the explicit learning system is necessary for discovering regularities with 
intention and awareness. Mackintosh hypothesized that individual differences in implicit 
learning are independent from general intelligence but powerful predictors of educational 
success. In order to test this hypothesis, it is necessary to measure individual differences in 
implicit learning. For one thing, implicit learning may help to characterize cognitive ability in 
greater detail. For another thing, implicit learning measures may be used as selection criteria 
for university or job applications. 
To measure implicit learning, Reber and Mackintosh suggested to use artificial 
grammar learning tasks. In such a task, the participants are asked to learn a list of arbitrary 
letter strings (like KTQHXTJ). Afterwards they are told that these strings were constructed 
according to a complex rule system (grammar) and they are asked to judge new strings as 
grammatical or non-grammatical. The percentage of correct judgments is taken as an indicator 
for implicit learning success. Typically, the participants show above chance performance 
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which suggests that they learned something but they are not able to report the grammar rules, 
which suggests that they learned the rules implicitly. 
In order to use an artificial grammar learning task for individual assessment or the 
investigation of individual differences, the performance measures must meet several 
psychometric criteria. (1) The reliability of performance measures should be acceptable. (2) 
Measures should be independent from reportable knowledge to attest that the learning 
performance is implicit. (3) Implicit learning measures should be divergent from general 
intelligence to attest their divergent validity. (4) Implicit learning performance should be 
related with real life performance to reveal its predictive validity. (5) Performance should be 
task consistent, meaning measureable with more than one artificial grammar learning task in 
order to establish sufficient generalizability. There have been only sparse attempts to 
investigate the psychometric properties of artificial grammar learning measures. Therefore, 
the purpose of the present work was to evaluate these five issues. 
(1) Reliability. There are only few studies that investigated the reliability of artificial 
grammar learning measures. Reber, Walkenfeld, and Hernstadt (1991) examined N=20 
students and reported a Cronbach’s alpha of α=.51 for 100 grammaticality judgements. 
Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) assessed N=605 pupils and reported a split-half correlation of 
r=.70 for two artificial grammar learning tasks with 80 grammaticality judgements each. In 
addition, Danner, Hagemann, Schankin, Bechtold, and Funke (submitted) conducted a series 
of experiments with a total of N=83 students and reported Cronbach’s alphas between α=.32 
and α=.66 for grammaticality judgments in different artificial grammar learning tasks. These 
findings suggest that the performance scores of individuals should be interpreted carefully and 
the reliability of implicit learning performance variables should be taken into account when 
interpreting correlations with other variables. However, the previous findings may also be a 
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specific feature of the grammars that have been used. For the purpose of the present study, we 
developed two new grammars and investigated the reliability of the performance measures. 
(2) Relation with reportable knowledge. Reber (1967) suggested that the 
participants in an artificial grammar learning task learn the grammar rules implicitly because 
they are not able to report their grammar knowledge. However, to test whether grammaticality 
judgments are independent from reportable knowledge, it is necessary to define what kind of 
knowledge is relevant for the performance in artificial grammar learning tasks. Over the 
years, there have been controversial and fertile discussions about this topic. For example, 
Reber and Allen (1978) found that their participants were not able to report any knowledge 
about grammar rules and therefore suggested that they learned the grammar rules implicitly. 
Dulany, Carlson, and Dewey (1984) criticized that asking participants to report the grammar 
rules is too difficult and therefore the participants might not have been able to report their 
knowledge. To avoid this problem, Dulany et al. (1984) asked their participants to report 
letter string features on which they based their grammaticality judgments. They showed that 
the reported knowledge was sufficient to explain the above chance accuracy of 
grammaticality judgments and concluded that the acquired knowledge was not implicit at all. 
In a similar vein, Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) showed that knowledge of bigrams was 
sufficient to explain the above chance accuracy of grammaticality judgments. Other authors 
(e.g., Knowlton & Squire, 1996) suggested that the participants make grammaticality 
judgments based on the similarity of letter strings with previously learned strings. Having 
these different explanation attempts in mind, it seems difficult to find an appropriate 
measurement for the relevant knowledge. Shanks and St. John (1994) concluded that it is only 
possible to measure the relevant knowledge for implicit learning tasks, when the information 
criterion and the sensitivity criterion are met. Meeting the information criterion means to find 
an operationalisation that captures all kind of relevant knowledge. Meeting the sensitivity 
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criterion means to make the knowledge test as sensitive as the implicit learning task itself. 
Thus, to investigate the relation between implicit learning performance and reportable 
knowledge in the present study, we used a knowledge test that was designed to meet the 
information as well as the sensitivity criterion. 
(3) Relation with general intelligence. Reber et al. (1991) reported a correlation of 
r=.25 between the performance in an artificial grammar learning task and IQ. Gebauer and 
Mackintosh (2007) reported correlations between r=-.03 and r=.17 depending on the task and 
the instruction. Hence, there is preliminary evidence pointing towards the divergent validity 
of implicit learning measures. A further aim of the present study was to replicate these 
findings. 
(4) Predictive value. From a practical point of view, the most important characteristic 
of a measure may be its predictive value. Mackintosh (2006) hypothesizes that performance in 
artificial grammar learning may be a powerful predictor of educational attainment. However, 
there are no investigations of this hypothesis yet. Therefore, the present study will test 
whether the performance in an artificial grammar learning task can predict educational 
success. 
(5) Task consistency. A further purpose of the present work was to evaluate the task 
consistency of performance measures. This is of particular importance within the framework 
of artificial grammar learning tasks. During an artificial grammar learning task, the 
participants are asked to memorize a series of arbitrary letter strings. Only after this learning 
phase, they will be informed that there was a grammar constituting the strings and their task 
will be to classify new letter strings as grammatical or non-grammatical. During a subsequent 
artificial grammar learning task, the participants will already know that there is a grammar 
constituting the strings in the learning phase and that his or her job will be to rate the 
grammaticality of letter strings afterwards. Hence, it may be that the participants do not only 
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memorize the strings but also try to discover the grammar explicitly. To investigate this 
hypothesis, Danner et al. (submitted) performed an experiment where the participants 
completed three artificial grammar learning tasks with a subsequent knowledge test after each 
grammar learning task. They reported that there was no correlation between the performance 
in the first and the second artificial grammar learning task, which indicates a low task 
consistency of artificial grammar learning task measures. Likewise, the participants' 
performance in a first task was unrelated with the reported grammar knowledge whereas the 
performance in subsequent tasks correlated with the reported grammar knowledge. This 
finding suggests that the learning process in the second and third artificial grammar learning 
task was not implicit anymore. However, there is also an alternative interpretation of the 
results of Danner et al. (submitted). Their participants completed a knowledge test (containing 
bi- and trigrams of letter strings) after every artificial grammar learning task. Therefore, it is 
also possible that the knowledge test and not the grammar awareness changed the 
participants’ strategy and caused the low task consistency as well as the relation with reported 
knowledge. A further aim of the present study was to test the hypothesis that a knowledge test 
decreases the task consistency between two artificial grammar learning tasks and causes a 
substantial correlation between performance and reported grammar knowledge. Thus, in two 
separate conditions the participants completed either a grammar knowledge test or a dummy 
knowledge test. 
Aim of the present study. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the reliability 
and the validity of artificial grammar learning measures. Therefore, we investigated the 
reliability and the task consistency of performance measures as well as the relation with 
reportable knowledge, general intelligence and educational attainment. 
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Method 
Participants 
There were N=106 students of the University of Heidelberg participating in the present 
study. The participants were randomly assigned to either the bigram group (N=53) or the 
control group (N=53). 
Procedure 
All participants completed first an artificial grammar learning task, second a 
knowledge test, third the Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFT3), and forth an additional 
artificial grammar learning task and a further knowledge test. 
The first artificial grammar learning task. The stimuli for the first artificial 
grammar learning task were constructed according to Figure 1. The task consisted of a 
learning phase and a testing phase. 
******************************** 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
******************************** 
In the learning phase 39 letter strings were presented and the participants were 
instructed to memorize them. Each string was presented individually for 3 s on a 17” screen 
of a personal computer (e.g. KTQHXTJ). The participants were asked to repeat the strings 
correctly by pressing the respective letters on the keyboard. When a string was repeated 
correctly, the feedback “correct” was given and the next string occurred. When a string was 
repeated incorrectly, the feedback “false” was given and the string was displayed again until 
repeated correctly. After a participant repeated ten strings correctly, these ten strings were 
simultaneously displayed for 90s on the screen and the participant was asked to repeat them 
silently. After a participant repeated all 39 string correctly the learning phase was finished and 
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the participant was informed that all strings in the learning phase were constructed according 
to a complex rule system.  
In the testing phase 78 new strings were presented (see Appendix, Table A1). There 
were 39 grammatical strings that were constructed according to the same rule system as the 
strings in the learning phase (e.g. KXTJTTH). In addition, there were 39 non-grammatical 
strings that contained one letter at a position that violated the rule system (e.g. KXTXJK). All 
strings were presented twice so that there was a total of 156 items in the testing phase. The 
participants were instructed to judge the letter strings as grammatical or non-grammatical. To 
judge a string as grammatical, the participants had to press the A-key of the keyboard, to 
judge a string as non-grammatical, the L-key. The order of presentation of the strings was 
fixed across the participants in a random order. The percentage of correct judgments in the 
testing phase was taken as the performance indicator for implicit learning success.  
The first knowledge test. Immediately after the testing phase, the participants 
completed a knowledge test. The bigram group completed a bigram knowledge test and the 
control group completed a dummy knowledge test 
The bigram knowledge test assessed participants’ knowledge of bigrams. To meet the 
information criterion (Shanks & St. John, 1994), we designed the bigram knowledge test in a 
manner that the test was sensitive to different forms of knowledge. In particular, the test was a 
direct test of participants’ knowledge of bigrams as well as an indirect test of participants' 
performance relevant knowledge in general. For example, one participant may have acquired 
knowledge of bigrams during the learning phase (as suggested by Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990) 
and therefore achieved above chance accuracy in the testing phase as well as in the bigram 
knowledge test. Another participant may have used the similarity between previously learned 
and new strings (as suggested by Knowlton & Squire, 1996) and thus achieved above chance 
accuracy in the testing phase. However, the knowledge about the similarity of strings would 
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also help the participant to perform well in the knowledge test. In order to meet the sensitivity 
criterion, we made the instructions and response format analogous to the testing phase (as 
suggested by Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
Thus, all strings of the testing phase were decomposed into bigrams. For example, 
KXTJTTH was decomposed into KX, XT, TJ, JT, TT, and TH. The participants were 
instructed to rate a bigram as grammatical (occurring more often in grammatical strings) or 
non-grammatical (occurring more often in non-grammatical strings). To judge a bigram as 
grammatical, the participants had to press the A-key. To judge a bigram as non-grammatical, 
the participants had to press the L-key. There were 34 different bigrams for grammar 1 (see 
Appendix, Table A1). All bigrams were presented twice so that there were a total of 68 items 
in the bigram knowledge test. The order of presentation of the strings was fixed across the 
participants in a random order. The percentage of correct judgments in the bigram knowledge 
test was taken as an indicator for the amount of reportable knowledge. 
In order to make the procedure for the bigram and the control group parallel, the 
control group completed a dummy knowledge test which was unrelated with the letter strings. 
The dummy knowledge test consisted of statements like “Alberto Fujimori was president of 
Japan from 1990 to 2000” (which is right, by the way) and the participants were asked to rate 
the truth of the statements. To rate a string as true, the participants had to press the A-key of 
the keyboard, to rate a string as false, the L-key. There were 34 different statements and all 
statements were presented twice so that there were a total of 68 items in the dummy 
knowledge test. Participants’ responses in the dummy knowledge test were not analyzed. 
The Culture Fair Intelligence Test (CFT3). The CFT3 (Cattell, Krug, & Barton, 
1973) was used as an indicator for participants’ general intelligence. The test consists of 48 
different figural reasoning items. The speed version of the test was administered, which took 
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approximately 25 minutes. The number of correctly solved items was taken as the 
performance indicator for participants’ general intelligence.  
The second artificial grammar learning task. The stimuli for the second artificial 
grammar learning task consisted of completely different letters. The stimuli were constructed 
according to Figure 2. The second artificial grammar learning task also consisted of a learning 
phase and a testing phase. The procedure was identical to the first artificial grammar learning 
task. 
******************************** 
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
******************************** 
The second knowledge test. The procedure for the second knowledge test was 
identical to the first with the exception that all participants completed a bigram knowledge 
test after the testing phase and the bigram knowledge test consisted of 34 items only. The 
stimuli are shown in the Appendix (Table A2). 
In addition, the participants were asked to report their final school exams’ grade point 
average (1=very good to 6=failed) and their subject of study (psychology vs. other subject). 
Results 
Performance in artificial grammar learning tasks 
To investigate the effect of the first bigram knowledge test, we analyzed the data 
separately for the bigram group and the control group. In the bigram group, the percentage of 
correct judgments in the first artificial grammar learning task was significantly above chance, 
M=58.09%, t(52)=7.40, p<.001. The split-half correlation (between the first and the second 
presentation of strings) was r=.60. The percentage of correct judgments in the second artificial 
grammar learning task was also above chance, M=56.98%, t(52)=11.02, p<.001 and the split-
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half correlation was r=.32. The correlation between both tasks was r=.22, p=.109, which 
points towards a low task consistency. 
In the control group, the performance in the first artificial grammar learning task was 
also significantly above chance, M=59.62%, t(52)=10.68, p<.001, and the split-half 
correlation was r=.39. The percentage of correct judgments in the second artificial grammar 
learning task was M=57.28%, t(52)=12.26, p<.001, and the split-half correlation was r=.21. 
The correlation between both tasks was r=.39, p=.004, which points towards an adequate task 
consistency. 
To investigate the effect of the knowledge test on the task consistency in greater detail, 
we tested whether the correlation between the first and the second artificial grammar learning 
task differed between the bigram group and the control group. As expected, the task 
consistency in the control group was greater, r=.39, Z=.39, than in the bigram group, r=.22 
Z=.22. However, the difference between groups was not significant, z=0.94, p=.347. 
Reportable knowledge 
In the bigram group, the percentage of correct judgments in the first bigram 
knowledge test was significantly above chance, M=55.45%, t(52)=5.01, p<.001. The split-half 
correlation was r=.55. The correlation between the performance in the first testing phase and 
the first knowledge test was r=.01, p=.942. The percentage of correct judgments in the second 
bigram knowledge test was also significantly above chance, M=55.03%, t(52)=5.50, p<.001. 
The split-half correlation was r=.32. The correlation between the performance in the second 
testing phase and the second knowledge test was r=.30, p=.029.  
In the control group, there was no bigram knowledge test after the first artificial 
grammar learning task. The percentage of correct judgments in the bigram knowledge test 
after the second artificial grammar learning task was significantly above chance, M=56.40%, 
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t(52)=6.79, p<.001. The split-half correlation was r=.33. The correlation between the 
performance in the testing phase and the knowledge test was r=.02, p=.884. 
Relation with general intelligence 
To investigate the relation between implicit learning and general intelligence we took 
the performance in the first artificial grammar learning task as an indicator for implicit 
learning performance. The procedure for the bigram group and the control group was identical 
until the completion of the first artificial grammar learning task and therefore the data of both 
groups were analyzed together. The number of solved items in the CFT3 served as a measure 
of participants' general intelligence.  
The mean number of solved items in the CFT3 was M=28.69 (SD=4.76). Cronbach’s 
alpha for the 48 items was α=.73. The correlation between performance in the first artificial 
grammar learning task and the CFT3 was r=.16, p=.112. Taking the reliability estimates of the 
variables into account, this reveals a correlation corrected for attenuation of r=.25. 
Prediction of educational success 
The participants’ final school exams’ grade point averages (GPA) ranged between 1.0 
and 3.1 with a mean of M=1.81 (SD=0.66). We performed a series of linear regression 
analyses with GPA as the criterion and subject of study, the performance in the first artificial 
grammar learning task, and the performance in the CFT3 as predictors. The subject of study 
was included as a confounder because there is a severe restriction on admission for 
psychology in Germany and we expected psychology students to have a better GPA than 
students of other subjects. There were N=47 psychology students and N=59 students of other 
subjects.  
Table 1 shows the results of four regression analyses. As can be seen, the performance 
in the first artificial grammar learning task (analysis 2) as well as the performance in the 
CFT3 (analysis 3) is significantly related with educational success. However, if both 
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predictors are considered simultaneously, then only general intelligence remains significant 
(analysis 4). 
******************************** 
Please insert Table 1 about here 
******************************** 
Discussion 
The present study demonstrates that it is possible to measure individual differences in 
implicit learning with an artificial grammar learning task. In particular, there are some 
findings that need attention. 
The reliability of performance measures is only moderate. The reliability estimates 
in the present study range between 0.21 and 0.60, which suggests that performance measures 
of artificial grammar learning are not suitable for individual assessment. This replicates the 
findings of Reber et al. (1991), Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007), and Danner et al. 
(submitted). Therefore, the moderate reliability seems to be a general property of artificial 
grammar learning task measures and not a specific feature of the grammar used or the sample 
investigated.  
Implicit learning performance is divergent from general intelligence. There was a 
small correlation between the performance in an artificial grammar learning task and the 
performance in the CFT3. Even if the reliabilities of the variables were taken into account, the 
correlation corrected for attenuation was only moderate. This result replicates the findings of 
Reber et al. (1991) and Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) and points toward the divergent 
validity of artificial grammar learning measures. 
There is a predictive value but not an incremental predictive value of artificial 
grammar learning measures. The results of the regression analysis demonstrate that 
artificial grammar learning performance is related with the participants’ graduation grade. 
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However, the regression coefficient becomes non-significant when participants’ general 
intelligence is included as a predictor. This finding suggests that even though both variables 
overlap only moderately, the relation between artificial grammar learning performance and 
educational attainment is due to this overlap. Therefore, the present findings speak against 
Mackintosh’s (2006) hypothesis that implicit learning is independent from general 
intelligence and relevant for success in real life. 
A grammar knowledge test decreases the task consistency and increases the 
correlation between performance and reportable knowledge. As expected, there was a 
substantial and significant correlation between both artificial grammar learning tasks if the 
participants did not complete a knowledge test between tasks. If the participants completed a 
knowledge test between tasks, there was no significant correlation between tasks. This result 
goes in line with the hypothesis that a knowledge test decreases the task consistency of 
artificial grammar learning task measures. The correlations between tasks did not differ 
significantly between the bigram group and the control group, but the sample size of the 
present study was only sufficient to detect a population difference in the correlation 
coefficients of q=0.50 with a one-tailed type-one-error probability of α=.05 and a power of 
1-β=.80. To detect a medium effect of q=0.30 (Cohen, 1977) a sample size of N=282 would 
have been required and to detect a small effect of q=0.10 a sample size of N=2480 would have 
been required. In addition, there was a substantial and significant correlation between the 
performance in the second artificial grammar learning task and reportable knowledge in the 
bigram group, but not in the control group. This suggests that the participants changed their 
strategy after they had completed a bigram knowledge test and this also points towards an 
effect of a grammar knowledge test on the task consistency. Taken together, this pattern of 
results suggests that the grammar knowledge test, and not the awareness of a grammar 
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constituting the letter strings decreases the correlation between subsequent artificial grammar 
learning tasks. 
Conclusion. The present findings demonstrate that artificial grammar learning tasks 
can be used to measure individual differences in implicit learning, and implicit learning 
performance is divergent from general intelligence. However, the reliability of performance 
measures is only moderate and there is no incremental predictive value of implicit learning on 
educational attainment. Furthermore, a grammar knowledge test decreases the task 
consistency and increases the correlation between performance and reportable knowledge. 
Therefore, artificial grammar learning tasks are suitable for investigating individual 
differences in implicit learning but they are not suitable for individual assessment. 
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Table 1 
Regression analyses of GPA 
Analysis Predictor β t-value df p-value  R² 
1 subject of study -.56 -6.65 1 <.001 .31 
2 subject of study -.58 -6.95 1 <.001 .34 
 AGL -.17 -2.04 1 .044  
3 subject of study -.50 -5.99 1 <.001 .36 
 CFT3 -.22 -2.67 1 .010  
4 subject of study -.52 -6.22 1 <.001 .37 
 AGL -.13 -1.62 1 .108  
 CFT3 -.20 -2.35 1 .020  
Note. β = standardized regression coefficient, AGL = performance in the first artificial 
grammar learning task, CFT3 = performance in the CFT3. 
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Figure 1: Grammar 1 that was used in the first artificial grammar learning task 
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Figure 2: Grammar 2 that was used in the second artificial grammar learning task 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Letter strings for grammar 1 sorted for different parts of the experiment 
phase strings 
learning phase KTJ KTJH KTJHQJ KTJHQJH KTJTH KTJTT KTJTTH KTJTTT 
KTJTTTH KTQHXTJ KTQJHHK KTQJKQJ KXTJ KXTJHQJ 
KXTJTTT KXTQHTJ KXXTJ KXXTJTH KXXTQJK KXXXTJ 
KXXXTJH XHTJ XHTJTT XHTJTTH XHTQHTJ XHTQJK XHXTJT 
XHXTJTT XHXTQJK XHXXTJ XHXXTJT XJHHHHK XJHHHK 




KTJHQJT KTJT KTJTHQJ KTJTTTT KTQHTJ KTQHTJH KTQHTJT 
KTQJHK KTQJK KXTJH KXTJT KXTJTH KXTJTT KXTJTTH 
KXTQJHK KXTQJK KXXTJH KXXTJT KXXTJTT KXXXTJT 
KXXXXTJ XHTJH XHTJHQJ XHTJT XHTJTH XHTJTTT XHTQJHK 
XHXTJ XHXTJH XHXTJTH XHXXTJH XHXXXTJ XJHHKQJ XJHK 





KHJT KHQJK KKTJTH KQQHTJ KTJQQJT KTJTTQT KTQHTHT 
KTQHTTH KTQJKK KXJTHQJ KXJXXTJ KXKTJT KXQJT 
KXQJTTH KXTHH KXTJJHK KXTXJK KXXJJH KXXJTT KXXTJJT 
KXXXTKT XHHKQJT XHJTJTH XHTHTTT XHTQJQK XHTTH 
XHXJJ XHXTXH XHXXQJH XJHHKXJ XJHKQTH XJKK XJKQKTH 
XJTQJH XKTJT XTK XTTJTH XTXXXTJ XXTJHQJ 
knowledge test 
(bigrams) 
HH HJ HK HQ HT HX JH JJ JK JQ JT JX KH KK KQ KT KX QH QJ 
QK QQ QT TH TJ TK TQ TT TX XH XJ XK XQ XT XX 
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Table A2 
Letter strings for grammar 2 sorted for different parts of the experiment 
phase strings 
learning phase DBWD DBWDNW DBWDNWB DBWDR DBWDRRR DBWNRBW 
DBWNRW DBWNSRW DRBBBWB DRBBWB DRBW DRBWB 
DRBWBNW DRW DRWB DRWBNBW DRWBRNW DSBWDR DSRBWB 
DSRWB DSSBWD DSSRBBW DSSRW DSSRWB DSSRWBR DSSSRBW 
DSSSSRW SWDNBW SWDNBWB SWDNW SWDRNBW SWDRNW 





DBWDNBW DBWDRNW DBWDRR DBWNBWD DBWNRWB DRBBBBW 
DRBBBW DRBBW DRBBWBR DRBWBR DRBWBRR DRWBNWB 
DRWBR DRWBRRR DSBWD DSRBBW DSRBW DSRW DSRWBR 
DSSRBW DSSRBWB DSSSBWD DSSSRW DSSSRWB SWD SWDNBBW 
SWDNWB SWDNWBR SWDR SWDRNWB SWDRR SWDRRR SWDRRRR 





DBSDNBW DBSNRRWB DBWDNR DBWDRDW DBWNBSD DRBDBBW 
DRBNBW DRBWWBR DRSSBWD DRSSRW DRWBNRB DRWDRBR 
DRWNR DSBRWD DSBW DSBWBR DSBWBRR DSRRBW DSRWBW 
DSRWSR DSRWW DSSRBBB DSSSNBW DWBBW SBDNWBR SDDR 
SDNRW SNDRRR SNNSRBW SRD SWBNWB SWDRRSR SWDWNWB 
SWNNBBW SWNRBWW SWNRR SWNRWRR SWNSRRW SWSSRW 
knowledge test 
(bigrams) 
BB BD BN BR BS BW DB DD DN DR DS DW NB ND NN NR NS NW RB 
RD RN RR RS RW SB SD SN SR SS SW WB WD WN WR WS WW 
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Abstract 
The Tailorshop simulation is a computer based dynamic decision making task in which 
participants have to lead a fictional company for twelve simulated months. The present study 
investigated whether the performance measure in the Tailorshop simulation is reliable and 
valid. The participants were 158 employees from different companies. Structural equation 
models were used to test tau-equivalent measurement models. The results indicate that the 
trends of the company value between the second and the twelfth month are reliable variables. 
Furthermore, this measure predicted real-life job performance ratings by supervisors and was 
associated with the performance in another dynamic decision making task. Thus, the trend of 
the company value provides a reliable and valid performance indicator for the Tailorshop 
simulation. 
Keywords: dynamic decision making, complex problem solving, Tailorshop, 
reliability, validity 
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Measuring performance in dynamic decision making:  
reliability and validity of the Tailorshop simulation 
Real life decisions are complex and sometimes there are no well-defined solutions for 
problems. A manager has to make decisions even if he or she does not have all relevant 
information, or an employer has to pursue the interests of his staff as well as the goals of his 
company, even if both views may be conflicting. Gonzalez, Yanyukov, and Martin (2005) call 
such decisions dynamic decisions. They are characterized by dynamics, complexity, 
opaqueness, and dynamic complexity. In a similar vein, Dörner (1980) characterizes such 
problems as complex problems, which means that their structure is complex, connected, 
dynamic, and non-transparent. Recently, dynamic decision making tasks have also been 
included in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA; Wirth & Klieme, 
2003). Since the ability to deal with such problems may have impact on important decisions 
in real life, it is an interesting question whether there are individual differences in dynamic 
decision making and whether these differences can be measured reliably and validly (e.g., 
Baker & O’Neil, 2002; Rigas, Carling, & Brehmer, 2002; Süß, 1996, 1999; Strohschneider, 
1986; Zaccaro, Mumford, Connelly, Marks, & Gilbert, 2000). Investigating these issues was 
the aim of the present study. 
To investigate dynamic decision making, several authors suggested to study persons’ 
behavior in computer simulations. The Tailorshop is such a dynamic decision making task, 
which has been used for several decades (e.g., Barth & Funke, 2010; Putz-Osterloh, Bott, & 
Köster, 1990; Süß, Kersting, & Oberauer, 1993; Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004). The scenario 
simulates a small business that produces and sells shirts. The participants have to lead this 
business for twelve simulated months by manipulating several variables like the number of 
workers, the expenses for advertising, etc. (see Figure 1).  
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***************************** 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
***************************** 
In total, the Tailorshop consists of 24 variables. Twenty-one variables are visible to 
the participants and three variables are invisible to the participant. Twelve variables can be 
manipulated directly (e.g., the costs for advertising) whereas other variables can only be 
manipulated indirectly (e.g., the demand). The state of a variable in a given month influences 
the state of the same and other variables in a following month. Figure 2 shows schematically 
how the variables are connected (see Funke, 1983, for an algebraic definition of all system 
variables). 
***************************** 
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
***************************** 
In order to use the performance in the Tailorshop for the investigation of individual 
differences or for individual assessment, the performance variable should be reliable and 
valid. The reliability of a performance variable is important in two ways.  
In a research context, reliability considerations are important for an understanding of 
the validity of dynamic decision making measures because the reliability of a variable affects 
its correlation with criterion variables. In an applied context, the Tailorshop may be used to 
measure a single person’s ability to solve complex problems, e.g., as part of an assessment 
center. This measurement is only useful if it is reliable because otherwise it will yield 
incorrect decisions. 
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Reliability estimation.  
In classical test theory, the reliability of a variable is defined as the proportion of the 
true score variance relative to the total variance of a variable (Lord & Novick, 1968). In the 
Tailorshop scenario, the reliability is defined as the proportion of true individual performance 
differences relative to the total individual performance differences. The true score τ of a 
measurement i of a variable Y is defined as the expected value given a particular person P 
(Lord & Novick, 1968). In the Tailorshop scenario, the true score of a performance variable is 
defined as the expected performance given a particular person, τi := E(Yi|P). In addition, the 
measurement error ε is defined as the deviation of the measured variable from the true score 
variable, εi := Yi – τi (Lord & Novick, 1968). To estimate the reliability, multiple, 
experimentally independent measurements of a variable are necessary. 
In addition, two assumptions have to be made which define the τ-equivalent 
measurement model. The first assumption is that the true score of a measurement i of a 
particular person is identical with the true score of another measurement j of this person, 
τi = τj =: τ. The second assumption is that the errors of the measurements are uncorrelated, 
cov(εi,εj) = 0, for all i ≠ j. These assumptions may be tested with a structural equation model 
(Steyer, 1989) as shown in Figure 3. If the assumptions hold, then the variance of the true 






Please insert Figure 3 about here 
***************************** 
Validity assessment 
According to Dörner (1980) and Gonzalez et al. (2005) dynamic decisions are 
characterized by complexity, connectivity, non-transparency, and dynamics. Hence, the 
content validity of a performance variable may be evaluated regarding these four criteria. The 
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convergent validity may be evaluated by the correlation with another dynamic decision 
making task. Therefore, we expected a substantial correlation with the dynamic decision 
making task Heidelberg Finite State Automaton (Wirth & Funke, 2005), which has also been 
used in the German PISA assessment in 2000 (Wirth & Klieme, 2003). The predictive validity 
may be evaluated by the correlation with real life performance. Therefore, we expected that 
the performance in the Tailorshop can predict professional success. Finally, the divergent 
validity may be attested by a low correlation with another ability construct. Hence, we 
hypothesized that there is a low correlation between the performance in the Tailorshop and 
the performance in a standard intelligence test. 
Performance measurement 
At the beginning of the simulation, the participants were instructed to maximize the 
company value. Thus, the success of dynamic decision making may be measured by the 
achieved company value. The simplest approach may be to measure the company value after 
every month. However, the company value of a particular month depends on the company 
value of the previous month, company valuei = company valuei-1 + changei. Therefore, the 
company values are not experimentally independent and the assumption of uncorrelated errors 
will be violated. On the other hand, there is no such relationship between the changes of the 
company values. Furthermore, the sum of the changes of the company values corresponds to 
the company value after twelve months because the company value at the beginning of the 






Therefore, the changes of the company values after each simulated month may be taken as 
performance indicators for the Tailorshop simulation. 
As an alternative, Funke (1983) suggested to use the trends of the company value as 
performance indicators. The trends of the company value are binary variables. If the company 
value between two successive months increases, the trend is positive. If the company value 
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decreases, the trend is zero.1 This scoring may has several advantages. First, the trend 
measure is simple to interpret because each point corresponds to a month where the given aim 
(“maximize company value”) was achieved. Second, the trend measure is robust against 
outliers, whereas the change value may rise to extreme values (due to the non-linear 
relationships between the variables). And finally, the measurement model for the trend 
measure makes fewer assumptions than the measurement model for the change measures on 
how the company value develops over the months. In particular, the τ-equivalent 
measurement model for the change measures states that the (true) change of a person is 
constant over the months, τi = τj. On the other hand, the measurement model for the trend 
measures only states that a person who has a greater probability to make gain in a particular 
month, also has a greater probability to make gain in another month. 
Aim of the present study 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the reliability and the validity of (1) 
the change of the company value and (2) the trend of the company value. The reliabilities of 
these variables were investigated with τ-equivalent measurement models. Furthermore, the 
content, convergent, predictive, and divergent validities of these variables were evaluated. 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were N=158 employees (111 female, 47 male), who were recruited 
via newspaper announcement from different branches and different companies around 
Heidelberg.  The participants rated their jobs according to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88 COM). 6% rated themselves as legislators, senior 
officials, and managers, 25% as professionals, 11% as technical and associate professionals, 
14% as clerks, 40% as service workers and shop and market sales workers, 1% as craft and 
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related trade workers, 1% as plant and machine operators and assemblers, and 1% as 
elementary occupations. The participants’ mean age was M=43.34 years (SD=11.22). 
Measures 
Advanced Progressive Matrices. General intelligence was measured using the 
Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1994). The number of solved items 
in the second set was taken as a performance indicator. Cronbach’s alpha for the 36 items was 
α=.85. 
Heidelberg Finite State Automaton. The Heidelberg Finite State Automaton (Wirth 
& Funke, 2005) was used as a second indicator for dynamic decision making. The scenario is 
computer based and simulates a space flight where the participants control a space ship and a 
ground vehicle with a graphical user interface (see Figure 4). The system variables are 
connected and dynamic. For example, the ability to fly with the space ship depends on the 
state of the propulsion, the heat shield, the landing gear, and the state of the ground vehicle. 
The performance was measured with 22 items where the participants have to reach a specified 
target (e.g., land the space ship on a particular planet). The number of solved items was taken 
as the performance variable. Cronbach’s alpha for the 22 items was α=.93. 
***************************** 
Please insert Figure 4 about here 
***************************** 
Tailorshop. The participants were given information about the meaning of the 
variables in the Tailorshop (e.g., “The account status is the amount of money in your account 
that is available anytime. A negative value signifies that you took a loan.”). Further, the 
participants were instructed to maximize the company value within twelve simulated months. 
For the purpose of the present study we measured (1) the changes of the company value and 
(2) the trends of the company value after every simulated month (English and German 
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versions of the Tailorshop simulation software are available from the website 
http://www.atp.uni-hd.de/tools/tailorshop).  
Professional success. The participants’ professional success was measured by 
supervisor ratings (Higgins, Peterson, Pihl, & Lee, 2007) with five items on a six point scale 
(“The employee achieves arranged and set objectives“, “The employee demonstrates 
competence in all job-related tasks”, “The employee meets all my expectations in his roles 
and responsibilities”, “How do you rate the quality of his work?”, “How do you rate the 
overall level of performance that you observe for this employee?”). Cronbach’s alpha for 
these five item was α=.91. In addition, the participants’ yearly income was measured with 
thirteen categories (1 = ”under €2,500”, 2 = ”€2,500 to €5,000”, 3  = ”€5,000 to €7,500”, 4 = 
“€7,500 to €10,000 €”, 5 = “€10,000 to €12,500”, 6 = “€12,500 to €15,000”, 7 = “€15,000 to 
€20,000”, 8 = “€20,000 to €25,000”, 9 = “€25,000 to €30,000”, 10 = “€30,000 to €37,500”, 
11 = “€37,500 to €50,000”, 12 = “€50,000 to €125,000”, 13 = “over €125,000”).  
Results 
Measurement models 
The τ-equivalent measurement model was specified according to Figure 2. The 
measurement model for the change variables was estimated using the maximum likelihood 
procedure implemented in Mplus 5. The measurement model for the trend variables was 
estimated using the means and variance adjusted weighted least square estimator (WLSMV) 
implemented in Mplus 5 (Muthén & Muthén, 2007). In a first step, we estimated the 
measurement models for the performance indicators of all twelve months. However, the first 
assessment in a study may be unreliable and sometimes may not measure what is intended. 
Therefore, we also estimated the measurement models for the last eleven months, then for the 
last ten months and so on.  
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Neither measurement model for the change variables fitted with the data, all 
χ²>714.41, all RMSEA>0.71, all CFI<0.45. However, the measurement models for the trend 
variables fitted better with the data. The results are reported in Table 1. As can be seen, the 
measurement model for the last eleven trend variables revealed an acceptable model fit and 
the measurement models for the last nine or fewer trend variables fitted even better. However, 
the fewer months were included, the smaller the covariance matrix was and the fewer 
covariances had to be fitted with the parameters of the model. Therefore, the better model fit 
might also be a consequence of the smaller covariance matrix. Furthermore, the dynamics 
during twelve months is greater than the dynamics in only the last few months. Therefore, the 
more months are captured by a performance measure, the greater the content validity of the 
measure will be. Therefore, we decided to accept the measurement model for the last eleven 
trend variables and use it for reliability estimation.  
***************************** 
Please insert Table 1 about here 
***************************** 
The estimated variance of the latent τ-variable was 0.70, p<.001. Therefore, the 
reliability of each trend variable may be estimated by 
var(τ) 0.70
reliability trend = 0.70
var(trend ) 1.00i i
= = . Applying the Spearman-Brown formula to 
estimate the reliability of the sum score of these eleven items reveals a reliability estimate of 
0.96. 
Correlation between performance in the Tailorshop and other variables 
To evaluate the convergent, predictive, and divergent validity of (1) the change and (2) 
the trend of the company value, we computed the correlations between these performance 
variables and the performance in the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, the participants’ 
income, the participants’ supervisor ratings, and the performance in the APM. The sum of the 
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change variables was used as the performance indicator change of the company value and the 
sum of the trend variables (between the second and twelfth month) was used as the 
performance indicator trend of the company value. 
The correlations between these variables are reported in Table 2. As can be seen, the 
correlation between the change variable and the trend variable was neither substantial nor 
significant, which suggests that both performance variables measure different performance 
aspects. The change of the company value only correlated significantly with the APM, which 
suggests a low overall validity of this performance variable.  
On the other hand, there was a significant and substantial correlation between the 
trend of the company value and the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, which points towards 
the convergent validity of the trend variable. Furthermore, there was a significant correlation 
between the trend variable and the supervisor ratings, which points towards the predictive 
validity of this measure.  
***************************** 
Please insert Table 2 about here 
***************************** 
There was also a substantial correlation between the trend of the company value and 
the APM. Therefore, we additionally computed partial correlations that were adjusted for the 
performance in the APM. The partial correlation between the trend variable and the 
Heidelberg Finite State Automaton was r=.20, p=.023, the partial correlation between the 
trend variable and the participants’ income was r=.05, p=.525, and the partial correlation 
between the trend variable and the supervisor ratings was r=.22, p=.010. 
Outlier analysis 
The measurement models for the trend values fitted better with the data than the 
measurement models for the change variables. One reason for this may be that the trend 
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variables are less sensitive to outliers. To investigate the role of outliers in greater detail, we 
z-transformed the change variables for each month. There were N=7 participants with |z|>3 in 
at least one month. These z-values were trimmed to a maximum of z=3 and a minimum of 
z=-3 and the measurement models were estimated again. However, the measurement model 
for the trimmed change values also did not fit with the data, χ²(65)= 1963.52, p<.001, 
RMSEA=0.43, CFI=0.30.  
In addition, we computed the correlations between the (sum of the) trimmed change 
values and the participants’ scores of the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, income, 
supervisor ratings, and APM. The correlation with the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton was 
r=.24, p=.003, the correlation with the participants’ income was r=.02, p=.807, the correlation 
with the supervisor ratings was r=.14, p=.102, and the correlation with the APM was r=.38, 
p<.001. Meng, Rosenthal, and Rubin’s (1992) method for comparing correlated correlations 
revealed that none of these correlations was significantly greater than the correlation with the 
trend variable.  
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to evaluate the reliability and the validity of 
performance variables in the Tailorshop simulation. Therefore, we investigated (1) the change 
of the company value and (2) the trend of the company value. 
Reliability and measurement models 
The measurement models for the changes of the company value did not fit with the 
data. This suggests that the single change values are not suitable for the reliability estimation. 
One reason for this may be that the τ-equivalent measurement model makes rather strong 
assumptions about how the company value develops over the months. In particular, the model 
states that the “true” change of the company value in the month i is the same than the “true” 
change in the month j, τi= τi. 2 However, this assumption may be violated because different 
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persons may use different strategies to maximize their company value. For example, one 
participant may make great investments in the first month and therefore has little gain first 
and great gain later. Another participant may make constant investments and therefore have a 
constant gain across the months. Hence, investigating individual differences in dynamic 
decision making processes may be a worthwhile issue for future research. Nonetheless, the 
structural equation model analysis of the present study revealed that the sum of the trends 
between the second and twelfth month is a reliable performance variable. 
Content validity 
The Tailorshop was developed according to Dörner’s (1980) definition of dynamic 
decision making. In particular, the simulation may be seen as complex and connected because 
it consists of many variables that are connected. The tasks may also be seen as non-
transparent because the participants do not know how the variables in the simulation are 
connected and the tasks may be seen as dynamic because each intervention in the simulation 
influences the following state of the simulation. Therefore, the structure of the present 
dynamic decision making task can be seen as a valid representation of general dynamic 
decision making demands. Furthermore, the participants were instructed to maximize their 
company value and therefore, the changes in the company value as well as the trends of the 
company can be seen as content valid performance measures. 
Convergent validity 
The correlation between the trend of the company value and the performance in the 
Heidelberg Finite State Automaton was substantial and significant, which indicates the 
convergent validity of this variable. Furthermore, this correlation remained significant when 
adjusted for general intelligence, which indicates that the relation between both dynamic 
decision making tasks is incremental to the overlap with general intelligence. 
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On the other hand, the correlation between the change of the company value and the 
performance in the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton was close to zero and not significant. 
After controlling for outliers this correlation increased. However, controlling for outliers may 
be difficult, especially in small samples or in individual assessments. Furthermore, none of 
the correlations with the trimmed change variable was significantly greater than the 
correlation with the trend variable.  
Predictive validity 
The correlation between the change of the company value and the participants’ 
supervisor ratings was not significant. However, there was a significant correlation between 
the trend of the company value and the supervisor ratings, which remained significant after 
controlling for individual differences in general intelligence. This indicates the incremental 
predictive validity of the trend measure. This replicates the findings of Kersting (2001), who 
also reported an incremental predictive value of a dynamic decision making measures on 
participants’ superior ratings. Furthermore, this result points towards the practical value of 
dynamic decision making measures and suggests that they may provide insights into aspects 
of professional success, which cannot be predicted by general intelligence. 
There was no relationship with participants’ income.3 This may be due to two reasons. 
First, income may measure a different aspect of professional success than supervisor ratings. 
This is supported by the low and non-significant correlation between income and supervisor 
rating. Second, income may just be a valid indicator for professional success within an 
occupational category and not between. For example, a priest may earn less than a broker, 
even if the priest does his job better than the broker. 
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Divergent validity and the relationship between dynamic decision making and general 
intelligence 
Dörner and colleagues (e.g., Dörner, 1980; Dörner & Kreuzig, 1983), who introduced 
the construct of dynamic decision making (or complex problem solving respectively), 
proposed that general intelligence and dynamic decision making are independent abilities. 
They reported several studies where low relations between measures of general intelligence 
and dynamic decision making were observed (Dörner, Kreuzig, Reither, & Staudel, 1983; 
Putz-Osterloh, 1981; Putz-Osterloh & Lüer, 1981). However, following studies revealed 
rather heterogeneous findings. Kluwe, Misiak, and Haider (1991) presented an overview of 
early studies and reported a broad range of correlation (between r=-.52 and r=.46), whereas 
subsequent studies found stronger associations (Kröner, Plass, & Leutner, 2005; Wittmann & 
Hattrup, 2004). One study even found a correlation between a latent intelligence and a latent 
dynamic decision making variable of r=.84 (Wirth & Klieme, 2003). 
In the present study, there was a significant correlation of r=.31 between the 
performance in the APM and the performance in the Tailorshop. In addition, there was a 
significant correlation of r=.57 between the performance in the APM and the performance in 
the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton. Thus, general intelligence could explain 10% (or 32% 
respectively) of the variance in dynamic decision making performance which suggests that 
there is a partial but not a complete overlap between the constructs. 
 However, our results do not allow to draw final conclusions about the relation 
between general intelligence and dynamic decision making. In particular, Wittmann (1988; 
Wittmann & Süß, 1999) suggested that the relation between two indicators only allows 
conclusions about the relation between underling constructs if the indicators are symmetric. 
For example, the APM may be seen as an intelligence test that particularly captures individual 
differences in figural reasoning. In a similar vein, the Tailorshop may particularly capture 
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individual differences in economy related dynamic decision making. Therefore, both 
measures may contain not only systematic construct variance (e.g., general intelligence 
variance) but also “unwanted” but reliable and specific variance (e.g., specific figural 
reasoning variance in the APM). However, investigating the symmetry of the variables would 
require to measure each construct with several indicators and at several measurement 
occasions. Following this reasoning, the present findings can not provide a final answer to the 
question on how general intelligence and dynamic decision making are related. 
Performance differences between men and women 
Wittmann and Hatrupp (2004) reported that men showed a better performance in the 
Tailorshop than women (d=0.70). This finding was replicated in the present study. The 
number of months with a positive trend in the company value (between the second and the 
twelfth month) was greater for men (M=3.60) than for women (M=2.25), t(156)=2.49, p=.014, 
d=0.46. Wittmann and Hatrupp (2004) suggested that women may behave more risk-aversive 
than men and therefore construct themselves a less favorable learning environment in the 
Tailorshop and accordingly show a lower performance. Furthermore, there were no significant 
performance differences between women and men in the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton 
or the APM, which suggests that these differences are task specific for the Tailorshop. 
Conclusion 
The sum of the trends between the second and the twelfth month is a reliable and valid 
performance indicator in the Tailorshop simulation. Hence, this score may be used for the 
study of individual differences as well as for individual assessments. For example, dynamic 
decision making tasks may be a useful complement for the selection of job applicants as 
suggested by Kersting (2001). 
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Footnotes
                                                 
1
 Due to the complex relations between the variables it is very unlikely to obtain a 
change in the company value of exactly zero. In the present study, there was always either a 
positive or a negative change in the company value. 
2
 We additionally investigated the change variables with a τ-congeneric measurement 
model, which makes weaker assumptions than the τ-equivalent measurement model. In 
particular, the model states that the “true” change of the company in a month i can be linearly 
transformed into the true score of another month j, τi = γ*τi. (Lord & Novick, 1968; Steyer, 
1989). However, the τ-congeneric measurement model fitted neither with the non-trimmed 
change variables (χ²(54)=4582.79, p<.001, RMSEA=0.73, CFI=0.16) nor with the trimmed 
change variables (χ²(54)=1605.81, p<.001, RMSEA=0.43, CFI=0.42). 
3
 Some studies (e.g. Roszkowski & Grable, 2010) report, that women earn less than 
men. Therefore, we additionally calculated this correlation separately for women and men. 
There were no significant differences. 
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Table 1 
Model fit indices for the measurement models for the trend of the company value 
Trend  χ² df p RMSEA CFI 
1 to 12 79.85 22 <.001 0.13 0.94 
2 to 12 40.10 23 .015 0.07 0.98 
3 to 12 38.08 21 .013 0.07 0.98 
4 to 12 25.35 18 .116 0.05 0.99 
5 to 12 17.77 16 .337 0.03 1.00 
6 to 12 11.93 14 .612 0.00 1.00 
7 to 12 8.51 11 .667 0.00 1.00 
8 to 12 6.19 8 .626 0.00 1.00 
9 to 12 2.29 5 .808 0.00 1.00 
10 to 12 1.24 2 .538 0.00 1.00 
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Table 2 
Correlations between performance variables (p-values in brackets) 
 Change Trend HFA Income Supervisor rating 
Trend .13 (.098)     
HFA .03 (.255) .31 (<.001)    
Income .01 (.923) .08 (.323) .05 (.561)   
Supervisor rating .15 (.085) .19 (.025) .09 (.292) -.02 (.801)  
APM .19 (.020) .31 (.001) .55 (<.001) .16 (.054) -.03 (.706) 
Note. change = sum of changes of the company value, trend = sum of trends of the 
company value (between second and twelfth month), HFA = Heidelberg Finite State 
Automaton, income = participants’ yearly income, APM = Advanced Progressive Matrices. 
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Figure 1. Screenshot of the graphical user interface of the Tailorshop (labels translated). 
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Figure 2. Schematic relation between the variables in the Tailorshop. The marked variables 
can be manipulated directly. 
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Figure 3. τ-equivalent measurement model. τ = true score variable, ε = measurement error 
variable. 
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The present study investigated cognitive performance measures beyond IQ. In particular, we
investigated the psychometric properties of dynamic decision making variables and implicit
learning variables and their relationwith general intelligence and professional success.N=173
employees from different companies and occupational groups completed two standard
intelligence tests, two dynamic decision making tasks, and two implicit learning tasks at two
measurement occasions each. We used structural equation models to test latent state-trait
measurement models and the relation between constructs. The results suggest that dynamic
decision making and implicit learning are substantially related with general intelligence.
Furthermore, general intelligence is the best predictor for income, social status, and
educational attainment. Dynamic decision making can predict supervisor ratings even beyond
general intelligence.








General intelligence is one of the most successful psycho-
logical constructs. Since Spearman's (1904) early investiga-
tions, there is a wealth of evidence for the reliability, stability,
and validity of intelligence measures (Carroll, 1993). Further-
more, general intelligence is a powerful predictor of success in
many domains of real life (Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005;
Salgado et al., 2003; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). Beside its
undisputed usefulness, some researchers have suggested to use
additional constructs for characterizing individuals' cognitive
ability such as dynamic decision making and implicit learning
(Dörner, 1980; Mackintosh, 1998).
The concept of dynamic decision making was developed
by Dörner (1980, 1986) who proposed that situations in
real life are complex and solving problems in real life
requires managing complex information. He criticized that
standard measures of general intelligence only assess
whether individuals perform accurately and quickly in
rather simple tasks but not whether they show intelligent
behavior in complex tasks. Therefore, he suggested to
measure performance in computer based scenarios that
simulate complex, connected, dynamic, and non-transparent
environments. Further on, he hypothesized that individual
differences in dynamic decision making are unrelated to
general intelligence but are substantially related to profes-
sional success.
Mackintosh (1998) suggested to consider another con-
struct. He proposed that there are two independent mental
systems: an explicit, hypothesis generating and testing
system and an implicit, associative learning system. In
particular, the explicit learning system is necessary for
discovering regularities with intention and awareness (like
in a numerical series task). The implicit learning system, on
the other hand, detects contingencies without awareness or
intention (like judging whether a sentence is grammatically
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right or wrong without being able to report the respective
grammatical rule). Mackintosh suggested that standard
intelligence tests capture individual differences in the explicit
system but not individual differences in the implicit learning
system. Therefore, he suggested to take individual differences
in implicit learning into account. He hypothesized that these
differences are independent from general intelligence mea-
sures but are nevertheless important predictors of educa-
tional and professional success.
Dörner and Mackintosh's proposals raise two interesting
questions. Are there reliable individual differences in dynam-
ic decision making and implicit learning which are indepen-
dent from general intelligence? Can these differences predict
real life performance beyond IQ? Investigating these issues
will be the aim of the present study.
1.1. Previous ﬁndings
1.1.1. Dynamic decision making
Dörner's (1980, 1986) critique of standard intelligence
tests laid the foundation for a ﬁeld of research, which has been
called dynamic decision making (Gonzalez, Vanyukov, &Martin,
2005) or complex problem solving (Funke, 2010). Over the years,
several dynamic decision making tasks have been developed.
For example, the Tailorshop scenario (Funke, 1983) simulates a
ﬁctional companywhere the participants have to controlmany
variables like thenumber ofworkers or the costs for advertising
to maximize their company value. Other tasks simulate a
forestry (Wagener, 2001), a power plant (Wallach, 1998), or a
space ﬂight (Wirth & Funke, 2005)where the participants have
to control several variables to reach a given goal state. Recently,
dynamic decision making tasks have also been included in the
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA; Wirth
& Klieme, 2003).
Over the years, there have been many studies investigat-
ing the relation between dynamic decision making and
general intelligence. Whereas several studies found non-
signiﬁcant or only small correlations (for an overview see
Kluwe, Misiak, & Haider, 1991), other studies reported
signiﬁcant standardized path coefﬁcients between β=0.38
and β=0.54 from latent intelligence to latent dynamic
decision making variables (Kröner, Plass, & Leutner, 2005;
Rigas, Carling, & Brehmer, 2002; Wittmann & Hattrup, 2004).
One study even found a correlation between a latent
intelligence and a latent dynamic decision making variable
of r=0.84 (Wirth & Klieme, 2003).
There are only two studies that investigated the predictive
validity of dynamic decision making measures. Wagener and
Wittmann (2002) assessed a sample of N=35 trainees and
reported correlations between r=0.16 and r=0.40 between
the performance in a dynamic decision making task and the
performance in different assessment center tasks. However,
the study did not report whether these relationships were
incremental or due to an overlap between dynamic decision
making and general intelligence. Kersting (2001) reported a
correlation of r=0.37 between the performance in a dynamic
decision making task and supervisor ratings in a sample of
N=73 policemen. He further reported that this correlation
remained signiﬁcant after controlling for individual differ-
ences in general intelligence, r=0.29, which points towards
the incremental predictive validity of this dynamic decision
making measure.
Taken together, these ﬁndings draw a rather heteroge-
neous picture of the relation between dynamic decision
making and general intelligence and there is only preliminary
evidence for the predictive validity of dynamic decision
making variables.
1.1.2. Implicit learning
Mackintosh (1998) suggested to use artiﬁcial grammar
learning tasks (Reber, 1967) to measure performance
differences in implicit learning. In such a task, the participants
are asked to learn a list of apparently arbitrary letter strings
(like WNSNXS). Afterwards, they are told that these strings
were constructed according to a complex rule system (a
grammar) and they are asked to judge newly presented
strings as grammatical or non-grammatical. Typically, the
participants show above chance performance but are not able
to report the grammar rules. Therefore, Reber (1967)
suggested that the participants learned the grammar implic-
itly. Although Reber's interpretation released a long and
fertile discussion about implicit learning processes, there
have been only a few studies investigating the relation
between performance in artiﬁcial grammar learning tasks
and general intelligence.
Reber, Walkenfeld, and Hernstadt (1991) reported a
correlation of r=0.25 between the performance in an
artiﬁcial grammar learning task and IQ, and Gebauer and
Mackintosh (2007) reported respective correlations between
r=−0.03 and r=0.17 depending on the task and the
instruction. To our knowledge, there is no published study
investigating the relation between educational or profession-
al success and the performance in an artiﬁcial grammar
learning task. Thus, there is a paucity of evidence on the
relation between implicit learning and general intelligence as
well as on the relation between implicit learning and success
in real life.
1.2. Some psychometric considerations
Previous studies that investigated the relation between
general intelligence, dynamic decision making, and implicit
learning treated the performance measures as trait-like
variables. A trait may be deﬁned as a variable that is stable
over several measurement occasions, consistent across
different situations, and consistent across different
methods. However, the variance of a performance measure
may capture additional factors beyond individual differ-
ences in a trait.
First, a performance measure may also be inﬂuenced by
the speciﬁc measurement situation even in standardized
experiments. For example, one person may be well rested
whereas another person may already have worked several
hours before testing. One person may be motivated to show
maximum performance whereas another person may have
gotten a stinging rebuke by his or her supervisor that day and
may not be motivated to show performance at all. Because
these effects may contribute unwanted variance, it may be
beneﬁcial to take this occasion speciﬁcity of performance
variables into account.
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Second, a performance measure may be inﬂuenced by
the speciﬁc method that is used for the assessment. Hence,
there may be individual differences in a performance
measurement which are triggered by the method. For
example, a verbal intelligence test may capture individual
differences in general intelligence as well as individual
differences in speech comprehension whereas a ﬁgural
intelligence test may capture individual differences in
general intelligence and visual thinking. Thus, individual
differences in speech comprehension or visual thinking are
method speciﬁc because they can only be assessed with
verbal or ﬁgural test material. Similarly, a particular
dynamic decision making task may measure performance
differences, which are speciﬁc for this particular task but not
for dynamic decision making in general.
Third, a performance measure may be inﬂuenced by
unsystematic measurement error. For example, instructions
may be ambiguous or persons may accidently makemistakes,
which may result in a low reliability of performance
measures. Because these effects may contribute unwanted
variance, it seems worthwhile to investigate these factors
with respect to dynamic decision making and implicit
learning variables in greater detail.
These considerations have been formalized in Steyer et
al.'s latent state-trait theory (Steyer, Schmitt, & Eid, 1999). In
a nutshell, latent state-trait theory proposes that the
measurement i of a variable Y can be decomposed into a
trait ξi, a state residual ζi, a method residual ηi, and an
unsystematic error residual εi, thus Yi=ξi+ζi+ηi+εi.
Given the independence of these factors (Steyer et al.,
1999), the variance of this measurement can be decomposed
as σ²(Yi)=σ²(ξi)+σ²(ζi)+σ²(ηi)+σ²(εi), and the factor
variances may be estimated with a structural equation
model as shown in Fig. 1. As can be seen in this ﬁgure, the
latent trait factor is deﬁned as a variable that is consistent
across several measurement occasions and methods, where-
as the latent state residual and themethod factor are speciﬁc
for the individual measurement occasion and the assess-
ment method, respectively. Hence, these models allow to
separate the different contributions of the trait, the mea-
surement occasion, and the measurement method to the
manifest variables.
There have been many applications of latent state-trait
models in different domains of personality research, which
demonstrated substantial effects of the measurement
occasion or the method on behavioral variables (e.g., Eid,
Notz, Steyer, & Schwenkmezger, 1994; Schmitt & Steyer,
1993; Steyer, Schwenkmezger, & Auer, 1990; Yasuda,
Lawrenz, Whitlock, Lubin, & Lei, 2004; Ziegler, Ehrlenspiel,
& Brand, 2009) and physiological variables (e.g., Hage-
mann, Hewig, Seifert, Naumann, & Bartussek, 2005; Hermes
et al., 2009). However, there have been no applications of
latent state-trait models on performance variables yet,
even if some ﬁndings suggest that it may be instructive to
consider the occasion speciﬁcity and method speciﬁcity of
these variables.
For example, in some studies the participants completed
the same dynamic decision making task for several times
(Süß, Kersting, & Oberauer, 1993;Wittmann &Hattrup, 2004)
and the performance between subsequent task correlated
only moderately (between r=0.37 and r=0.62). This points
either towards a low reliability or towards a substantial
occasion speciﬁcity of the variables. Moreover, Wirth and
Klieme (2003) reported structural equation models, which
implied a correlation of r=0.33 between two dynamic
decision making tasks (r=0.47 when corrected for attenu-
ation) and Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) reported a
correlation of r=0.15 between two artiﬁcial grammar
learning task (r=0.21 when corrected for attenuation).
These ﬁndings suggest a substantial method speciﬁcity of
performance measures. Therefore, a further aim of the
present study was to investigate the occasion speciﬁcity and
the method speciﬁcity of dynamic decision making and
implicit learning variables.
1.3. The present study
The present study investigated the psychometric proper-
ties of general intelligence, dynamic decision making, and
implicit learning measures within the framework of latent
state-trait theory. Therefore, each construct was measured
with two methods at two measurement occasions. A further
scope of this study was the relation between the respective
trait variables and real life performance. We expected that
general intelligence is a powerful predictor of professional
success and we further expected that there are individual




There were N=173 employees (113 females, 47 males, 13
not reported) completing the ﬁrst measurement occasion and
N=151 completing the second measurement occasion. The
participants were recruited via newspaper announcement
from different branches and different companies around
Heidelberg. The participants' jobs were rated according to the
Fig. 1. Latent state-trait structural equation model. Y11 = variable at
measurement occasion 1 with method 1, Y12 = variable at measurement
occasion 1 with method 2, Y21 = variable at measurement occasion 2 with
method 1, Y22 = variable at measurement occasion 2 with method 2, ξ= trait
variable, ζ1=state residual 1, ζ2=state residual 2, η1=method residual 1,η2=
method residual 2, ε1 = error 1, ε1 = error 2, ε1 = error 3, ε1 = error 4.
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International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88
COM). 6% rated themselves as legislators, senior ofﬁcials, and
managers, 25% as professionals, 11% as technical and
associate professionals, 14% as clerks, 40% as service workers
and shop and market sales workers, 1% as craft and related
trade workers, 1% as plant and machine operators and
assemblers, and 1% as elementary occupations. The partici-
pants' mean age was M=43.34 (SD=11.22).
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Advanced progressive matrices (APM)
The APM (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1994) were used as
an indicator for participants' general intelligence. A
computer adapted version of the test was administered.
According to the test manual, the number of solved items
of the second set was taken as a performance indicator.
These raw scores were transformed to z-scores for further
analysis, because the APM and the Berlin Intelligence
Structure Test were scaled differently.
2.2.2. Berlin intelligence structure test (BIS)
The short version of the BIS (Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel,
1997) was used as a second indicator of general intelli-
gence. The BIS consists of a variety of tasks like an
analogical reasoning task, a visual memory task, and a
numerical series task (for an English description, see Süß,
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). The test
was administered and the raw scores were computed
according to the test manual. We did not compute IQ
scores because there is no adult normative sample for the
BIS. For further analysis the raw scores were transformed
to z-scores.
2.2.3. Artiﬁcial grammar learning tasks
Implicit learning was measured with two artiﬁcial
grammar learning tasks (Reber, 1967). The procedure and
the stimuli were adopted from Gebauer and Mackintosh
(2007). The artiﬁcial grammar learning tasks consisted of a
learning phase and a testing phase. In the learning phase, 30
letter strings were presented and the participants were
instructed to memorize them. Each string was presented
individually for 3 s on a 17 in. screen of a personal computer
(e.g., WNSNXS). The participants were asked to repeat the
strings correctly by pressing the respective letters on the
keyboard.When a string was repeated correctly, the feedback
“correct” was given and the next string occurred. When a
string was repeated incorrectly, the feedback “false” was
given and the string was displayed again until repeated
correctly. After a participant repeated ten strings correctly,
these ten strings were simultaneously displayed for 90 s on
the screen and the participant was asked to repeat them
silently. After a participant repeated all 30 strings correctly
the learning phase was ﬁnished and the participant was
informed that all strings in the learning phase were
constructed according to a complex rule system. In the testing
phase, 80 new strings were presented (see Appendix A).
There were 40 grammatical strings that were constructed
according to the same rule system as the strings in the
learning phase (e.g., WNSWWW). In addition, there were 40
non-grammatical strings that contained one letter at a
position that violated the rule system (e.g., NTSWWN). The
participants were instructed to judge the letter strings as
grammatical or non-grammatical. To judge a string as
grammatical, the participants had to press the A-key of the
keyboard, to judge a string as non-grammatical, the L-key.
The order of presentation of the strings was ﬁxed across the
participants in a random order. The percentage of correct
judgments in the testing phase was taken as the performance
indicator. The stimuli for the ﬁrst artiﬁcial grammar learning
task were constructed according to Fig. 2. The stimuli for the
second artiﬁcial grammar learning task were constructed
according to Fig. 3.
2.2.4. Tailorshop
The Tailorshop simulation (Funke, 1983) was used as a
dynamic decision making task. The Tailorshop is a computer
based scenario and requests the participants to lead a ﬁctional
company which produces and sells shirts for twelve simulat-
ed months. Several variables can be manipulated like the
number of workers, the expenses for advertising etc. (see
Fig. 4). The state of a variable in a given month inﬂuences the
state of the same and other variables in the following month
Fig. 2. Grammar 1 that was used in the ﬁrst artiﬁcial grammar learning task.
Fig. 3. Grammar 2 that was used in the second artiﬁcial grammar learning
task.
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but the participants do not know how the variables are
connected (for a more detailed description see Funke, 1983,
2010). The participants completed a training phase, a
knowledge test, and a control phase. In the training phase
the participants controlled the system for six simulated
months and were instructed to ﬁnd out as much as possible
about the scenario. The knowledge test consisted of twelve
questions that measured how much the participants learned
about the Tailorshop so far. In the control phase the
participants were instructed to maximize their company
value during twelve simulatedmonths. For the purpose of the
present study only data from the control phase were
analyzed. The percentage of months with an increase in the
company value between the second and the twelfth month
was taken as the performance indicator, because Danner et al.
(2011) have shown that this is a reliable and valid
performance indicator.
2.2.5. Heidelberg ﬁnite state automaton (HFA)
The HFA (Wirth & Funke, 2005) was taken as a second
indicator for dynamic decision making. The scenario is
computer based and simulates a space ﬂight where the
participants can control a space ship and a vehicle with a user
interface (see Fig. 5). The scenario consists of a training phase,
a knowledge test, and a control phase. During the 15 minute
training phase the participants were instructed to ﬁnd out
how to control the space ship and the vehicle. The knowledge
test consists of 16 items and measures how much the
participants have learned about the system so far. The control
phase consists of 22 items where a target state is given which
the participants have to reach by controlling the system (e.g.,
landing the space ship on a speciﬁed planet). For the purpose
of the present study, only data from the control phase were
analyzed. The percentage of correctly solved items was taken
as the performance indicator.
2.2.6. Professional success
The participants' professional success was measured
with two instruments. Objective professional success was
measured by the participants' income (thirteen categories),
self-rated social status (seven categories), and the partici-
pants' highest educational attainment (nine categories).
To adjust for different scaling, the three variables were
z-transformed (M=0, SD=1) for further analysis. In
addition, professional success was measured by supervisor
ratings with ﬁve items (e.g., “The employee demonstrates
competence in all job-related tasks”) on a six-point Likert
scale.
2.3. Procedure
There were two measurement occasions. The ﬁrst mea-
surement occasion started in July 2009 (till September 2009)
and consisted of session 1 and session 2. Both sessions took
place within one week for each participant. The second
measurement occasion started in December 2009 (till
February 2010) and consisted of session 3 and session 4,
which also took place within one week. The participants were
assessed in small groups of not more than four persons. Each
session took approximately 2.5 h.
The participants completed the same tasks at both
measurement occasions. During session 1 (and session 3)
the participants completed an artiﬁcial grammar learning
task with grammar 1, the APM, and the Heidelberg Finite
State Automaton. During session 2 (and session 4), the
participants completed an artiﬁcial grammar learning task
with grammar 2, the short version of the BIS, and the
Tailorshop simulation. After the ﬁrst session, each partici-
pant received an envelope with a questionnaire for his or
her supervisor. During the third session, the participants
additionally completed a questionnaire about their profes-
sional success.
2.4. Statistical analysis
To investigate the relations between the variables, we
used structural equation models. The parameters of the
models were estimated using the maximum likelihood
Fig. 4. Screenshot of the graphical user interface of the Tailorshop (labels translated).
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algorithm implemented in Amos 18 (Arbuckle, 2006). In
a ﬁrst step, we investigated latent state-trait measurement
models separately for intelligence, dynamic decision
making, and implicit learning. In a second step, we
investigated the correlation between the latent trait vari-
ables. In a third step, we performed a latent regression




The raw scores of the measurements are reported in
Table 1. The number of solved items in the Advanced
Progressive Matrices at the ﬁrst measurement occasion was
M=21.64 (SD=5.80), which corresponds to an IQ of
M=100.62 (SD=22.55). There are no normative samples
for the Berlin Intelligence Structure Test, the Tailorshop, the
Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, or the artiﬁcial grammar
learning tasks. However, the present scores are similar to
previous results. The mean score of the BIS was M=96.30
(SD=6.21) at the ﬁrst measurement occasion and
M=99.21 (SD=6.38) at the second measurement occasion.
According to Jäger et al. (1997), a mean score of M=100
corresponds to an average performance. In the present
study, the participants solved M=10.79 (SD=5.80) HFA
items at the ﬁrst measurement occasion and M=13.44
(SD=5.95) HFA items at the second measurement occasion.
This result is similar to Wirth and Klieme (2003), who
reported that their participants solved M=11 HFA items on
average. The judgment accuracy in the artiﬁcial grammar
learning tasks varied between M=61.58 (SD=7.11) and
M=63.90 (SD=7.24), which corresponds to the ﬁndings of
Gebauer and Mackintosh, who reported mean accuracies
between M=59.16 (SD=8.59) and M=69.93 (SD=7.52)
for the same artiﬁcial grammar learning tasks that were used
in the present study.
3.2. Measurement models
We used a basic latent state-trait model (Steyer et al.,
1999) with a state residual ζ for each measurement occasion
and a method factor η for each instrument to control for
effects of the measurement occasion and method effects (see
Fig. 1). All path coefﬁcients were ﬁxed to one and the
variances of all latent variables were estimated. If a ﬁrst
estimation revealed negative or non-signiﬁcant variances,
then these variances were ﬁxed to zero and the model was
estimated again.
3.2.1. Intelligence
A ﬁrst analysis of the basic model revealed a goodmodel ﬁt,
χ²(1)=0.30, p=0.569, RMSEA=0.00, CFI=1.00. However,
Fig. 5. Screenshot of the graphical user interface of the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton (labels translated).
Table 1





Task M SD M SD
APM 21.64 5.80 22.94 7.02
BIS 96.30 6.21 99.21 6.38
Tailorshop 2.68 3.21 3.15 3.77
HFA 10.79 5.80 13.44 5.95
AGL1 61.58 7.11 62.83 6.87
AGL2 63.90 7.24 62.20 7.70
Note. APM = number of solved items in the Advanced Progressive Matrices,
BIS = scores in Berlin Intelligence Structure Test, Tailorshop = number of
months with an increase in the company value, HFA = number of items
solved in the Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, AGL1 = percent of correct
judgments in the artiﬁcial grammar learning task with grammar 1, AGL2 =
percent of correct judgments in the artiﬁcial grammar learning task with
grammar 2.
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the estimated variance for ζ1 was negative (ζ1=−14.14,
p=0.016), and the estimatedvariance for ζ2wasnot signiﬁcant
(ζ2=9.60, p=0.125). Therefore, these parameters were set to
zero and the model was estimated again. The modiﬁed model
ﬁtted the data well, χ²(3)=5.59, p=0.133, RMSEA=0.07,
CFI=1.00, and the difference in the ﬁt of the models was not
signiﬁcant, Δχ²(2)=4.29, p=0.117. Therefore, this model
could be accepted. The estimated model parameters are
reported in Table 2.
3.2.2. Dynamic decision making
The basic latent state-trait model ﬁtted well with the data,
χ²(1)=0.9, p=0.335, RMSEA=0.00, CFI=1.00. However,
the latent state residuals were negative (ζ1=−49.20,
p=0.183) or non-signiﬁcant (ζ1=48.30, p=0.257). The
modiﬁed model without latent state residuals also ﬁtted
well with the data, χ²(3)=3.25, p=0.355, RMSEA=0.02,
CFI=1.00; Δχ²(2)=2.35, p=0.309. Thus, this model could
be accepted. The estimated model parameters are presented
in Table 2.
3.2.3. Implicit learning
The basic latent state-trait model ﬁtted well with the data,
χ²(1)=0.13, p=0.719, RMSEA=0.00, CFI=1.00. However,
the variances of the latent state residual and the latent
method variables were non-signiﬁcant (ζ1=6.57, p=0.128;
ζ2=2.35, p=0.585; η1=−0.06, p=0.988; η2=−4.96,
p=0.250). Therefore, these variances were set to zero. This
modiﬁed model ﬁtted the data well, χ²(5)=3.19, p=0.671,
RMSEA=0.00, CFI=1.00; Δχ²(4)=3.06, p=0.548, and this
model was accepted. The estimated model parameters are
presented in Table 2.
3.2.4. LST parameters
Based on these estimates, several latent state-trait
parameters may be computed such as coefﬁcients of
reliability, trait-speciﬁcity (also referred to as consisten-
cy), occasion-speciﬁcity, and method-speciﬁcity. These
parameters have a range between zero and one, and a
greater value indicates a greater speciﬁcity. The reliability
coefﬁcient of a measurement i reveals how great the
proportion of systematic variance in this measurement is.
It is computed as [σ²(ξi)+σ²(ζi)+σ²(ηi)] /σ²(Yi). The
trait-speciﬁcity coefﬁcient of a measurement i reveals
how great the proportion of trait differences in a mea-
surement is. It may be computed as σ²(ξi) /σ²(Yi). The
occasion-speciﬁcity coefﬁcient of a measurement i indi-
cates the effects of the situation and the interaction
between the situation and the person on the measure-
ment. It may be computed as σ²(ζi) /σ²(Yi). The method-
speciﬁcity coefﬁcient of a measurement i reveals how
great the proportion of individual differences is due to the
method (e.g., task) used. This coefﬁcient is computed as
σ²(ηi) /σ²(Yi).
These parameters are presented in Table 3. As can
be seen, the general intelligence measurements revealed
great reliabilities, great trait-speciﬁcities, and low method-
speciﬁcities. The Heidelberg Finite State Automaton mea-
surements also showed great reliabilities, but smaller
trait-speciﬁcities and greater method-speciﬁcities. The
Tailorshop measurements revealed small reliabilities and
small trait-speciﬁcities. All implicit learning measurements
revealed very small reliabilities and trait-speciﬁcities.
Since all measurement models ﬁtted well without state
residuals, the estimated occasion-speciﬁcity was zero for
all measurements.
3.2.4. Professional success
Objective professional success was measured with three
indicators at session 3. A measurement model with one
latent success variable, equal path coefﬁcients (β=1), and
a latent error variable for each manifest variable was
speciﬁed. The model ﬁtted the data well, χ²(2)=2.46,
p=0.293, RMSEA=0.04, CFI=0.98. Therefore, this model
was accepted. The composite reliability (Raykov, 1997) of
the items' mean score was 0.71. The participants' supervisor
ratings were measured with a ﬁve item questionnaire. A
measurement model with one latent success variable, equal
path coefﬁcients (β=1), and a latent error variable for
each manifest variable ﬁtted the data well, χ²(9)=11.93,
p=0.217, RMSEA=0.04, CFI=0.99. Thus, this model was
accepted. The composite reliability of the items' mean score
was 0.95.
Table 2
Estimated variances for measurement models (p-values in brackets).
Intelligence Dynamic decision making Implicit learning
ξ 0.73 (b0.001) 317.12 (b0.001) 14.87 (b0.001)
ζ1 0 (ﬁxed) 0 (ﬁxed) 0 (ﬁxed)
ζ2 0 (ﬁxed) 0 (ﬁxed) 0 (ﬁxed)
η1 0.14 (0.015) 144.66 (0.046) 0 (ﬁxed)
η2 0.24 (b0.001) 257.37 (b0.001) 0 (ﬁxed)
ε1 0.14 (b0.001) 425.17 (b0.001) 35.92 (b0.001)
ε2 0.18 (b0.001) 637.27 (b0.001) 33.38 (b0.001)
ε3 0.11 (b0.001) 146.00 (b0.001) 35.29 (b0.001)
ε4 0.06 (0.014) 145.21 (b0.001) 43.83 (b0.001)
Note. ξ = trait variable, ζ1 = state residual 1, ζ2 = state residual 2, η1 =
method residual 1, η2 =method residual 2, ε1 = error 1, ε2 = error 2, ε3 =
error 3, ε4 = error 4. The different scaling of the variables affects the
magnitude of the variances estimates.
Table 3







APM 1 0.86 0.72 0.14
APM 2 0.83 0.70 0.13
BIS 1 0.90 0.67 0.22
BIS 2 0.95 0.71 0.24
Tailorshop 1 0.52 0.36 0.16
Tailorshop 2 0.42 0.29 0.13
HFA 1 0.80 0.44 0.36
HFA 2 0.80 0.44 0.36
AGL1 1 0.29 0.29 0.00
AGL1 2 0.31 0.31 0.00
AGL2 1 0.30 0.30 0.00
AGL2 2 0.25 0.25 0.00
Note. APM = Advances Progressive Matrices, BIS = Berlin Intelligence
Structure Test, HFA = Heidelberg Finite State Automaton, AGL1 = artiﬁcial
grammar learning task with grammar 1, AGL2 = artiﬁcial grammar learning
task with grammar 2.
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3.3. Relations between intelligence, dynamic decision making,
implicit learning, and professional success
We speciﬁed an omnibus model, which simultaneously
tested all measurement models described above and allowed
free correlations between the latent trait variables and the
latent professional success variables. The speciﬁed model
revealed a good model ﬁt, χ²(174)=197.74, p=0.105,
RMSEA=0.03, CFI=0.98 and thus was accepted. The
correlations between the latent variables are shown in
Table 4. As can be seen, there were signiﬁcant and substantial
correlations between all performance variables. The greatest
correlation was between intelligence and dynamic decision
making, r=0.86, pb0.001. There was also a correlation of
r=0.78, pb0.001 between objective professional success and
general intelligence. There were further substantial correla-
tions between objective professional success and dynamic
decision making, r=0.52, pb0.001, and between objective
professional success and implicit learning, r=0.31, p=0.030.
The only signiﬁcant correlation with supervisor ratings was
the correlation with dynamic decision making, r=0.25,
p=0.021.
3.4. Prediction of objective professional success
To investigate the relation between performance variables
and objective professional success in greater detail, we
speciﬁed a latent regression model according to Fig. 6. As
can be seen, dynamic decision making, implicit learning, and
professional success were regressed on intelligence. The
residuals of this regression are the proportions of trait
variances which are independent from general intelligence.
The dynamic decision making and implicit learning residuals
were used to predict the proportion of construct variance in
objective professional success that could not be explained by
general intelligence.
The speciﬁed model revealed a good model ﬁt, χ²(95)=
114.44, p=0.085, RMSEA=0.03, CFI=0.98. The standard-
ized path coefﬁcients are shown in Fig. 6. As can be seen,
dynamic decision making as well as implicit learning
revealed trait variances, which were independent from
general intelligence. In addition, general intelligence was
the only signiﬁcant predictor of objective professional
success. Neither the path coefﬁcient from the residual
dynamic decision variable to the residual professional
success variable, nor the path coefﬁcient from the residual
implicit learning variable to the residual professional success
variable was signiﬁcant. Therefore, these path coefﬁcients
were set to zero and the model was estimated again. The
modiﬁed model also revealed a good model ﬁt, χ²(97)=
117.62, p=0.076, RMSEA=0.04, CFI=0.98; Δχ²(2)=3.18,
p=0.204. Thus, this model was accepted.
3.5. Prediction of supervisor ratings
The relations between general intelligence, dynamic
decision making, implicit learning, and supervisor ratings
were investigated analogously to the analysis described
above. The speciﬁed model ﬁtted the data well, χ²(126)=
125.86, p=0.487, RMSEA=0.00, CFI=1.00. The stan-
dardized path coefﬁcients are shown in Fig. 7. As can be
seen, dynamic decision making was the only signiﬁcant
predictor of participants' supervisor ratings. Neither the
path coefﬁcient from the general intelligence variable, nor
the path coefﬁcient from the residual implicit learning
variable was signiﬁcant. A modiﬁed model, which ﬁxed
these parameters to zero, revealed an adequate model ﬁt,
χ²(128)=126.00, p=0.533, RMSEA=0.00, CFI=1.00;
Δχ²(2)=0.14, p=0.932. Therefore, this model was
accepted.
Table 4
Correlation between latent success and latent trait variables (p-values in brackets).
Intelligence Dynamic decision making Implicit learning Objective professional success
Dynamic decision making 0.86 (b0.001)
Implicit learning 0.32 (0.005) 0.26 (0.033)
Objective professional success 0.78 (b0.001) 0.52 (b0.001) 0.31 (0.030)
Supervisor ratings 0.03 (0.760) 0.25 (0.021) −0.02 (0.871) −0.07 (0.559)
Fig. 6. Latent Regression Analysiswith standardized path coefﬁcients (p-values
in brackets). IQ = latent general intelligence variable, DDM= latent dynamic
decision making variable, IL = latent implicit learning variable, OPS = latent
objective professional success variable, DDMres = latent residual for dynamic
decision making, ILres = latent residual for implicit learning, OPSres = latent
residual for professional success.
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4. Discussion
The present study investigated Dörner's (1980) and
Mackintosh's (1998) hypotheses that dynamic decision
making and implicit learning are cognitive abilities that are
independent from general intelligence.
In a ﬁrst step, we analyzed the psychometric proper-
ties of intelligence variables, dynamic decision making
variables, and implicit learning variables within the
framework of latent state-trait theory. All measurement
models ﬁtted well without latent state residuals. This
indicates that the performance measures were not
affected by situational factors such as individual differ-
ences in fatigue or individual differences in the form of
the day. Furthermore, the general intelligence variables
revealed high trait speciﬁcities and low method speciﬁc-
ities, which indicate a high proportion of trait differences
in these performance measures. The dynamic decision
making and implicit learning variables, on the other hand,
revealed lower trait speciﬁcities and greater method
speciﬁcities, which suggests that these variables capture
task speciﬁc performance differences as well. However,
even if the trait speciﬁcities were small, the variances of
the latent trait variables were still signiﬁcant. This
indicates that there are true individual trait differences
in dynamic decision making and implicit learning.
In a second step, we analyzed the relations between
these latent trait variables. The present results suggest that
there are substantial relations between general intelligence,
dynamic decision making, and implicit learning. In partic-
ular, there was a great correlation (r=0.86) between the
latent general intelligence variable and the latent dynamic
decision making variable. This result goes in line with
previous ﬁndings of Wirth and Klieme (2003), Wittmann
and Hattrup (2004), and Kröner et al. (2005) who also
reported great relations between measures of dynamic
decision making and measures of general intelligence.
Taken together, these ﬁndings contradict Dörner's hypoth-
esis that dynamic decision making and general intelligence
are independent variables.
The correlation between the latent implicit learning
variable and the latent general intelligence variable was of
medium size (r=0.32). This goes in line with the ﬁndings of
Reber et al. (1991) and Gebauer andMackintosh (2007) who
also reported low to medium correlations between mea-
sures of implicit learning and general intelligence. This
ﬁnding does not support Mackintosh's hypothesis that
implicit learning and general intelligence are independent
constructs. However, general intelligence could only explain
10.24% of the implicit learning trait variance, which suggests
that there are substantial individual differences in implicit
learning beyond IQ.
Taken together, this pattern of result suggests that
there are substantial relations between cognitive perfor-
mance measures, which have been developed within very
different domains. Measures of general intelligence have a
long research tradition and were developed to measure
persons' general mental ability. Measures of dynamic
decision making arose in the domain of complex problem
solving and were designed to explore persons' ability to
deal with realistic problems. And measures of implicit
learning were developed in the domain of cognitive
psychology in order to study persons' ability in making
intuitive decisions. The present ﬁndings suggests that
these performance measures share a substantial propor-
tion of common variance but also reveal variance pro-
portions that are independent from each other. This ﬁts
well with hierarchical intelligence models like Carroll's
(1993) three-stratum theory of cognitive abilities. In
particular, Carroll suggested that the structure of human
cognitive abilities may be explained by a hierarchical
structure with three levels (three strata). On the lowest
level (stratum 1) there are 64 different speciﬁc ability
factors like reading comprehension, memory span, or
general sound discrimination. According to Carroll, these
speciﬁc abilities are not independent and therefore may
be grouped together to eight more general ability factors
(stratum 2), which are ﬂuid intelligence, crystallized
intelligence, general memory and learning, broad visual
perception, broad auditory perception, broad retrieval
ability, broad cognitive speediness, and processing speed.
On the top of the hierarchy (stratum 3) there is a single
general ability factor that explains the correlation be-
tween the stratum 2 factors. In Carroll's model there are
no ability factors such as dynamic decision making or
implicit learning. Accordingly, these constructs may be
seen as supplementary aspects of human cognitive ability.
However, the present results ﬁt well with the concept of a
hierarchical structure of human cognitive ability. In
particular, the results of the structural equation models
revealed that the overlap between the performance in the
Tailorshop and the Heidelberg Finite Automaton may be
Fig. 7. Latent Regression Analysiswith standardized path coefﬁcients (p-values
in brackets). IQ = latent general intelligence variable, DDM= latent dynamic
decision making variable, IL = latent implicit learning variable, SR = latent
supervisor rating variable, DDMres = latent residual for dynamic decision
making, ILres = latent residual for implicit learning, SRres = latent residual for
supervisor ratings.
9D. Danner et al. / Intelligence xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
Please cite this article as: Danner, D., et al., Beyond IQ: A latent state-trait analysis of general intelligence, dynamic decision
making, and implicit learning, Intelligence (2011), doi:10.1016/j.intell.2011.06.004
explained by a more general dynamic decision making
ability factor. In the same vein, the overlap between the
different artiﬁcial grammar learning tasks could be
explained by an implicit learning ability factor. Further-
more, there were substantial correlations between gen-
eral intelligence, dynamic decision making and implicit
learning that could be explained by one single general
ability factor. Taken together, these results suggest that
dynamic decision making and implicit learning may be
supplementary abilities that ﬁt well into a hierarchical
concept of human cognitive ability. However, the present
ﬁndings do not sufﬁciently allow to draw a conclusion on
which stratum these ability factors may be located.
Investigating this may be an interesting issue for future
research.
In a third step, we analyzed whether dynamic decision
making and implicit learning are powerful predictors of
professional success beyond IQ. The zero correlation between
objective professional success and supervisor ratings
(r=0.07) suggests that both variables capture different
aspects of professional success. One reason for this may be
that income, social status, and education attainment are
rather proﬁt-based indicators, whereas supervisor ratings
may also capture social aspects. According to this, both
aspects were analyzed separately.
There were substantial correlations between objective
professional success and dynamic decision making
(r=0.52) as well as between objective professional success
and implicit learning (r=0.31). This suggests that both
performance measures are able to predict objective pro-
fessional success. However, when general intelligence
was included as a predictor, then general intelligence
remained the only signiﬁcant predictor (β=0.78). This
ﬁnding is consistent with the literature and emphasizes the
meaningfulness and usefulness of IQ measures (e.g.,
Schmidt & Hunter, 2004).
There was a substantial relation between the participants'
supervisor ratings and dynamic decision making even when
general intelligence was simultaneously considered
(β=0.43). This replicates ﬁndings of Kersting (2001) who
also reported an incremental predictive value of dynamic
decisionmakingmeasures on participants' supervisor ratings.
Furthermore, this result points towards the practical value of
dynamic decision making measures and suggests that
dynamic decision making measures may provide insights
into aspects of professional success, which cannot be
predicted by general intelligence. Therefore, Dörner's hy-
pothesis that dynamic decision making has an incremental
predictive value is partially supported. The relation between
supervisor ratings and implicit learning was close to zero
(r=-0.02) and not signiﬁcant. Thus, this result may be seen
as preliminary evidence against Mackintosh's hypothesis that
implicit learning is a useful predictor of professional success.
There was no signiﬁcant correlation between supervisor
ratings and general intelligence. At ﬁrst sight, this ﬁnding is
astonishing because there is a wealth of evidence for the
relation between general intelligence and supervisor rating
(e.g., Ng et al., 2005; Salgado et al., 2003; Schmidt & Hunter,
2004). However, the samples in these studies typically consist
of employees within a single department or company
whereas the sample in the present study consisted of
employees of different companies and occupational groups.
In particular, there may be a relation between general
intelligence and supervisor ratings within single companies
or occupational groups but not between. For example, a
broker with an IQ of 130may be rated as more successful than
a broker with an IQ of 100 but a journalist with an IQ of 130
may still be rated as less successful than the broker with the
IQ of 100.
4.1. Implications for assessment
The present results show that the APM as well as the
Berlin Intelligence Structure Test yield measures with good
trait speciﬁcities (0.67 to 0.72). Furthermore, there was a
strong relation (r=0.78) between general intelligence and
objective professional success. Therefore, general intelli-
gence tests seem to be a good choice for measuring cognitive
ability.
There was also a relation between the dynamic decision
making trait variable and objective professional success
(r=0.52) and between the dynamic decision making trait
variable and supervisor ratings (r=0.25). However, the
performance measures of the Tailorshop simulation and the
Heidelberger Finite State Automaton showed trait speciﬁc-
ities between 0.29 and 0.44. This suggests that less than half
of the variance in these performance measures is due to trait
differences in dynamic decision making. Therefore, the trait-
speciﬁcity of both tasks should be improved before they are
used for an individual assessment. A more theory-orientated
development of dynamic decision making tasks may help to
reach this goal.
There was a relation of medium size between the implicit
learning trait variable and objective professional success
(r=0.31). However, the latent regression analysis revealed
that this relation was due to an overlap with general
intelligence. This suggests that there is no incremental
predictive value of implicit learning measures. The trait
speciﬁcities of the artiﬁcial grammar learning measures
were between 0.25 and 0.31. There was no method
speciﬁcity of these variables, which suggests that the low
trait speciﬁcity was due to unsystematic measurement error.
Therefore, lengthening the test may help to enhance the
trait-speciﬁcity. However, whether such an approach in-
creases the reliability or rather causes fatigue effects is an
open issue.
5. Conclusion
The present ﬁndings acknowledge the overall approval
and usefulness of general intelligence measures. In
addition, the results demonstrated that there are signiﬁ-
cant individual trait differences in cognitive performance
beyond IQ. In particular, there was a large proportion of
trait variance in implicit learning, which was independent
from general intelligence and in addition, dynamic deci-
sion making revealed an incremental predictive validity.
These ﬁndings make dynamic decision making as well as
implicit learning attractive for the research of individual
differences.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Letter strings for grammar 1 sorted for different parts of the assessment.
Phase Strings
Learning phase WNSNXS NXSTWXT WNSTTWXT WXWSNXT NWXTS NXSNWXS WNTSSS NXSWXTX WXWSNWSN WNSNWXS NXSWXT
NXSWWWW NWSWN WNSNWXTX NXSWNTX NXS WNSWWWW WXWSWN NXSTNWS WNSTWNSW WNSWXTX
WNTSSX WNSNWSW WNTX NXSWNSW WNSNXTS NXTSSS NXSNWSN WNSNWSN NXSWNTSS
Testing phase (correct items) WNSN NWSW NWSN NXSWW NWXSW NXTSX WNSWNS NXSWNT NWXTSS WNSWWW WNSWNT NXTSSX WXWTSX
WNSNXT NWSWWN NXSNWS NXSNWXT NXTSSSX WNSTWNS NXSTNXS WNTSSSX WNSWXWT NXSNXTX WXWSWXT
NWXSWNS NWXSNWS NXSTXWNT WNSTNWXT WXWSNWXS NXSTWNTX WXWSTWXT WXWSNWSW WXWSWXTX
NXSTNWSN NWXSWXWS WXWTSSSS WNSTNXTX WXWSWNSW NWXSWXTX NXSNXSWN
Testing phase (incorrect items) TXSWNT TWXTSX NTSWWN WWSWNS WNWWNT NWSXWN NWXSSW WXWTST TXWTSSX SWXSWNS WSSWWWN
WSSWXTS NWWSWXT NXNTNXS WNTTSSX NWXWSSX NWXSNTS WNSNXXX WXWSWST WNSWXWN WXWSWNW
XNSTWNTS TWXSWXWS TWSWWWWN NNXSWXWT WSSTTNXT WNNWNSWW WNNNWXSW NWXWWXTX
WXWXWXTX WXWSXWXT WXWSNWSW NXSWWXWN WXWSWNWW WXWSNWNS
Table A2
Letter strings for grammar 2 sorted for different parts of the assessment.
Phase Strings
Learning phase LRHMMLM LRPHLLMM RHPHR RHPHMMLM LRHL LPMHLLMM LPPHLM RHPRLMMM LRHMRP RHPHMMRP LPPPLL
RPHHHLLM RHPHL LPPRLMMM LPR LRHRPMMM LPPRL LPMMRPMM RHPHRP LPMHHLLM LPMMRP RHMHLLMM LPLM
RPHHHHLL LRR LRRLMMM RHMHHL LPPRLMM RPLLMMM RHPHLMM
Testing phase (correct items) LRPHHHL RHMHHHL LRHMLMMM LPRP LPRPMM LPRPMMM LPLMMMM RHPHMMML LPMR LPMRPM RPHHHLL
LPPHMLM LPPHMMRP RPHL LRHLMM RHPHMML RHPHLMMM LPMLLMMM LPLMM LRHMML RPHLLMM LPMHHHLL
LPPHLMMM RHPHLM LPPHMML RHMLLMM RPLLMMMM LPPPHLLM LPMMML LPMLLMM RHMHLLM RHPHMLMM
LPRPMMMM LPLMMM RHPHMLM RHPRLMM LRPHHHLL RHPPHLLM
Testing phase (incorrect items) RPRL LLRPMM RHHPHHL RHMHHPL LRPHMHLL LPLR LPPMRP LPHMMR RHPRLMH LPMHHPLL HHMLL LPLRMM RPPLLMM
PPLLMMMM LRHMMHPM LPHHL LPMMHM LPPLRPM PHPHMMML LPPHLMHM LPPLL RPHHPL RPHHRLL MPPHMMRP
LPPPHLRM LPLMP LPMMMP LPPHPML LPHMMMRP RHMHHLLP HRHLMM MHPPHLL LPPHPRP LPPMMRPM LPMLLMMP
LLMHHL RMPPLLM LPPHMHM LPPLHHHL RHPPHLLL
Table A3
Correlations between the manifest variables.
APM1 APM2 BIS1 BIS2 Tailor1 Tailor2 HFA1 HFA2 AGL1 AGL2 AGL3 AGL4 Income Status Education
APM2 0.83***
BIS1 0.66*** 0.65***
BIS2 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.91***
Tailor1 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.25** 0.28***
Tailor2 0.33*** 0.25** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.48***
HFA1 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.32*** 0.41***
HFA2 0.60*** 0.59*** 0.52*** 0.56*** 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.79***
AGL1 0.24** 0.29*** 0.16* 0.27** 0.11 0.04 0.19* 0.13
AGL2 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.36***
AGL3 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.20* 0.16* 0.27** 0.27***
AGL4 0.12 0.16 0.16* 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.23** 0.32*** 0.29***
Income 0.23** 0.11 0.21** 0.22** 0.09 0.14 0.17* 0.21** 0.01 0.17* 0.13 −0.04
Status 0.31*** 0.23** 0.21** 0.29*** 0.14 0.12 0.24** 0.23** 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.29***
Education 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.11 0.05 0.18* 0.14 0.19* 0.16* 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.28*
Supervisor 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.20* 0.12 0.14 0.18* 0.00 −0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01 −0.07 −0.07
Note. *pb0.050, **pb0.010, ***pb0.001, APM1 = Advances Progressive Matrices at measurement occasion 1, APM2 = Advances Progressive Matrices at
measurement occasion 2, BIS1 = Berlin Intelligence Structure Test at measurement occasion 1, BIS2= Berlin Intelligence Structure Test at measurement occasion
2, Tailor1 = Tailorshop at measurement occasion 1, Tailor2= Tailorshop at measurement occasion 2, HFA1=Heidelberg Finite State Automaton at measurement
occasion 1, HFA2 = Heidelberg Finite State Automaton at measurement occasion 2, AGL1 = artiﬁcial grammar learning task with grammar 1 at measurement
occasion 1, AGL2 = artiﬁcial grammar learning task with grammar 2 at measurement occasion 1, AGL3 = artiﬁcial grammar learning task with grammar 1 at
measurement occasion 2, AGL4 = artiﬁcial grammar learning task with grammar 2 at measurement occasion 2, Income = participants' yearly income, Status =
participants' self rated social status, Education = participants' educational level, Supervisor = participants' supervisor ratings, N varied between N=173 and
N=151 due to dropouts between the ﬁrst and the second measurement occasion.
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